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EDITOR’S NOTE
Every year, the ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
publishes three Issues.  The Journal strives to publish on relevant topics in 
international law which are of great global importance.  Volume 24 Issue 1 
focuses on human rights in the areas of marriage, judicial corruption, self-
determination, juveniles, and access to healthcare.
This Issue begins with Professor Hijratullah Ekhtyar’s article, “Public 
Trials and Trial Broadcasting as Combating Tools for Judicial Corruption in 
Afghanistan.” Professor Ekhtyar discusses the vast amount of bribery and 
corruption occurring within Afghanistan’s judiciary and the ability to 
prevent or minimize it by having open trials both to the public and the 
media.  While such laws exist, Professor Ekhtyar proposes that the remedy 
to fight the judicial corruption is to further strengthen these laws regulating 
open trials.
The second piece is authored by a fellow student, Nicholas Meyer.  Meyer’s
note—“A Comparative Analysis of the Juvenile Death Penalty in the 
United States, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and China:  Will It Be Abolished?”—
discusses the continuous human right violations on juveniles.  Despite 
international laws, which outright bans the sentencing of death to juvenile 
offenders, Meyer’s note reveals that death sentences for juveniles are still 
occurring in some areas of the world. The note further analyzes the law and 
the ongoing battle to completely eradicate juvenile death sentences.
The next piece is an article authored by Rez Gardi, “From Suppression to 
Secession:  Kurds, Human Rights and the Right to Self-Determination in 
Turkey.”  In this piece, Ms. Gardi provides the history of the Kurds and 
highlights Turkey’s disregard and mistreatment of the Kurds.  While 
international law provides the right to self-determination, Turkey has 
consistently violated this right of the Kurds.  Ms. Gardi analyzes the 
applicable tests to determine if a group is entitled to self-determination and 
offers insight on what the Kurds should do to obtain their right to self-
determination.
War and terror continue to strike our world today leaving many refugees 
seeking a new home.  Student, Paula Castañeda Restrepo authored a 
comparative note entitled, “A Comparative Study of Migrants’ Access to 
Healthcare:  Similarities and Differences Between England, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, Canada, and the United States.” In this note, Ms. Castañeda 
Restrepo compares the access to healthcare for migrants in Europe and 
North America and social challenges that arise which can aid or inhibit 
migrants’ access to healthcare.
viii
 
Professor Yuichiro Tsuji delivers a powerful piece—“Decisions That 
Declared Laws Unconstitutional and Their Impact on Japanese Families”—
which shows the history and progression of marriage laws in Japan and the
impact the constitutional amendments have had.  In this piece, Professor 
Tsuji analyzes multiple cases of human right violations, the 
constitutionality of same-sex marriage, and the constitutionality of laws 
which discriminate against women, all of which have had major impacts on 
Japan’s family law system.
Finally, this Issue concludes with the winning memorial briefs from the 
2017 Philip C. Jessup International Moot Court Competition.  Each year, 
thousands of law students from around the world participate in regional 
qualifying competitions to potentially earn a spot in the International 
Rounds, held annually in Washington, D.C. 
As a proud Editor, I would like to announce on behalf of the Journal that
the ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law hosted its Inaugural 
Conference, “ILSA Journal Conference:  Current Issues in Immigration 
Policy.” The Journal hosted the Conference on immigration policy because 
of the effects it has globally, as well as the impact it has locally on our very 
own diverse community here in South Florida.
The Conference had an excellent turnout, consisting of both students and 
local attorneys in the community. The topics covered an array of areas such 
as Temporary Protected Status (TPS), Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals (DACA), Prosecutorial Discretion, Non-Physical Abuse Violence 
Against Women Act (VAWA), and Asylum.  I want to thank Arianna 
Zabala, Vanessa Terrades, and Stephanie Viel for all their work planning 
the Conference, Dean Jon Garon for his continuous support of ILSA 
Journal, Dean Shahabudeen Khan for helping us plan and moderating the 
Conference, and Ms. Kathy Perez for her assistance in making this possible.
On behalf of the Journal, I want to thank the authors for working with us 
and for providing us with great publishable work on current topics, the 
Junior and Senior Staff members for their hard work, the Editorial Board 
for being meticulous and hardworking, and Professor Donoho, our faculty 
advisor, for his continuous support and guidance.
Last, I want to thank the 2017–2018 Executive Board for all of their hard 
work and commitment to the ILSA Journal.  I am honored to work with a 
group of gifted women who support me the way you all do.  To my 
husband, Jack Esau, thank you for supporting me in everything I do and for 
always believing in me.  To my family and friends, thank you for your 
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continuous support and for always being understanding.  I am so grateful to 
have you all as my amazing support system and I love you all very much.
Lora Esau
Editor-in-Chief, 2017–2018
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Abstract
Although Afghanistan has a very effective judicial system in theory, in 
practice, a lack of accountability, oversight, and public involvement have 
enabled judicial corruption to continue. The Constitution of Afghanistan 
has a provision providing for public trials, but it does not have any 
provision clarifying that the broadcasting of court hearings is permitted. 
Moreover, the Penal Code of Afghanistan has expressly prohibited the 
broadcasting of court hearings without the permission of the court. The 
resulting lack of oversight and public awareness about trials has enabled 
and perpetuated corrupt practices like bribery, nepotism, misinterpretation 
of the law, and consequently, weakness of the rule of law. This paper 
suggests that by reinforcing and strengthening the law to force courts to 
conduct trials publicly (unless otherwise prohibited for the protection of the 
litigants), and to broadcast them in the media, Afghanistan could encourage 
judges not only to closely follow the law, but also to curb the culture of 
taking bribes and engaging in other corrupt practices that may otherwise go 
unnoticed.
“If you can buy a judge, you do not need to hire a lawyer”1
–Kenyan proverb.
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite various law reforms and efforts to promote good governance 
over the past decade, Afghanistan remains one of the most corrupt countries 
                                                
1. I heard this proverb from one of my classmates, Francis who is from Kenya and has 
experiences of working with Transparency International of Kenya.  Francis is graduating this year from 
Sustainable International Development Program of Law School, University of Washington.
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in the world.2 With this tragic story of corruption, one cannot point blame 
at any one institutiuon; it is widespread and deeply rooted in the political, 
military, judicial, and bureaucratic systems of the country. Although 
Afghanistan has a very effective judicial system in theory, in practice, a 
lack of accountability, oversight, and public involvement have enabled 
corruption to flourish in the Judiciary; and with the wide acceptance of 
corrupt practices like bribery, corrupt officials enjoy cultural impunity as 
well. In this article, the term “judicial corruption” means “behaviors
conduct[ed] by judges who try to influence adjudgement with their official 
authorities so as to obtain some personal interests.”3
Studies show that judges, prosecutors, and police are the most corrupt 
government officials in Afghanistan.4 About 55% of people, who dealt 
with courts in 2016, were asked for bribes.5 The general reasons for bribing 
Afghan officials are “no other way to obtain a service,” “to speed up the 
process,” or “to be sure [they] get what [they] need.”6 Judges and judicial 
officials are not exceptions in the case of bribing. In addition, nepotism, 
and influences of high-ranking officials and politicians are also ever present 
in the every-day conduct of the Judiciary.
This article posits that public trials and trial broadcasting offer two 
effective ways to increase transparency and reduce corrupt practices in the 
Judiciary, and Afghanistan would be well served by promoting and 
facilitating both. To this end, the first part of this article describes the state 
of judicial corruption in Afghanistan, discussing the results of surveys and 
studies by national and international institutions about judicial corruption 
there. Next, the article argues that open court proceedings, including 
promotion and facilitation of public trials and trial broadcasting, could help 
                                                
2. In 2016, Afghanistan ranks 169th among 176 countries in Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).  See Corruption Perception Index 2016:  Afghanistan,
TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perce
ptions_index_2016.  In the World Justice Project (WJP)’s Rule of Law Index, Afghanistan ranks 111th
among 113 countries.  See WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT RULE OF LAW INDEX 
2016: AFGHANISTAN 47 (2016), https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/RoLI_Final
-Digital_0.pdf [hereinafter WJP RULE OF LAW INDEX 2016]. The Integrity Watch of Afghanistan’s 2016 
survey report reveals that Afghans give $3 billion dollars in bribes annually.  See Afghans Pay Close to 
$3B in Bribe Annually, INTEGRITY WATCH AFG. (Dec. 26, 2016), https://iwaweb.org/integrity-watch-
afghans-pay-close-to-3b-in-bribes-annually-4/.
3. Yaxin Wang, “Judicial Corruption” Understanding - Several Theoretic Reflections Based 
on Empirical Investigations, 2 CIV. PROC. REV. 74, 76 (2011).
4. INTEGRITY WATCH AFG., NATIONAL CORRUPTION SURVEY 2016: AFGHAN PERCEPTIONS 
AND EXPERIENCES OF CORRUPTION x (2016), https://iwaweb.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/12/
Executive-NCS2016.pdf [hereinafter IWA 2016 SURVEY].
5. Id. at 33.
6. Id. at 36.
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Afghanistan fight judicial corruption and improve the justice system. Then,
the paper examines and presents the judicial practices in the United States
(U.S.) and Kenya, particularly with respect to the way they facilitate open 
courts. From there, the article discusses current international law and 
policy that supports and recommends open trials, describing and identifying 
international norms for facilitating open court proceedings. The article
concludes with practical recommendations for reforms related to promoting 
and facilitating open trials in the Afghan judiciary.
II. JUDICIAL CORRUPTION IS WEAKENING THE RULE OF LAW IN
AFGHANISTAN
A. Everyday Corruption
Afghanistan, with an illiteracy rate of over 60%,7 has been plagued by 
instability, war, poverty, backwardness, and corruption.8 Since 2007, it has 
consistently remained among the five most corrupt countries in the world 
(with the exception of 2016, when it was ranked 169 among 176 
countries).9 The World Justice Project (WJP),10 Rule of Law Index, ranked 
Afghanistan at 111th amongst 113 countries in 2016; and about the corrupt 
status, Afghanistan falls at the bottom of the list: 113 out of 113.11 
Corruption in Afghanistan is an increasing problem in people’s lives.
In a survey conducted by Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA), 55% of the
                                                
7. The World Factbook:  Literacy, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov
/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2103.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2017).
8. Larry Sage, Rule of Law Development in Afghanistan:  A Brief Report,  NEV. LAW., June 
2010 at 6, 10.
9. See Corruptions Perception Index, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, https://www.transparency.org/
research/cpi (last visited Dec. 13, 2017) (analyzing the reports from 2007–2016).
10. Measuring the Rule of Law, WORLD JUST. PROJECT, worldjusticeproject.org (last visited 
Oct. 15, 2017).  The WJP is an independent, multidisciplinary organization working to advance the rule 
of law around the world.  “It is the foundation for communities of peace, opportunity, and equity—
underpinning development, accountable government, and respect for fundamental rights.”  WJP RULE 
OF LAW INDEX 2016, supra note 2, at 4. The WJP measurements rule of law across the countries.  Its 
Rule of Law Index (RoLI) contains factors such as:
1) constraints on government powers;
2) absence of corruption;
3) open government;
4) fundamental rights;
5) order and security;
6) regulatory enforcement;
7) civil justice; and
8) criminal justice. Id.
11. WJP RULE OF LAW INDEX 2016, supra note 2, at 3.
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respondents were asked for bribes.12 In this survey, the overwhelming 
majority, approximately 80% of respondents considered corruption as a 
serious problem in their lives.13 Similarly, in a survey by the Asia 
Foundation in 2014, 62.4% of respondents considered corruption to be a
major problem.14 Further, in a 2010 survey by United Nations Office of 
Drugs and Crimes (UNODC), a Survey of the Victims of the Corruption,
identified the Judiciary as the most corrupt and bribe-demanding agency in 
Afghanistan.15 In fact, corruption in the justice sector (the police, the 
prosecution offices and the courts) accounted for 43% of corruption in 
Afghanistan, almost half of the total corruption in the country.16
B. Judicial Corruption
1. Definition of Judicial Corruption
In his influential book, “Corruption and Political Development, A Cost 
Benefit Analysis,” Joseph S. Nye, defines corrpution as an “abuse of office 
by a public official for personal gains,” and he explains that it includes any 
behavior that deviates from the normal duties of a public officer.17 These 
deviations may also be tied to family or close private cliques, and they may 
result in pecuniary or status gains, or they may violate rules as well.18 The 
judiciary, as a public office, is not immune to corruption of this kind.
Amélie Arvidsson and Emelie Folkesson define judicial corruption as
conduct that results in some kind of advantage for judges, judicial officials,
or others involved in the judiciary.19 This behavior typically leads to 
                                                
12. IWA 2016 SURVEY, supra note 4, at 33.
13. Id. at 25.
14. ZACH WARREN, ASIA FOUND., AFGHANISTAN IN 2014: A SURVEY OF THE AFGHAN 
PEOPLE 91 (Nancy Hopkins ed., 2014), https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/Afghanistan2014
final.pdf.
15. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, CORRUPTION IN AFGHANISTAN: BRIBERY 
AS REPORTED BY THE VICTIMS 25 (Ragnhild Johansen & Suzanne Kunnen, eds., 2010),
https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Afghanistan/Afghanistan-corruption-survey2010-
Eng.pdf.
16. Id.
17. POLITICAL CORRUPTION: CONCEPT & CONTEXTS 26 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer & Michael 
Johnson eds., 3d ed. 2002).
18. Id.
19. Amélie Arvidsson & Emelie Folkesson, Corruption in the Judiciary:  Balancing 
Accountability and Judicial Independence, ÖREBRO UNIV. DEP’T OF LAW, PSYCHOL. & SOC. WORK 1, 5 
(2010), https://www.academia.edu/5046438/Corruption_in_the_Judiciary_Balancing_Accountability_an
dJudicial Independence.
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extralegal or unfair court decisions.20 Arvidsson and Folkesson explain that
judicial corruption may include “payment or acceptance of bribes, 
extortion, embezzlement, threats, abuse of the procedural rules, or other 
improper pressures that can affect the independence and impartiality of the 
judicial outcome . . . .”21
Similarly, Yaxin Wang22 explains that judicial corruption involves 
bribes, intercessions of family, friends, or colleagues, and interventions 
from internal or external leaders, when affecting the judicial decisions in 
such manner as “swearing black is white” or more abusively, preventing the 
implementation of the law.23 Wang, focuses on the misinterpretation, or 
misapplying the law, under the influences of externalities.24 Transparency 
International,25 the United Nations (U.N.) Convention Against Corruption 
of 2003,26 and the WJP,27 independently enumerates what judicial 
corruption consists of.
2. Status of Judicial Corruption in Afghanistan
Judicial corruption prevents a government from establishing a firm 
rule of law,28 and in this way, it is at the heart of many of Afghanistan’s 
struggles with and attitudes about the rule of law. Many Afghans are 
skeptical about the level of corruption they see in the Judiciary—viewing 
                                                
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Wang, supra note 3, at 74.  Mr. Wang is a Professor of the School of Law at the Tsinghua 
University, Beijing, China.  Id.
23. Id. at 77.
24. Id.
25. Judiciary:  Problem, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/topic/detail/
judiciary (last visited Oct. 15, 2017).  Transparency International (TI) asserts that “judicial corruption” 
consists of, (i) bribes to fast-track backlog cases; (ii) payment to court personnel “to slow down or speed 
up a trial, or dismiss a complaint”; and (iii) involving judges in:  bribing, suffering pressure from above, 
and influencing by the politicians in decisions which can distort the appointment process.  Id.
26. G.A. Res. 58/4, at arts. 15–20 (Oct. 31, 2003).  The United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption of 2003 lists certain types of corruption such as bribery, embezzlement, trading in influence,
abuse of functions, and illicit enrichment.  See id.
27. Absence of Corruption (Factor 2), WORLD JUST. PROJECT, http://worldjusticeproject.org/
factors/absence-of-corruption (last visited Oct. 15, 2017).  In the WJP’s Rule of Law Index, judicial 
corruption includes:  “bribery, improper influence by public or private interests, and misappropriation of 
public funds or other resources [in the judicial system].”  Id. These forms of corruption could also be in 
executive, police, and military, or legislative branches of a state.  Id.
28. BEN WHEATLAND, U4 ANTI-CORRUPTION RES. CTR., AFGHANISTAN: CORRUPTION AS A 
DRIVER OF CONFLICT 6 (2015).
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Afghanistan’s courts as one of the country’s most corrupt institutions.29 In 
a 2016 survey by the WJP, only 7% of respondents maintained that there is
“[n]o corruption in the Judiciary”; the remaining 93% answered that there is
corruption in the Judiciary.30 In the survey of Criminal and Civil Justices of 
Judiciary: 23% of the respondents said that there is no corruption in the 
criminal justice system, while the remaining 77% affirmed that there is.31
Only 6% of the respondents said that there is “no corruption” in the civil 
justice system, while the remaining 94% of them said that there is 
corruption in civil justice.32
In Afghanistan, judicial corruption affects justice in a variety of ways,
especially when it comes to political influence by high-ranking bureaucrats 
or high-ranking judicial officials over judicial appointments and subsequent 
influence over judicial decision-making, undermining the independence of 
the judges.33 For example, in 2007, the record of the Supreme Court 
showed that among the 1415 judges in the Afghan judiciary, only 44% of 
them were graduates from the faculty of Sharia, and 11.6% of them were 
graduates of law schools; notably, more than one-third (36.6%) of them did 
not have a university degree, and 7.7% of them graduated from other 
                                                
29. In 2006, 74% of the respondents to the IWA’s survey, “Afghan Perception of Corruption”
perceived that corruption had increased in the last five years.  See Yama Torabi & Lorenzo Delesgues, 
Afghan Perceptions of Corruption:  A Survey Across Thirteen Provinces, INTEGRITY WATCH AFG. 2, 63 
(2007), https://iwaweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/04-afghan_perception_of_corruption_2006.pdf.
In 2010, the graph of this perception reduced, and about 50% of the respondents to the IWA’s national 
survey, “Afghan Perceptions and Experiences of Corruption,” labeled the judiciary and ministry of 
justice as the most corrupt institutions.  See INTEGRITY WATCH AFG., NATIONAL CORRUPTION SURVEY 
2010: AFGHAN PERCEPTIONS AND EXPERIENCES OF CORRUPTION 74 (2010),  https://iwaweb.org/wp
content/uploads/2016/12/Executive-NCS2016.pdf [hereinafter IWA 2010 SURVEY]. In 2013, the 
corruption perception graph increased and 60% of Afghans—perhaps those who attended in the 
survey—viewed the judiciary as a corrupt institution and 65% admitted to paying bribes to judges. See 
Report Shows Judiciary is Most Corrupt Institution in Afghanistan, TOLO NEWS (July 11, 2013), http://
www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/report-shows-judiciary-most-corrupt-institution-afghanistan.  
Interestingly, in 2016, once again the level of perception came down and around 55% of the people who 
dealt with the courts were asked for bribes.  IWA 2016 SURVEY, supra note 4, at 33.
30. WJP RULE OF LAW INDEX 2016, supra note 2, at 47.
31. Compare with id. (finding responses of “[n]o corruption” receiving only 7%, while 93% of 
respondents believed that corruption exist in the branch).
32. Id.
33. Marie Chêne, U4:  Expert Answer:  Tackling Judicial Corruption in Afghanistan, U4
ANTI-CORRUPTION RES. CTR. 1, 2, http://www.u4.no/publications/tackling-judicial-corruption-in-
afghanistan/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2017).
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faculties than Law and Sharia.34 In another finding of September 2007, 
about 80% of Afghan judges were found unqualified.35
In response to this finding, the Afghanistan Independent Human 
Rights Commission (AIHRC), began a project in 2011, to further examine 
the qualifications of judges and court staff in its observational report of the 
courts and judicial system—after a comprehensive assessment, the AIHRC
recommended further professional training for court staff, especially for 
judges.36 With continued concerns about judicial qualifications, in 2016 the 
government launched a Justice Sector Reform Plan in which new 
qualification requirements were set forth for prosecutors and judges, 
including refresher exams.37
In addition, the historically acceptable practices of bribe and nepotism 
continue in Afghanistan.38 These forms of judicial corruption also affect 
court proceedings, from requiring bribery fees to award “judicial access”
and to speed up the process; judges and judicial officials are also extracting 
money from defendants for satisfactory decisions.39 Corrupt practices in 
the Judiciary also perpetuate the strength of the parallel, an informal
Judiciary ran by the Taliban.40 People who do not trust the formal Judiciary
or who cannot afford bribes have been known to go to the Taliban’s 
informal court “to resolve their legal cases swiftly and with a lack of red 
tape.”41
Public attitudes about judicial corruption are reinforced by personal 
experience in the courts. In interviews with Afghan litigants in 2013, 
Antonio De Lauri42 found that many in Kabul had lost their cases because 
                                                
34. Levingston Armytage, Justice in Afghanistan:  Rebuilding Judicial Competence After the 
Generation of War, 67 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 185, 190 (2007).
35. Chêne, supra note 33, at 3.
36. Judiciary:  An Overview to the Report of Overseeing the Status and Functioning of Courts 
and Judicial System in Afghanistan, AFG. INDEP. HUM. RIGHTS COMM’N (Sept. 14, 2011), 
http://www.aihrc.org.af/home/article/939.
37. TRANSPARENCY INT’L, FROM PROMISES TO ACTION: NAVIGATING AFGHANISTAN’S
ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMITMENTS 3, 8 (Sept. 2016), https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/
publication/from_promises_to_action_navigating_afghanistans_anti_corruption_commitments.
38. IWA 2016 SURVEY, supra note 4, at 33, 38.
39. Parag R. Dharmavarapu, Corruption and Graft in Post-Conflict Afghanistan, 7 INQUIRIES 
J. 1, 3 (2015), http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1057/corruption-and-graft-in-post-conflict-
afghanistan.
40. Hasib Danish Alikozai, Corruption Encourages Parallel Judiciary in Afghanistan:  
Asia, VOA (Jan. 12, 2016, 6:39 PM), http://www.voanews.com/a/corruption-encourages-parallel-
judiciary-afghanistan/3142316.html.
41. Id.
42. Antonio DeLauri, ACADEMIA.EDU, http://cmi-norway.academia.edu/AntonioDeLauri (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2017).  “Antonio De Lauri (PhD) is Senior Researcher at the Chr. Michelsen Institute . . 
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the opposing party had bribed the judge.43 IWA conducted a survey in 
2016 in which 55% of respondents stated that the court had asked them for 
bribes.44 In this same survey, Afghans reportedly gave around 
AFN2,323,608 ($37,210) in bribes to courts, and AFN1,818,000 ($30,300) 
in bribes to prosecutors.45 In fact, 58% of Afghans believed in 2016 that 
“there [was] no other way” to receive judicial services than to bribe court 
officials.46
Ironically, despite their perpetuations of corrupt practices, courts are 
charged with overseeing corruption cases for other agencies of government. 
In this way, they are directly responsible for ensuring that corruption is 
addressed through the courts. They set the tone for whether and how 
Afghanistan can heal the wounds of corruption—deciding what is corrupt 
and not corrupt.47
III. PUBLIC TRIALS AND TRIAL BROADCASTING AS A WAY TO FIGHT 
CORRUPTION IN THE JUDICIARY
One of the main arguments that this paper makes is that the promotion 
and support of public trials and trial broadcasting could help curb and 
prevent corruption in the Judiciary in Afghanistan. This section provides 
some background on what these mechanisms are and the rationales for 
them.
A. Meanings and Purposes
When this paper refers to a “public trial” it means “an open court 
where people can witness . . . proceedings as long as they show reasonable 
behaviour.”48 Openness of the justice is a common law policy that 
“proceedings ought to be open to the public, including the contents of court 
files and public viewing of trials.”49 The Lord Chief Justice of England and 
                                                
. .  Since 2005 he has been carrying out fieldwork in Afghanistan and lately in Pakistan, with a focus on 
legal reconstruction, judicial practice, human rights, war, humanitarian interventionism, forms of 
dependence and freedom.”  Id.
43. Dharmavarapu, supra note 39.
44. IWA 2016 SURVEY, supra note 4, at 33.
45. Id. at 35.
46. Id. at 36.
47. See generally Dharmavarapu, supra note 39.
48. What is PUBLIC TRIAL?, L. DICTIONARY (2d ed.), http://thelawdictionary.org/public-
trial/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2017).
49. Open Justice Definition, DUHAIME’S L. DICTIONARY, http://www.duhaime.org/Legal
Dictionary/O/OpenJustice.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 2017).
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Wales, Harry Kenneth Woolf, explained that trial should be private only if
it is necessary for the protection of:
1) national security;
2) confidentiality of information of the parties (including
information about personal financial matters);
3) interests of children or any protected party; or
4) interests of judiciary.50
The purpose of public trials is “the protection of innocence and the 
pursuit of truth.”51 It not only keeps the judges and lawyers honest and 
competent, but it also assures that society can rely on decent operations of
the judiciary.52 A public trial is critically important for monitoring the
legitimacy of convictions and public trials promote other checks on the 
judiciary, such as observance of procedural rules in the courts of appeal.53
By enabling citizen oversight, public trials discourage the misinterpretation 
of the laws against defendants and reduce the likeliness of corruption in the 
judicial system.
The openness of justice also involves the reporting or broadcasting of 
court proceedings, because the media operates as a representative for the 
public to ensure that trials in the courts are in fact open and accessible by 
the people.54 The term “trial broadcasting,” as used in this paper, refers to 
television and photographic coverage of the courtroom proceeding,55 as
well as other forms of media such as radio, newspaper, magazines, and 
even online media such as Twitter.56 Trial broadcasting increases the 
possibility that people can access public trials, even when they cannot be 
physically present in the courts. By allowing media cameras and media 
representatives into the courtroom to record and/or broadcast trials and 
                                                
50. Id.
51. Kristin Saetveit, Close Calls:  Defining Courtroom Closures Under the Sixth Amendment,
68 STANFORD L. REV. 897, 899 (2016).
52. Id. at 902.
53. Zach Cronen, Criminal Law:  Behind Closed Doors:  Expanding the Triviality Doctrine to 
International Closures—State v. Brown, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 252, 254 (2013).
54. Cristina Carmody Tilley, I Am A Camera:  Scrutinizing the Assumption That Cameras in 
the Courtroom Furnish Public Value by Operating as A Proxy for the Public, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
697, 697 (2014).
55. Adriana C. Cervantes, Will Twitter Be Following You in the Courtroom?:  Why Reporters 
Should be Allowed to Broadcast During Courtroom Proceedings, 33 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 133,
137 (2010).
56. Id. at 135, 137.
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make those proceedings available to the public, “the achievement of the aim 
of . . . a fair trial” is guaranteed in any democratic society.57
Notably, for trial broadcasting like this to happen, the Judiciary must 
also trust the way the media reacts to and reports on crimes and other 
problems that exist in society.58 This article will address the issue of public 
trust more fully in later sections.
B. Rationale for Public Trials and Trial Broadcasting as Tools to 
Combat Corruption in Afghanistan
Greater transparency enhances public trust in the courts.59 This 
influence undermines the independence of the judiciary60 in interpretation 
and application of the laws. If the courts conduct proceedings openly, the 
chance for influence from the politicians and high-ranking judicial officials 
would undoubtedly be reduced.
Proponents of trial broadcasting point to various important benefits to 
society:
1) assuring the public’s right to know and access to information;
2) increasing public confidence in the fairness of the Judiciary;
3) observing and checking on any unfairness in the Judiciary; 
4) discouraging false testimony; 
5) encouraging attorneys and judges to be well-prepared for 
trial;61 and
6) having trial records for the future, records that can be used on 
appeal or by future litigants, if needed.
Televising trials has other benefits too: namely, educating the public 
with information about court procedures and the legal system, in general.
Enabling people to see how the courts decide cases and apply the law to
                                                
57. Joshua D. Rosenzweig, Public Access and the Right to a Fair Trial in China, DUI HUA 
FOUND., http://duihua.org/wp/?page_id=2542#3fn (last visited Oct. 15, 2017) (internal citations
omitted).
58. Wendy Pogorzelski & Thomas W. Brewer, Cameras in Court:  How Television News 
Media Use Courtroom Footage, 91 JUDICATURE 124, 125 (2007).
59. Cervantes, supra note 55.
60. See TRANSPARENCY INT’L, COMBATING CORRUPTION IN JUDICIAL SYSTEMS: ADVOCACY 
TOOLKIT 3, 33–34 (2007), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/Judiciary
_Advocacy_ToolKit.pdf [hereinafter TI Advocacy Toolkit].
61. See Roger K. Warren, Public Trust and Procedural Justice, CT. REV. 12, 12 (2000), 
http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/courtrv/cr37/cr37-3/CR37-3Warren.pdf.
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resolve disputes and hold criminals accountable has the potential to 
improve public perception of courts and the government.62
Many international and domestic laws support policies of public trial 
and trial broadcasting for similar reasons. For example, Transparency 
International (TI) posits arguments in favor of these mechanisms stating 
that they:
1) enhance judicial transparency;
2) promote fairness in judicial appointments;
3) promote decent judicial terms and conditions; and
4) increase judicial accountability and discipline.63
In fact, enhancing judicial transparency is one of TI’s most important 
missions.64 This transparency includes access to information and 
transparency practices related to the internal operations and administrative 
aspects of the judiciary, including jurisdictional functions of the judiciary.65
While these could have impact on the appointment of judges and judicial 
officials, public trials and trial broadcastings are much more influential on 
access to information and transparency practices related to the jurisdictional 
functions of the judiciary.
To curb the roots of irregularities in the court proceedings, enhancing 
the public trial and trial broadcasting (access to information) are among the 
recommended reforms by various institutions and researchers.66 Because in 
public trial when the media is also present, the judges are more likely to 
carefully follow the rules protecting due process and describe reasons for 
their decisions, decreasing the likelihood that judges would be susceptible 
to taking bribes.
The public’s right to “access to information” not only includes
coverage of proceedings by the media, but it also includes: access to the 
laws, procedural regulations, code of conducts, ethics inside the courtroom 
or during proceedings, information about judge appointment criteria, 
judicial decisions and holdings, and reasons for those decisions and
                                                
62. Angelique M. Paul, Turning the Camera on Court TV:  Does Televising Trials Teach Us 
Anything About the Real Law?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 655, 655 (1997).
63. TI Advocacy Toolkit, supra note 60, at 37–43.
64. Mission, Vision and Values, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, https://www.transparency.org/
whoweare/organisation/mission_vision_and_values/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2017).
65. See Álvaro Herrero & Gaspar López, Access to Information and Transparency in the 
Judiciary:  A Guide to Good Practices from Latin America 13 (World Bank Inst.:  Governance Working 
Paper Series, Paper No. 80757, 2010), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/WBI/Resources/213798-
1259011531325/6598384-1268250334206/Transparency_Judiciary.pdf.
66. Id. at 35.
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holdings.67 In a democratic country, the judicial officials cannot be sided 
from the political and social contexts of the country. The judicial officials 
should effectively arrange for the public to have access to information 
related to their administrative operations and its jurisdictional work “under 
the right to freely access to public information.”68
Despite all of these benefits, and while Afghanistan has open trials in 
theory, most of the trials in most of the courts are held out of the public 
eye.69 Antonio De Lauri, explains that in the Afghan legal system today, 
“[a] corrupt official accepts money not to do his job or to do it wrongly, a 
good official accepts money to do what he is supposed to do anyway, but to 
do it for you and do it now.”70 Furthermore, it is more common in 
Afghanistan that court proceedings “prevent the media and civil society 
from monitoring court activity and exposing judicial corruption.”71 Trial 
broadcasting is practically non-existent in all courts and provinces.72
IV. INCREASING ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE JUDICIARY: LEARNING FROM 
THE EXPERIENCES OF OTHER NATIONS
A. Accountability in the United States Courts, Public Trials and Trial 
Broadcasting
As a leader among established democratic nations, the United States 
can provide a strong example to Afghanistan for how to develop a strategy 
for designing policies and procedures that would both encourage and 
facilitate public trial and trial broadcasting. The United States is also a 
logical place to start because of the relationship Afghanistan has with 
                                                
67. Id. at 7, 19, 40.
68. Id.
69. In an informal inquiry, conducted by the members of civil society organizations in 
Nangarhar and Kandahar provinces, the respondent, defense lawyers revealed that because of various 
reasons, such is insecurity, lack of public interest, and imposing of restrictions over judges from the 
Supreme Court, most of the trials in those provinces hold with attending of only the litigants, and few 
clerks of the court.  Some respondents even said that some judges invite the defense attorneys and 
prosecutors with litigants to decide in their offices.  More and specific description about this will come 
later.
70. Antonio De Lauri, Corruption, Legal Modernisation and Judicial Practice in Afghanistan,
37 ASIAN STUD. REV. 527, 530 (2013).
71. See Judicial Corruption Fuels Impunity, Corrodes Rule of Law, Says New Transparency 
International Report, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (May 23, 2007), https://www.transparency.org/news/press
release/20070523_judicial_corruption_fuels_impunity_corrodes_rule_of_law_says_repor.
72. In Nangarhar and Kandahar provinces, the judges and defense attorneys said in an 
informal inquiry that the court allows media in some serious cases but this is very rare, with each court 
deciding five to seven cases in a week.  More description will come later.
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United States advisors and funding agencies, persons and entities that have 
formed strong relationships with members of the judicial system over the 
past sixteen years, and a strong role in supporting anti-corruption efforts in 
Afghanistan—especially through programs like the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID).
1. Doctrinal Foundations for Public Trials and Trial Broadcasting 
in the United States
In the United States, the right to a public trial and trial broadcasting 
stem from the constitutional guarantees afforded by the First and Sixth 
Amendments: the First Amendment protects the right of freedom of 
speech,73 and the Sixth Amendment protects the right of fair and public 
trial74 of individuals. The concepts of open or public trial and trial 
broadcasting are closely related to these rights75 that they require balancing 
of the two Amendments.
Trial broadcasting was first recognized as constitutional by the United 
States Supreme Court in 1981 in Chandler v. Florida, in which the Court
held that “consistent with constitutional guarantees, a state could provide 
for radio, television and still photographic coverage of a criminal trial for 
public broadcast, notwithstanding the objection of the defendants.”76 With 
Chandler, the Supreme Court reversed its previous decision in Estes v. 
Texas, which had prohibited cameras from the court proceedings.77 Unlike 
                                                
73. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The First Amendment of the United States Constitution reads, 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”  Id.
74. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution reads, 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defense.  Id.
75. Jeanine Blackett Lutzenhiser, An Open Courts Checklist: Clarifying Washington’s Public 
Trial and Public Access Jurisprudence, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2012).
76. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
77. Id. at 586 (J. Stewart, concurring).
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in Estes, in Chandler, no one had presented empirical data that the 
broadcast of the court hearing had an adverse effect on the process.78
In Chandler, the Court reasoned that, “[a]n absolute constitutional ban 
on broadcast coverage of trials cannot be justified . . . that, in some cases, 
conduct of the broadcasting process . . . may impair the ability of jurors to 
decide the issue of guilt or innocence uninfluenced by extraneous matter.”79
The Court further explained that “Estes . . . did not announce a 
constitutional rule that all photographic [or broadcast coverage] of criminal 
trials is inherently a denial of due process.”80 Ultimately in Chandler, the
Court held that the Constitution does not prohibit a state from broadcasting 
trials, and that doing so does not inherently violate due process.81 As such, 
trial broadcasting remains a viable avenue for expressing the right to a fair 
and open trial.
Some do argue that trial broadcasting violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment right to due process.82 Opponents of the trial broadcasting 
point to the psychological impact of the camera in the courtroom—on
everyone from judges, lawyers, witnesses and juries.83 In Estes, Chief 
Justice Warren wrote that, “the evil of televised trials . . . lies not in the 
noise and appearance of the cameras, but in the trial participants’ awareness 
that they are being televised. To the extent that television has such an 
inevitable impact[,] it undercuts the reliability of the trial process.”84 At the 
same time, it also could be said that the presence of cameras in the 
courtrooms ensures the due process right because it encourages judges and 
jurors to follow and interpret the law properly because their actions will be 
scrutinized by the public. In this way, it increases the accountability and 
transparency in the decision-making process, thereby protecting due 
process.
2. A History of Controversy in the United States
Historically, media coverage of criminal proceedings has been a hot 
issue among lawyers and courts in the United States. In 1946, the media 
coverage of the criminal proceedings in federal courts was prohibited under 
                                                
78. Id. at 561.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 560.
81. Chandler, 449 U.S. at 583; Tilley, supra note 54, at 722–23.
82. Ralph E. Roberts, Jr., An Empirical and Normative Analysis of the Impact of Televised 
Courtroom Proceedings, 51 SMU L. REV. 621, 623 (1998).
83. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 599 (1965).
84. Id. at 570.
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the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 53.85 This law explicitly stated 
that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by a statute or these rules, the court 
must not permit the taking of photographs in the courtroom during judicial 
proceedings or the broadcasting of judicial proceedings from the
courtroom.”86
In 1972, in the Judicial Conference of the United States, the 
prohibition of media coverage was once again adopted more explicitly, and 
it expanded to the civil cases too.87 These prohibitions included 
“broadcasting, televising, recording, or taking photographs in the courtroom 
and areas immediately adjacent thereto.”88 These prohibitions also stated in 
the Code of Conduct for the United States Judges.89 Following that, in 
1988 the Supreme Court assigned an Ad Hoc Committee to observe the 
need of Cameras in the Courtrooms, and in its September 1990 session, the 
Conference adopted the Committee’s report which recommended a pilot 
program allowing media coverage of civil proceedings.90
Following its 1994 refusal of the proposed amendment to the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 53: Courtroom Photographing and 
Broadcasting Prohibited, about media coverage, the Conference, adopted 
rules and guidelines for media coverage in all courts in 1996, and once 
again in 2017.91 The current media coverage rule about court proceedings 
allows a judge to authorize “broadcasting, televising, recording, or taking 
photographs in the courtroom and in adjacent areas during investit[ure],
naturalization, or other ceremonial proceedings.”92 Moreover, 
                                                
85. History of Cameras in Courts, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federalcourts
/cameras-courts/history-cameras-courts (last visited Oct. 15, 2017).
86. FED. R. CIV. P. 53.
87. See generally History of Cameras in Courts, supra note 85.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. History of Cameras in Courts, supra note 85.
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[a] judge may authorize such activities . . . during other 
proceedings, or recesses between such other proceedings, only:
1) for the presentation of evidence; 2) for the perpetuation of the 
record of the proceedings; 3) for security purposes; 4) for other 
purposes of judicial administration; 5) for the photographing, 
recording, or broadcasting of appellate arguments; or 6) in 
accordance with pilot programs approved by the Judicial 
Conference. When broadcasting, televising, recording, or 
photographing in the courtroom or adjacent areas is permitted, a 
judge should ensure that it is done in a manner that will: 1) be 
consistent with the rights of the parties; 2) not unduly distract 
participants in the proceeding; and 3) not otherwise interfere with 
the administration of justice.93
Currently, it is permitted to televise courtrooms’ proceedings with the 
authorization of judges at both the federal and state levels. Per the 
Sunshine in the Courtroom Act of 2017, every presiding judge of appellate
or trial court of the United States has the discretion to “permit the 
photographing, electronic recording, broadcasting, or televising to the 
public of any court proceeding over which that judge presides.”94 The 
presiding judges, or the panel of judges in both courts takes in to account 
the due process rights of the parties while permitting media coverage of the 
proceeding.95
Notably, at the trial court level, a witness can request to “disguise” or 
“obscure” his or her voice and/or face; it is the obligation of the presiding 
judge to inform the witness of this right.96 Furthermore, the presiding judge 
also can obscure the face and voice of an individual, if there is good cause 
that shows the media coverage threats:
1) the safety of the individual; 
2) the security of the court; 
3) the integrity of future or ongoing law enforcement operations;
or
4) the interest of justice97
                                                
93. Id.
94. Sunshine in Courtroom Act, S. 643, 115th Cong. § 2 (b)(1)(2) (2017).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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B. Public Trials and Trial Broadcasting in Kenya
As a developing country that has had some success in implementing 
laws that support public trials and trial broadcasting, Kenya provides a
useful example for Afghanistan to learn from and develop such
mechanisms. Like Afghanistan, Kenya also had a fundamental change to
government in 2002, when a new government came to power.98 Judicial
reform was one of the promises by the new government. After a deep 
incisive investigation about the judiciary, among the key issues that needed 
reform were the issues of 1) performance management; 2) corruption, ethics 
and integrity; and 3) access to information and communication in the 
judiciary.99 Reforms to the judiciary began in earnest after the new 
government came to power in 2007.100
Furthermore, the new 2010 constitution created a new momentum for 
judicial reforms. Among the main transformational reforms were:
a) transformation of the “[j]udiciary to be an independent but 
complementary partner with the other branches of government
. . . ;
b) [t]ransforming Court procedures, processes, organizational 
culture, and management to re-orientate them towards a 
culture of responsive, friendly, and effective service delivery .
. . ; [and]
c) [r]eordering the [j]udiciary’s [staff] and judicial [procedures]”
to improve delivery of services; “improv[ing] the speed of 
justice; and improv[ing] access to justice . . . .”101
The wave of judicial reforms also led to a new eagerness for openness 
and transparency among judicial officials. The Kenyan judiciary developed 
a “case-tracking system that facilitated nationwide monitoring of delays and 
                                                
98. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, KENYA’S UNFINISHED DEMOCRACY: A HUMAN 
RIGHTS AGENDA FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT 10 (2002), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/kenya2/
kenya1202.pdf.
99. REPUBLIC OF KENYA, FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL REFORMS 65, 73, 
97 (2010), http://www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads/Final%20Report%20of%20the%20Task%20Force%20
on%20Judicial%20Reforms.pdf.
100. See id. at 4–5.
101. REPUBLIC OF KENYA: JUDICIARY, JUDICIARY TRANSFORMATION FRAMEWORK, 2012–
2016 11 (2012), http://www.judiciary.go.ke/portal/assets/downloads/reports/Judiciary's%20
Tranformation%20Framework-fv.pdf.
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workloads . . . [and] opened lines of communication for citizens to register 
complaints, suggest changes, and receive responses.”102
1. Kenyan Law on Public Trials and Broadcasting of Courtroom 
Proceedings
Chapter 4, Article 50 of the Kenya Constitution provides for the right 
of a fair hearing.103 The law states that this right includes a right to be 
heard by any court or tribunal and the hearing must be fair and public.104
This provision is dealing with fair prosecuting of an accused person that 
contains creating such mechanisms to ensure that the proceeding of the 
court is fair to all persons.105 Further the right to a fair trial is included as 
among the inalienable rights under the Constitution, and constitutionally it
is among the fundamental rights that cannot be limited.106
In practice, all Kenyan courts are, therefore, open to the public and the 
media; and this openness has led to greater levels of transparency in how 
courts operate and how disputes are adjudicated.107 For recording the 
proceeding and storing the cases, the courts are facilitated with digital
instruments to provide cases for the public “at a click of a button.”108 It has 
also helped to restore and boost the confidence that ordinary members of 
the public have in the Judiciary.109 The lack of confidence in the judiciary 
was a major contributor to the violence that rocked the country in 2007 and 
2008.110 The judiciary also organizes open days where judges and 
magistrates get opportunities to interact with the public outside the confines 
                                                
102. Transforming the Courts:  Judicial Sector Reforms in Kenya, 2011-2015, INNOVATIONS 
FOR SUCCESSFUL SOCIETIES: PRINCETON UNIV., 1 (2015), https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/
sites/successfulsocieties/files/MG_OGP_Kenya.pdf [hereinafter Transforming the Courts].
103. CONSTITUTION art. 50(1)–(2) (2010) (Kenya).
104. Id.
105. Waikwa Wanyoike, Kenya: Access to Justice and the Constitution - Part 1, ALLAFRICA
(Mar. 14, 2015), http://allafrica.com/stories/201503150184.html.
106. CONSTITUTION art. 25 (2010) (Kenya).
107. See Judiciary Scorecard, INSIDE JUDICIARY, Mar. 2014, at 1, http://www.judiciary.
go.ke/portal/assets/files/NEWSLETTERS/EMAG%20E04%20March%202014.pdf.
108. Id. at 5.
109. See Jay Loschky, Less Than Half in Africa Confident in Their Judicial Systems, GALLUP 
NEWS (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/174509/less-half-africa-confident-judicialsystems.
aspx.
110. See KENYA NAT’L COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF 
INQUIRY INTO THE POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE (CIPEV) vii (2008), http://www.knchr.org/
Portals/0/Reports/Waki_Report.pdf.
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of a courtroom; This is meant to help demystify the institution and to give it 
a human face.111
A Kenyan judicial officer can, however, exclude members of the 
public and press in certain circumstances.112 This case-by-case 
determination is made based on the peculiarity of a certain case or the 
sensitivity of witnesses or evidence to be tabled.113 Among the main cases 
that are often heard in-camera include cases involving sexual offences to 
minors especially during the time that a minor is testifying.114
Media access to Kenyan courts is highly liberalized.115 The only 
requirement is for the individual journalists to be duly accredited by their 
employer.116 The administrative wing of courts also provides authorization 
to the media representatives that are assigned to the different courts.117 This 
allows them to bring in equipment, to sit in court and listen to proceedings 
and to also relay the proceedings to their media stations uninhibited by any 
restriction.118 Authorized media representatives are also allowed to take 
photographs and record video and audio of the proceedings.119 In the recent 
past, during the hearing of cases of national importance, the courts allowed
for proceedings to be relayed live to local television and radio stations.120
This has played a great role in demystifying the administration of justice in 
the country.121
                                                
111. Open Day at Githongo Law Courts, JUDICIARY (Mar. 2, 2017), http://www.judiciary
.go.ke/portal/blog/post/open-day-at-githongo-law-courts.
112. See Children Act (2001) Cap. 6 § 76(5) (Kenya) (discussing publication prohibitions, with 
regard to proceedings in Children’s Court, whether it be by publication, report, law report or otherwise).
113. Interview with Francis Kairu, Lawyer, in Seattle, Washington (June 2017) [hereinafter 
Interview with Francis Kairu]. Francis has experience working with Transparency International of 
Kenya; he graduated from Sustainable International Development Program of Law School, University 
of Washington in June 2017.  Id.
114. Id.; see generally Children Act (2001) Cap. 6 (Kenya).
115. Interview with Francis Kairu, supra note 113.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. The Presidential Election Petition:  The Mwananchi Friendly Version, KENYA L. (Apr. 
25, 2013), http://kenyalaw.org/kenyalawblog/the-presidential-election-petition-the-mwananchi-friendly-
version-2/.
121. Interview with Francis Kairu, supra note 113.
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2. Challenges and Successes
In 2011, Justice Willie Mutunga, was appointed as Chief Justice;
holding such position places the holder as the president of the Supreme 
Court and the leader of the entire Judiciary, the third arm of government in 
Kenya.122 He and his team initiated the Judiciary Transformation 
Framework and the 2011 Judicial Service Act, through which he applied 
critical reforms in the Judiciary.123 One of significant reforms of Justice 
Mutunga was engaging civil society and the public in courts affairs.124 The 
Judiciary has partnered with other stakeholders such as the civil society and 
the bar association to form court users’ committees.125 The committees 
bring together judicial staff and selected stakeholders to discuss ways of 
improving the administration of justice, and in the meantime, the 
committees are established for each county.126 Court users’ committees 
have been crucial in establishing a culture of accountability and 
transparency among judicial officers.127 Within the court users’ 
committees, any challenges with access to court, handling of cases, 
management of court files and other administrative issues can be discussed 
and solutions proposed in a constructive manner underpinned by a form of 
peer review and feedback.128
Other reforms also included access to and expeditious delivery of 
justice; people-centeredness and public engagement; and stakeholder 
engagement in the Judiciary.129 The Judiciary has established an Office of 
the Judicial Ombudsperson (Judiciary Ombudsperson).130 “The Judiciary 
Ombudsperson is mandated to enforce administrative justice in the 
Judiciary by addressing mal-administration through effective complaint 
                                                
122. CONSTITUTION art. 163(1)(a) (2010) (Kenya); Transforming the Courts, supra note 102.
123. THE JUDICIARY, STATE OF THE JUDICIARY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
ANNUAL REPORT, 2014–2015 3–4 (2014–2015) [hereinafter Annual Report].
124. Id. at 19.
125. Interview with Francis Kairu, supra note 113; CJ Launches Milimani Criminal Division 
Court Users Committee, JUDICIARY (Mar. 22, 2016), http://www.judiciary.go.ke/portal/blog/post/cj-
launches-milimani-criminal-division-court-users-committee [hereinafter CJ Launches].
126. CJ Launches, supra note 125.
127. KNCHR, HUMAN RIGHTS BASELINE SURVEY REPORT 53 (2016), 
http://www.knchr.org/Portals/0/GeneralReports/KNCHR_Human-Rights-Baseline-Survey-Report_2016
_FX-Print.pdf?ver=2016-0823-121839-380.
128. Interview with Francis Kairu, supra note 113.
129. JUDICIARY TRANSFORMATION FRAMEWORK, 2012–2016, supra note 101, at 13–15.
130. Office of the Ombudsperson:  About Us, JUDICIARY, http://www.judiciary.go.ke/portal/
page/office-of-the-ombudsperson (last visited Dec. 10, 2017).
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handling structures. The office investigates any allegations of misconduct
by judicial officers [or] staff.”131
Although levels of corruption within the Judiciary still have remained 
high, open bribery and malfeasance among judicial officers and staff has 
been eradicated almost completely.132 TI ranks the Judiciary third in 
likelihood encountering of bribery as among the top ten most corrupt 
sectors in the country.133 Anticorruption experts, however, have concluded 
that in the sequencing of anticorruption reforms, curbing open blatant 
bribery and malfeasance is the first step towards addressing corruption and 
highlighting it as an evil deed.134
Indicator/Year        2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Average size 
of bribe (Ksh)
11,046       9230        5063        8390       7885
Average size 
of bribe (USD)
        108         90         49          82         77
Figure 1: Average size of bribe—Kenya Judiciary 1 USD = 
102.5 Ksh.  Source: East African bribery index trends analysis. 
Transparency International Kenya, www.tikenya.org.
C. Promoting and Facilitating Public Trials and Trial Broadcasting in 
the Afghan Context
1. Legal Grounds for Public Trial and Trial Broadcasting in 
Afghanistan
a. Afghanistan Constitution
The current 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan clearly states that trials
in Afghanistan’s court “shall be held openly,” and it is the constitutional 
right of Afghan citizens to attend in the public trials. Article 128 of the 
Constitution states the following:
                                                
131. Id.
132. See Annual Report, supra note 123, at 16–17.
133. TRANSPARENCY INT’L, THE EAST AFRICAN BRIBERY INDEX 2017 16 (2017), http://www.ti
kenya.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/East-African-Bribery-Index-EABI-2017-1-1.pdf.
134. See George R.G. Clarke, How Petty is Petty Corruption? Evidence from Firm Surveys in 
Africa, (Munich Pers. RePEc Archive, Paper No. 15073, 2008), https://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/15073/1/petty_corruption_Aug08_WPS.pdf.
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In the courts in Afghanistan, trials shall be held openly and every 
individual shall have the right to attend in accordance with the 
law. In situations clarified by law, the court shall hold secret 
trials when it considers necessary, but pronouncement of its 
decision shall be open in all cases.135
This provision of the Afghan Constitution is designed after the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and other international 
principles and norms about the Justice and Rule of Law.
However, secret trials are not necessarily prohibited by the 
Constitution. From the first clause of the Article 128, it seems that the 
publicity of trials is the principle, and it is not only for the criminal cases,
but the terms (in the courts in Afghanistan) and (trials) mean that criminal, 
civil, and commercial trials should be public. Moreover, the clause also 
places the condition (in accordance with the law) that means attendees must 
obey the rules, and code of conduct of the court and must not violate
them.136
The Afghan Constitution does not say anything about trial 
broadcasting or recording the court proceeding. However, like the United 
States, it has foundational provisions for “right of freedom of speech”137
and “right of access to information.”138 Based on Article 50, the right of 
access to information is limited by the “violation of others’ rights,” and 
“national security.”139 Some judges in Afghanistan’s courts justifies the 
prevention of the trial broadcasting and recording of a court proceeding as a 
violation of rights of the defendants,140 but this author has not seen any 
interpretation of the provisions mentioned above for trial broadcasting.
b. The Afghanistan Statutes
The New Criminal Procedure Code (NCPC) of Afghanistan was
adopted in 2014.141 NCPC comports with the Constitution regarding public 
trials for criminal cases. For example, Article 213 of the NCPC guarantees 
the right to public trials, in general, but it identifies exceptions for 1) moral 
                                                
135. CONSTITUTION OF ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN ch.7, art. 128.
136. CRIM. PROC. CODE, ch. 8, art. 225 (Jan. 26, 2014) (Afg.) (explaining that if someone 
disturbs the courtroom’s order the judge can exclude him or her or impose a fine up to 5,000 AFN).
137. CONST. AFG. ch. 2, art. 34.
138. Id. art. 50.
139. Id.
140. Anatullahullah Hafiz, Do Not Read Journalists!, ROHI.AF (May 25, 2013), http://rohi.af/
fullstory.php?id=26447.
141. CRIM. PROC. CODE (Afg.).
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issues, 2) family issues, and 3) public security.142 Keeping in consideration 
the courtroom’s space, the court can limit the number of attendees;
moreover, the law excludes the armed and those who do not hold perfect 
legal competency from the courtroom attendance.143 Chapter 8 of the 
NCPC is allocated to the regulations about the order of the courtroom144
that is vital for public trials.
As stated in the Constitution, the NCPC also insists on the public
announcement of court decisions under all circumstances.145 The recording, 
photographing, and publishing of the courtrooms’ proceedings, however,
depends on the permission of the judges on the panel;146 otherwise,
broadcasting is prohibited. Moreover, the Penal Code also treats the 
publication of court’s decision as a complimentary punishment.147 The 
NCPC only allows the publication of decision, which concerns the 
innocence of the accused.148
There is no specific procedure or pathway for the announcement of the 
schedule of open trials or invitation of the public or media representatives 
in the procedural laws, and as well as in the Regulation of Judicial Conduct 
for the Judges of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The NCPC only has 
provisions for inviting of family members of the person who is convicted of
the death penalty one day prior to the date of his or her execution.149
                                                
142. Id. art. 213. This article reads, “Trial is public, everyone can attend in it, unless the judge 
declares part of the proceeding or at all to be closed, because of moral issues, family secrets, protection 
of order or public peace.”  Id.
143. Id. arts. 214–15.  Article 214 reads, “The president of the bench can take in account the 
space of the courtroom and limit the attendance in preceding, and distribute visitor cards to the 
attendees.”  Id. art. 214.  Article 215 reads, “From the proceeding, the reports of radio, television, [and] 
video recording and photographing; and its broadcasting are only permitted with the permission of judge 
[president] of the court.”  Id. art. 215.
144. See generally id. arts. 223–25.
145. Id. art. 234.  Article 234 reads, 
Although the case is investigated in a close proceeding, the announcement of the 
is announced public at any situation. The court can take such measurements that 
ensure the presence of the accused person during the announcement. In case of 
acceptance of the decision by the accused person, the measurements include the 
capturing and detaining of him.  Id.
146. CRIM. PROC. CODE at art. 215. (Afg.).
147. PENAL CODE, ch. 3, art. 117 (Oct. 7, 1976) (Afg.).
148. CRIM. PROC. CODE at art. 215. (Afg.).
149. Id. art. 312.
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Notwithstanding, the Regulation of Judicial Conduct for the Judges150
of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan also prevents the publication of the 
decision without the consent of the judges. However, in a comment, it 
accepts that it would be a better way for catching public trusts and  
educating public through the media.151 In addition, one could raise the 
questions that what is the purpose of the announcement of the decision 
publicly? What does the term (publicly) mean here? Does it really differ 
from the broadcasting of a decision through the television, radio, or in a 
newspaper?
c. What Happens in the Afghan Courts?
Afghanistan has substantial legal grounds for public trial; however, it 
does not have clear rules for recording and broadcasting court proceedings. 
The Supreme Court of Afghanistan only publishes the list of weekly 
decisions held in various provincial and district courts in its official journal, 
the Mezan (pair of scales). In a recently published number, the Mezan 
includes a list of seventy-five decisions of provincial appellate courts and of 
city trial courts.152 The list includes the titles of the courts, type of 
accusations, number of convictions, date of decisions, and type of 
punishments.153 Interestingly, the number publishes a four-sentences report 
of two decisions, held at public trials in the trial court of Jalalabad city, 
Nangarhar province. The report does not include any picture from the 
proceedings, nor the names of convictions. It only has the names and titles 
of the judges who heard the cases. The report does not say anything about 
the number of attendees in the proceeding.154
In an informal inquiry, attended twenty defense lawyers in Jalalabad 
city of Nangarhar province, most of them (twelve) described their clients’ 
proceedings legally public but the majority of them (fifteen) illustrated that 
they have not seen public people to attend in those proceedings.155 Those 
                                                
150. REGULATION OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR THE JUDGES OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF 
AFGHANISTAN (June 19, 2007), http://www.deontologie-judiciaire.umontreal.ca/fr/magistrature/
documents/REGULATIONOFJUDICIALCONDUCTFORTHEJUDGESOFTHEISLAMICREPUBLIC
OFAFGHANISTAN.pdf.
151. Id. art. 12 cmt.
152. JARIDA-AL-MEZAN, DA STARI MAHKAME KARE SARGANDOYA KHPARAWANA [THE MEZAN 
JOURNAL, A PUBLICATION FOR SUPREME COURTS CONDUCTS], Serial No. 374, p.3 (May 10, 2017), 
http://supremecourt.gov.af/Content/Media/Documents/%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%B2%D8%A7%DB%
8C%D9%86%DB%B3%DB%B7%DB%B4135201712757541553325325.pdf (Afg.).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2.
155. Interview with Mohammad Ibrahim Afghan, Member, Civil Soc’y Org., in Jalalabad, Afg. 
(Apr. 1, 2017).
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attorneys attend, approximately, more than five proceedings in a week, but 
almost all of them revealed that they have not seen the media 
representatives in the court proceedings more than once a month.156 The 
defense attorney explained that because of security concerns, the court does
not allow the public to attend the proceedings. Three of them even said that 
because no one comes to the proceedings, most judges simply decide cases 
in their offices, not in the courtroom.157
The same questionnaire was also sent to the judges of the Jalalabad
city while majority of them refused to answer questions because (as they 
said) the Supreme Court does not allow them to share information or 
interview with the media or others.158 Only three judges answered the 
questionnaire, and they requested anonymity. In their responses, they
claimed that their proceedings are public, but they tried to justify that they 
cannot allow people to attend because of concerns about security.159 About 
the media coverage, they accepted that at least once a month we allow the 
media to cover the proceeding, especially in some serious or major cases. 
The judges were also asked the meaning of Public Trial; they described that 
those trials in which public, media, witness, and experts attend are public 
trials.160
The same questionnaire was also sent to Kandahar,161 a southern 
province of Afghanistan. A total of seventeen defense lawyers were asked 
in that province about the status of public trials and attendance of public 
and media in court hearings.162 About half of them (nine out of seventeen)
consider the court proceedings public, but almost all of them do not see 
media to cover the court proceeding at least once a month.163 The majority 
of the respondents (thirteen of them) said that they attend more than five 
hearings a month, and ten of the respondents said that they attend more than 
ten sessions in a month.164 Like the Jalalabad’s attorneys, the vast majority 
                                                
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Personally, I haven’t seen such a law, or regulation but majority of the judges refrain from 
sharing information or interview with media and others with saying this.
159. Interview with Mohammad Ibrahim Afghan, supra note 155.
160. Id.
161. Interview with Atiqullah Daqiq, Student, Prosecution Off., in Kandahar, Afg. (Apr. 1, 
2017).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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in Kandahar too, marked the security concerns as reason that courts could 
not allow public to attend in hearings.165
Haroun Rahimi,166 an Afghan PhD researcher in the Law School of 
University of Washington has also described to this author what he 
observed while seeking information in Afghan courts for his research.
Rahimi went to four provincial-commercial courts of Afghanistan to gather 
information through a survey, but the judges refused to share with him even 
some general information such as “the usual length of proceedings, and the 
number of cases [they receive] per year.”167 Rahimi says that in every 
court, the judge referred to a letter from the Supreme Court that prohibits
the judicial officials from sharing information about court proceedings 
without the formal approval from the Supreme Court. However, the 
problem was solved when Rahimi used his “personal connections,” and 
pulled “so many strings” to interview with judges, and obtain information 
from them in three different provinces, without the formal approval from 
the Supreme Court which is a long procedure and is time consuming.168
V. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS THAT ENCOURAGE
PUBLIC TRIALS AND TRIAL BROADCASTING TO PROMOTE TRANSPARENCY
IN THE JUDICIARY
Many countries are committed to establishing foundations of freedom, 
justice, and peace in their own territories, as well as in the world.169 This 
commitment is reflected in their ratification of and membership in various 
international conventions and instruments. The UDHR, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Bangalore 
Principles of Judicial Conducts of the United Nations (BPJCUN) are the 
foundations for justice and treatment with criminals. Justice does not need
to only be done, but it needs to be observed by the people that it is done.170
For this purpose, countries are committed to the public trials and trials 
broadcasting.
The “Right to a Fair Trial” is declared by the international community 
as a foundation for ensuring justice.171 The UDHRs regards it, for 
                                                
165. Id.
166. Interview with Haroun Rahimi, Professor, Herat U., in Herat, Afg. (Apr. 1, 2017).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. The Right to A Fair Trial, FAIR TRIALS, https://www.fairtrials.org/about-us/the-right-to-a-
fair-trial/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2017).
170. Id. See also Open Justice, FAIR TRIALS, https://www.fairtrials.org/about-us/the-right-to-a-
fair-trial/open-justice/.
171. See generally The Right to A Fair Trial, supra note 169.
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everyone, as a principle of human rights to be tried in an open trial before 
an independent and impartial court. It says, “[e]veryone is entitled in full 
equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial 
tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and any criminal 
charge against him.”172 Countries are required to develop certain ways of 
doing this, unrelatedly of which legal system is following by them.173
ICCPR, also supports public trial and trial broadcasting. ICCPR 
recognizes the “fair and public hearing” as a fundamental right of all 
persons.174 However, it announces that the press can be excluded from the 
court for some exceptional reasons such as:
1) morals;  
2) public order or national security;  
3) when the interests of the private lives of the parties so 
requires; or  
4) to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in 
special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the 
interests of justice.175 
If other than these reasons, it could be assumed from ICCPR’s “fair 
and public hearing” that media can attend and broadcast the proceedings 
because it reads that, “[a]ny judgement rendered in criminal case or in a suit 
at law shall be made public . . . .”176 The exceptions in banning publicity of 
the judgements that ICCPR sets are “interests of the juvenile persons,” and 
“concern [of] matrimonial disputes.”177
The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (BPJC) adopted by the 
Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity was supported by the 
U.N. at the Hague on November 25–26, 2002.178 BPJC indirectly supports 
public trials and trial broadcasting when it articulates the importance of 
“fair trial,”179 “reinforc[ing] public confidence in the judiciary,”180
                                                
172. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 10 (Dec. 10, 1948).
173. See generally id.
174. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14 
(Dec. 16, 1966).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2002) (adopted by the Judicial Group on 
Strengthening Judicial Integrity, Nepal on Nov. 25–26, 2002).
179. Id. at 3.
180. Id.
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“maintain[ing] and enhanc[ing] the confidence of the public,”181 and 
“reaffirm[ing] the people’s faith in the integrity of the Judiciary”182 as core 
principles that should guide judicial conducts. These principles, as 
constraints on judicial conducts, aim to assure the public that processes for 
treatment with law-breakers are fair and certain and that governments 
cannot abuse their powers.183
The right to a fair trial is not just to protect defendants, but its aim is to 
make trust in justice and government among the public.184 Trial 
broadcasting is not separable from the right to a public trial, and it serves to 
deter criminal activity. Furthermore, trial broadcasting also plays a
significant role in informing people about the crimes and the symptoms of 
criminals.185 That is why the abovementioned international instruments, 
directly or indirectly, are in favor of fair and public trial to protect the rights 
of defendants, and make trust in courts. The “competency,” 
“independency,” and “impartiality” that ICCPR sets as conditions for the 
court, could be ensured when the proceeding of the court is fair and public,
and the public has an eye over the proceeding through the lens of media.
A. International Norms of Fair Justice and Due Process
International law and policy is committed to promoting “fair trials” 
and “due process” in the judiciaries of the world,186 commitments that, as 
this article has explained, are furthered by mechanisms like public trials and
trial broadcasting. Moreover, these standards are indirectly supported by 
the certain international institutions that are fighting to establish rule of law
and combating judicial corruption.
Fair trial refers to the trialing of a defendant by an authorized court, 
while enjoying all its constitutional rights. A fair trial does not only 
increase transparency in the judicial system, but it lacks errors in the 
process that could be causing egregious harm to the defendant,187 most 
often, when the innocent defendant is convicted in misinterpretation of the
laws. There is a common saying in the judicial profession that the escape
                                                
181. Id.
182. Id. at 4.
183. See generally The Right to A Fair Trial, supra note 169.
184. Id.
185. Arguments for and Against Allowing Television Cameras into the Courtroom, U. NEB.-
LINCOLN, https://www.unl.edu/eskridge/cj211cameras.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2017).
186. Scott C. Pugh, Checkbook Journalism, Free Speech and Fair Trials, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
1739, 1741–42, 1758 n.99 (1995).
187. 21 TEX. JUR. 3D CRIM. LAW: RTS. OF THE ACCUSED Courtroom Atmosphere § 28,
Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2017).
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of ten guilty persons is not worse than the punishing of one innocent 
person.188 Therefore, it is not easy to see whether the court (or generally the
judicial system) provides a defendant with fair justice or not, but with 
coverage of public trials, the media could assure the fairness of trials, and 
prevent the misinterpretation of the laws.189
Due process refers to the operation of the judicial system within the 
law (“legality”) and providing a fair procedure190 for the prosecution of an 
accused person. It aims to interpret the laws properly for all litigants, and 
not to prejudice them consciously. American Judge Henry Friendly lists the 
points that remain highly influential on the legality procedure of a case-
hearing. He enumerates them as follow:
1) An unbiased tribunal.
2) Notice of the proposed action and the grounds asserted for it.
3) Opportunity to present reasons why the proposed action 
should not be taken.
4) The right to present evidence, including the right to call 
witnesses.
5) The right to know opposing evidence.
6) The right to cross-examine adverse witnesses.
7) A decision based exclusively on the evidence presented.
8) Opportunity to be represented by counsel.
9) Requirement that the tribunal prepares a record of the 
evidence presented.
10) Requirement that the tribunal prepare[s] written findings of 
fact and reasons for its decisions.191
The public trial and trial broadcasting assures the application of all
these procedural-points because these points could incentivize judges to 
follow the due process strictly and not to prejudice the interests of the 
litigants.
In addition, TI emphasizes the vital role of, “[c]ivil society, the private 
sector, [and] the media.”192 It believes in peoples’ influences on 
organizational behaviors with insisting that, “[w]e must expose judicial bias 
                                                
188. Danny J. Boggs, The Right to A Fair Trial, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 1, 5 (1998).
189. See Mark R. Stabile, Free Press-Fair Trial:  Can They Be Reconciled in A Highly 
Publicized Criminal Case?, 79 GEO. L.J. 337, 337–38 (1990). 
190. See Due Process, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/due_process (last 
visited Dec. 10, 2017).
191. Id.
192. Judiciary:  Solution, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/topic/detail/
judiciary (last visited Dec. 10, 2017).
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and drive reforms to increase courtroom honesty.”193 TI’s understanding of 
the ways for illuminating the judicial corruption, and enhancing the 
transparency and accountability in the judicial system are public trial and 
trial broadcasting. TI explicitly supports these two instruments for 
combating corruption.
Furthermore, the WJP defines the Rule of Law (RoL) in the context of:
1) accountability of the governmental officials;
2) publicity and clearness of the law;
3) fairness and efficient process of the enacting of the laws; and
4) the independence of the justice.194
Without public trials and trial broadcasting, these goals for RoL 
projects cannot be easily achieved. When United States Supreme Court 
Justice Louis Brandeis said, “[p]ublicity is justly commended as a remedy 
for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of 
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”195 He meant that 
the only way for the fairness, accountability, discovering the truth, and 
preventing the prejudice to the public, is public trials and trial 
broadcasting.196
Overall, many institutions that are involved in combating corruption, 
directly and indirectly, are in favor of public trial and trials broadcasting for 
increasing the accountability and preventing the misinterpretation of the 
laws.
B. International Codes About Free Media and Access to Information
“Freedom of expression,” “access to information,” and “respect for the 
truth and for the right of public to the truth” are important human-rights and 
professional-journalism principles that enshrined in the international 
instruments about the human rights and in the codes of conducts of 
journalists adopted by worldwide organization. The UDHR, the Universal 
Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, and the ICCPR support the 
mentioned principles about free media and access to information. The 
international organizations for supporting professional journalism, and their 
                                                
193. Id.
194. What is the Rule of Law?, WORLD JUST. PROJECT, http://worldjusticeproject.org/what-
rule-law (last visited Dec. 10, 2017).
195. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976).
196. Sherilyn Streicker, Criminal Trial Publicity, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-
encyclopedia/criminal-trial-publicity.html# (last visited Oct. 15, 2017).
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code of conducts and ethics also provide support to the above-mentioned 
principles.
The UDHR in description of “the right of freedom of opinion and 
expression” reads that this right includes “to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”197
Interestingly, the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights not only 
regards the “search after truth” as a right, but it burdens as a duty over 
every Muslim.198 The Islamic Declaration further states, “there shall be no 
bar on the dissemination of information” unless it “endanger[s] the security 
of the society or the state and is confined within the limits imposed by the 
[l]aw.”199 The ICCPR repeats the language of UDHR, but it more precisely 
sets the limitation for enjoying this right as:
1)respect for the rights and reputation of others;
2)protection of national security and the public order; and
3)protection of public health and morals.200
The Society for Professional Journalism’s (SPJ)201 Code of Ethic 
encourages journalists to seek and broadcast truthful information and 
burdens journalists to “[r]ecognize a special obligation to serve as 
watchdogs over public affairs and government.”202 Based on the SPJ’s 
Code, the journalists should “[s]eek to ensure that the [public affairs are]
conducted in the open, and that public records are open to all.”203 The 
Society offers a “comprehensive guide on accessing government records,”
including access to the courts’ records and attending in court 
proceedings.204 “The campaign is called Open Doors and covers what 
                                                
197. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 172, at art. 19.
198. Islamic Council, Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, at art. XII (Sept. 19, 
1981).
199. Id.
200. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), supra note 174, at art. 19.
201. About SPJ, SOC’Y PROF. JOURNALISTS, http://www.spj.org/aboutspj.asp (last visited Dec. 
10, 2017).  The Society of Professional Journalists is a “broad-based journalism organization, dedicated 
to encouraging the free practice of journalism and stimulating high standards of ethical behavior [in the 
United States of America].  Founded in 1909 as Sigma Delta Chi, SPJ promotes the free flow of 
information . . . .” Id.
202. SPJ Code of Ethics, SOC’Y PROF. JOURNALISTS (Sept. 6, 2014, 4:49 PM), https://www.
spj.org/pdf/spj-code-of-ethics.pdf.
203. Id.
204. Recognize A Special Obligation to Serve as Watchdogs Over Public Affairs and 
Government. Seek to Ensure that the Public’s Business if Conducted in the Open, and that Public 
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people should know and do about accessing records that belong to the 
public.”205 The Open Doors declares to the journalists that courts files are 
open to the public and media and both media and public can attend in court 
proceedings, unless they are not declared close by the judge who preside 
the court.206
The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) also has a Declaration 
of Principles on the Conducts of Journalists that encourages the journalists 
to “respect for [the] truth and for the right of the public to the truth . . . .”207
The Declaration motivates the journalists to “defend the principles of 
freedom in the honest collection and publication of news, and of the right of 
fair comment and criticism.”208
The Swiss Press Council also declared a declaration of the Duties and 
Rights of a Journalist in 2008.209 The duties part of the declaration sets 
rules for the journalists that should be bounded to, among others; here are 
two rules that directly support free media and access to information rights:
1) seeking the truth, “in the interests of the public’s right to know”; 2)
“defend[ing] freedom of information, freedom of commentary and criticism
. . . .”210 Furthermore, the declaration recognizes “[f]ree access to all 
sources of information and the right to investigate without impediment 
anything that is in the public interest” as a right of journalist; and in 
exceptional circumstances, and with the clearly defined reasons, the public 
or private confidentiality can be invoked against the journalist.211 The same 
rights and duties were enshrined in the Declaration of Munich that was 
“approved at a meeting of representatives of the Journalists’ Unions of the 
six countries of the European Community in Munich, Germany, on 
November 23–24, 1971.”212 Apart from these codes, there are many others 
too that in different ways support the free media and access to information 
right, especially when it is in the interest of public.213
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VI. PROPOSAL OF AMENDMENTS TO ENSURE PUBLIC TRIALS AND TRIAL 
BROADCASTING IN AFGHANISTAN
This section recommends specific steps that the Afghan government 
could take to combat judicial corruption through ensuring public access to 
trials and establishing and supporting programs that enable and promote 
trial broadcasting. As explained above, the Afghan Constitution guarantees 
a right to public trials, with some standard limitations for family issues,
juvenile issues, or issues related to the national security; however, more 
steps are needed to ensure access to and oversight of courts.
A. Legislation to Clarify the Right to Public Trial
Like the United States’ Sunshine in Courtroom Act of 2017, and like 
the Kenya’s Judiciary Transformation Framework and the Judicial Service 
Act of 2011 in the time of Justice Willie Mutunga, Afghanistan Judiciary 
also could develop such a draft of act for enhanced transparency and 
accessibility to the courts. This act could be passed and ratified by the 
legislature to be legalized its implementation. Under this new act, public 
hearing should be mandatory in all cases, except in some special 
circumstances. For closing trials, the courts must show reasonable causes 
such as family issue, juvenile issue, or issue related to the national security 
to the public through their websites or public media. The new act should 
oblige on the courts to announce their schedules of public trials via local 
media, courts’ websites, and official pages of social media. The courts 
even can send their monthly or weekly trial schedules to the schools, 
universities, mosques, and community leaders, and youths’ organizations in 
their jurisdictional area.
The new legislation can also amend the provision of criminal code that 
considers the publication of courts’ decisions as complimentary 
punishment. The bill should also better define and enlighten the 
international interpretation of “the right of public trial,” “trial 
broadcasting,” “the right of access to information,” “due process,” “the 
right of the protection of witness,” and “protection of interests of the courts, 
and litigants.” The bill should clearly introduce the constitutional 
discretions of the judges about conducting of the public trials, trial 
broadcasting, banning and permitting the media from the courtrooms. 
Under the “fair trial” standard, the bill should prevent the judges from 
excluding media and members of the public from attending hearings, as this 
is the practice of courts in Kenya.
Furthermore, the bill should require the courts to issue their written 
decisions, illustrating their legal reasoning and justification, and file them in 
their office. This obligation may require hiring new personals to courts, or 
force the judges and judicial officials to work hard and more. As the judges 
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receive the high amount of salary among the public officials, in some courts 
where the workload is not that much, I am quite sure if both judges and 
judicial official work from 8:00 AM through 4:00 PM in their offices, they 
can easily handle this task. In the sites, where the workload is much more 
on the courts, the new act should require the government for recruitment of 
new lawyers who are well familiar with computer technology to work 
towards computerizing the courts’ decisions and prepare it for online 
availability. This is the courts practice in the United States.
When statutes are promulgated, their provisions are of two 
characteristics: permissive and obligatory.214 The “right of public trial” 
under Afghan laws is not permissive—it is obligatory; nonetheless, most of 
the lawyers, especially judges, believe that it is just a permissive right. This 
paper recommends that the right of public trial should be taught as an 
obligatory provision, with the exceptions of certain cases where a public 
trial would violate others’ privacy rights or the national interests. As public 
trial is interpreted as core principle of fair trial, and a constitutional right of 
citizens, Afghanistan also needs to interpret it as a core principle of its 
adjudication, and pave the way for its ensuring, without keeping in mind the 
conditions, and realities on the ground, as most judges and courts do this.
B. Media Access to the Courtroom
As part of promoting media access, the government should develop a 
manual to teach the media representatives the legal responsibilities of them
toward the courts and litigant parties. Because understanding court 
proceeding requires some legal knowledge this paper also recommends that 
the Ministry of Information and Cultural with consultation of Supreme 
Court, Prosecution Office, the Afghanistan Independent Bar Association, 
and the Afghanistan Journalists Independent Association should develop 
such a manual to educate the Afghan journalists who report the courts’ 
proceedings. The manual should teach the journalist the legal language of 
reporting, the legal terminology, and the proceeding procedure and the 
ethics of attending in a proceeding. As part of this manual, there should be 
instruction on how to take notes during proceedings, how to ask questions if 
needed, how to write a report, and how to publish that report.
Media plays a proxy role for the public in the courtrooms of United 
States and Kenya, except in some special cases; while in Afghan courts, the 
media are invited in rare cases. In the United States and Kenya, access to 
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the courtrooms, and their decisions, are interpreted under the people’s 
access to information right, and freedom of expression. In Afghan courts, 
while not only most of the trial proceedings are closed, but most of the 
courts’ documents and decisions are considering the secret documents. 
Even for educational, and academic purposes, the judges are not allowed to 
disclose such information. To ensure compliance, the paper recommends to 
the Supreme Court of Afghanistan to develop a comprehensive strategy for 
ensuring access to information right and freedom of expression of the 
public, enshrined in the constitution of Afghanistan.
C. Promoting the Involvement of Law & Sharia Faculty and Students
In addition, this article recommends that Law and Sharia professors
and students should be formally encouraged to attend the courts’ 
proceedings and do their research in courts procedures and decisions. The 
new bill should set foundation for the government to foster relationship 
between courts and Sharia and Law Schools, and as well with the 
Afghanistan Science Academy. The professors, and members of the 
Academy could also be rewarded with increases in rank for serving time 
observing courts—as a benefit of engaging and leading in this public 
service. They will also enjoy the possibility of easy access to the courts’ 
decisions and documents for their research and writing. Similarly, students 
of those faculties could receive credits for attending court proceedings and 
recording and evaluating their observations. Furthermore, the students of 
Law and Sharia schools could serve a short term of their externship in the 
courts and help the judicial officials in writing their decisions.
This involvement would have the added benefit of bringing a more 
practical aspect to legal education, teaching students about the practical 
work that most currently do not learn until they leave law school. This 
would undoubtedly improve the profession overall, as students would learn 
how prosecutors develop lawsuits, how defense attorneys defend, and how 
judges reason. As the Supreme Court of the United States provides a
number of internships for law school students to work in the Office of the 
Counselor to the Chief Justice, Office of the Curator, Public Information 
Office and Office of the Clerk, and as well as in the Appellate, and Trial 
Courts of the United States, the Afghan government also can think about 
such internship programs for their law and sharia schools’ students.
D. Promoting Public Awareness About the Right to Public Trials
Civil society organizations (CSOs) can play a vital role in developing 
public awareness of their rights to attend court proceedings, and seek and 
support media coverage of those proceedings as an expression of their right 
2017]                                                Ekhtyar                                       37
 
to access to information. This paper recommends a broad-reaching 
campaign to develop public awareness that attendance in court proceedings 
is a citizen’s right. For this purpose, the government of Afghanistan can 
use two practical ways: first, the government can ask the donor agencies to 
initiate funds for civil society organizations to do a wide campaign about 
the necessity of public trial and trial broadcasting. The members of the 
civil society organization will work with local people to teach them about 
their right to attend in the trials of the court. This practice will pave the 
way for civil society engagement with courts, as it is in the Kenya. Second, 
the government of Afghanistan can ask the professors of the universities, 
the teachers of the schools, and the Mulas (religious scholars) of the 
mosques to inform the people about the necessity of the public trial and trial 
broadcasting. These influential figures can teach to people that how their 
attendance in the court proceedings, and broadcasting of the court 
proceedings can increase transparency and accountability in the courts; and 
decrease the level of corruption in a significant level. The engagement of 
the CSOs with courts is the most obvious cause of eradicating open 
corruption in Kenya.
VII. CONCLUSION
Over the past decade, Afghanistan has continued to be one of the most 
corrupt countries in the world. Corruption is widespread in all branches of 
the government, but judicial corruption has heavy impact on weakening the 
rule of law in the country. To increase accountability, and transparency in 
the Judiciary, public trial and trial broadcasting are the useful, and easy 
ways for combating corruption in the Judiciary. Openness and access to the 
courts’ decisions are the practices in many countries to grab the public trust 
in Judiciary, and consequently in the government. Among others, the 
United States (as a developed country, and the most fund provider to 
Afghanistan) and Kenya (as a developing country) also follow the 
Openness and Access to Courts’ Decision standards. These ways of 
increasing accountability are also supported by the international legal 
instruments. The Afghanistan Constitution also provides grounds for the 
public trial and access to information rights; however, the criminal 
procedure code and penal code of Afghanistan do not have clear provisions 
to oblige judges for conducting trials openly. In practice, in most of the 
proceedings, public do not attend and the courts also do not allow media to 
cover their hearings for the public. This article recommends that
Afghanistan adopt legislation that clearly supports openness of proceedings 
and access to courts and their decisions through the media.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Nations across the globe do not permit citizens to kill other citizens, so 
the question remains why governments of certain countries permit the 
lawful killing of its own citizens as a form of punishment.  There remain 
only fifty-seven countries in the world which retain the death penalty, in 
that they permit the practice for ordinary crimes.1 Many of these countries 
are located in Africa and the Middle East.2 Thirty other countries are 
considered abolitionist in practice, meaning that they retain the death 
penalty for ordinary crimes such as murder, but “have not executed anyone 
during the past ten years and are believed to have a policy or established 
practice of not carrying out executions.”3 Countries in this group have 
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1. Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Dec. 31, 2016), 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/abolitionist-and-retentionist-countries?scid=30&amp;did=140.
2. Id.
3. Id.
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made an international commitment to not use the death penalty.4 Issuing
death sentences to juveniles is a relatively unaccepted practice in the 
countries that still retain the death penalty; however, Iran is the only known 
country to have executed or imposed death sentences for crimes committed 
by offenders who were under the age of eighteen at the time the offense was 
committed.5 Saudi Arabia and China have imposed the death penalty on 
juveniles in recent years as undercover news agencies have been able to 
document it covertly, despite that international law prohibits the use of the 
death penalty for crimes committed by children.6 The international human 
rights system is a “collection of international and regional treaties, non-
binding declarations, resolutions, rules and guidelines,” giving offenders 
certain protections and giving them an opportunity to be heard all while 
complying with the law of that particular country.7 The practice of 
executing criminals who were under the age of eighteen at the time of their 
crime is directly prohibited by the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (UNCRC), and the American Convention on Human Rights.8
Article Six of the ICCPR ensures that the sentence of death be carried out in 
accordance with the individual country’s laws and not contrary to the 
provisions of the Covenant.9 Article Six states, in pertinent part,
1) Every human being has the inherent right to life.  The right 
shall be protected by law.  No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of 
his life. 2) In countries which have not abolished the death 
penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most 
serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of 
the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of 
the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.  This penalty can only 
be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a 
                                                     
4. Id.
5. Michael Garcia Bochenek, Doing Away with the Death Penalty, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr.
11, 2017, 11:01 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/11/doing-away-death-penalty.
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7. Iraj Lotfi, Criminal Responsibility of Children in International Documents and 
Comparative Study with Iranian Law, J. POL. & L., June 1, 2017, at 98.
8. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6(5)
(Dec. 16, 1966); G.A. Res. 44/25, International Covenant on the Rights of the Child, art. 37(a) (Nov. 20, 
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9. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), supra note 8, art. 6(2).
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competent court . . . . 5) Sentence of death shall not be imposed 
for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age and 
shall not be carried out on pregnant women.10
Although there is almost a unanimous international agreement that the 
juvenile death penalty violates international law, Amnesty International and 
other human rights organizations have reported that a few rogue nations 
continue to execute juveniles.11 A majority of these death sentences are in 
Iran, where there are many children on death row.12 Some third world 
countries do not have accurate record-keeping methods and are unable to 
definitively determine the age of persons.13 They use their best efforts to 
determine the age, but there is growing sentiment that persons ought not to 
be sentenced until their age can be definitely determined.14
However, around the world, efforts are underway to abolish the death 
penalty. The United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly voted on December 
19, 2016, to adopt a resolution co-sponsored by eighty-nine
countries, urging a worldwide moratorium on the death penalty.15 This was 
the world body’s sixth resolution on the subject, and 117 nations voted in 
support of the proposal.16 The resolution also called upon all countries to 
respect international standards, providing for procedural safeguards for 
those facing the death penalty, to progressively restrict their use of capital 
punishment, and to make available data on how and against whom they 
apply the death penalty.17
This note will begin by giving a history of the juvenile death penalty in 
the nations of the United States (U.S.), Saudi Arabia, China, and Iran.  With 
respect to each country, it will then explain in which instances the death 
penalty is used on juveniles and the progress being made in the 
international community to abolish it. A discussion will then follow with
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alternatives to the death penalty and what can be done to lessen or end its 
use.  It will then discuss the reasoning behind why most of the countries in 
the world have chosen to abolish the juvenile death penalty and why the 
remaining countries should follow this same reasoning.  This note will 
conclude that the juvenile death penalty should be abolished worldwide 
because of juveniles’ lack of maturity and the possibility that they may
contribute to society in a meaningful way at later points in their lives.
II. JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES
A. United States
Being a democratic republic, the United States has a President as its
chief of state.18 The legal system is a common-law system, further codified 
by state and federal statutes, which is mostly based on English common law 
at the federal level and common law on the state level.19 The chief of state 
and head of the government is Donald J. Trump, who has been President 
since January 20, 2017.20 The legislative branch is a bicameral Congress 
consisting of the Senate, which has 100 members who are elected for six-
year terms and the House of Representatives, which has 435 members who 
are elected for two-year terms.21
The United States is the only country in the G7 and the most 
developed country to continue to execute criminals.22 The juvenile death 
penalty was a feature of the criminal justice system in the United States for 
some time.23 English and American common law permitted execution of
juvenile offenders.24
Children under the age of seven were conclusively presumed to 
have no criminal capacity. [But,] that presumption was 
rebuttable for children aged seven to fourteen, and, if rebutted,
[they] could be convicted and subjected to adult punishment, 
                                                     
18. The World Factbook: United States, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
19. Id.
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21. Id.
22. See Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries, supra note 1.
23. Curtis A. Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty and International Law, 52 DUKE L.J. 485,
492–93 (2002).
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including execution. Individuals over the age of fourteen were 
treated as adults for purposes of criminal punishment.25
In 1966, the United States signed and ratified the ICCPR, while also
reserving its right to disregard the ban on executing juveniles.26 “The 
United States is the only country of the 144 signatories with such a 
reservation.”27 The United States further reiterated its reservation in 1995 
by “exempting itself from the adherence to the juvenile death penalty 
ban.”28 Between 1994 and 2004, the United States “executed more juvenile 
offenders than every other nation in the world combined.”29
The major turning point in relation to the death penalty being imposed 
on juveniles came in 2005. In that year, the United States Supreme Court 
decided that it was unconstitutional to impose a death sentence on 
individuals who committed the underlying crime while under the age of 
eighteen.30 This decision effectively overruled a prior decision which 
upheld the death penalty for offenders above or at the age of sixteen.31 The 
respondent in Roper v. Simmons relied on the Eighth Amendment’s32
protection against cruel and unusual punishment.33 For the Court to 
determine if the juvenile death penalty was permissible, they referred to the 
“evolving standards of decency that mark the process of a maturing 
society” test in deciding if it was “so disproportionate as to be cruel and 
unusual.”34
The Court in Roper noted that the death penalty should be used only
for the most heinous crimes and was reserved for the worst offenders, and 
pointed to three main reasons why juvenile offenders cannot with reliability 
be classified among the worst offenders.35 The first reason is that scientific
and sociological studies have shown that “[a] lack of maturity and an 
                                                     
25. Id.
26. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), supra note 8; JOHN A. TUELL, CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM.,
JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND THE DEATH PENALTY: IS JUSTICE SERVED? 11 (2002).
27. TUELL, supra note 26.
28. Id. at 12.
29. Juveniles and the Death Penalty, AM. C. L. UNION, https://www.aclu.org/other/juveniles-
and-death-penalty (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
30. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005).
31. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
32. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
33. Roper, 543 U.S. at 560.
34. Id. at 561 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
35. Id. at 569.
 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 24:1
  
44
underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than 
in adults and are more understandable among the young.36 These qualities 
often result in impetus and ill-considered actions and decisions.”37 The 
Court referred to the limitations placed on those under eighteen with respect 
to voting, serving on juries, and marrying without parental consent to show 
the comparative immaturity and irresponsibility of juveniles.38 The second 
notable difference is that “juveniles are more vulnerable . . . to negative 
influence and outside pressures, including peer pressure.”39 The Court 
stated that those under eighteen are most susceptible to influence and 
psychological damage and have less control over their own environment.40
Further, the Court said that “the third broad difference is that the character 
of a juvenile is not as well formed as an adult[, and] the personality traits of 
juveniles are more transitory, [and] less fixed.”41 Noting these major 
differences between adults and juveniles, the Court reasoned that it is hard 
to “conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence 
of [an] irretrievably depraved character.”42 The Court concluded that due to 
a juvenile’s insufficient culpability, objective immaturity, vulnerability, and 
lack of true depravity, inflicting the death penalty on a person under the age 
of eighteen would be a cruel and unusual punishment.43
Litigants and scholars have been attempting to incorporate
international human rights laws into the legal system of the United States.
For example, in Roper, the Court noted the international community’s 
almost universal opposition to the practice of the juvenile death penalty,
and even cited the UNCRC as reflective of the growing standards of 
decency.44 The success of the elimination of the juvenile death penalty will 
likely have a significant impact on other attempts to incorporate 
international human rights law in the United States.
                                                     
36. Id.
37. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
38. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
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40. Id.
41. Id. at 570.
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43. Roper, 543 U.S. at 572–73.
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B. Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy.45 This means it is a “monarchy 
that is not limited or restrained by laws or a constitution.”46 Saudi Arabia is 
governed by Islamic or Shari’a law, which is a legal system that mirrors 
Egyptian, French and customary law.47 The legislative branch features a 
unicameral Consultative Council of 150 members, who are appointed by 
the monarch to serve four-year terms.48 The executive branch has been led 
by Salman bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud since January 23, 2015, who is both the 
chief of state and head of government.49
Shari'a law is based on the teachings of the Prophet, with the Qur'an 
and Sunnah being the main sources of Shari'a law.50 Morals, legal 
relationships and economic activity in Saudi Arabia are governed and 
regulated by judicial precedent and established practices of the kingdom.51
The penal law is not codified regarding criminal offenses and judges 
are given wide latitude to apply Shari'a law as they see fit.52 “Information 
about any prisoner or judicial proceeding in Saudi Arabia is hard to come 
by—the justice system in notoriously arbitrary and secretive, and the media 
often offers only sparse or fragmented details.”53
                                                     
45. The World Factbook:  Saudi Arabia, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sa.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2017) [hereinafter Saudi 
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46. Absolute Monarchy, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/absolutemon
archy?s=t (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
47. Saudi Arabia, supra note 45.
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50. Marci Hoffman, Saudi Arabia-Introduction, BRILL ONLINE REFERENCE WORKS,
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/foreign-law-guide/saudi-arabia-introduction-COM_162300
# (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
51. Id.
52. Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sudan: End Juvenile Death Penalty, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 8, 
2010, 11:59 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/10/08/iran-saudi-arabia-sudan-end-juvenile-death-
penalty.
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“Under Saudi law, [those under the age of eighteen should be tried in 
juvenile court,] where the death penalty does not apply.”54 However, the 
legal system does not operate or always run on established principles;
events, where juveniles are sentenced to death, are not publicized. “On 
January 2, 2016, Saudi Arabia carried out a mass execution of forty-seven
men convicted on terrorism-related charges,” and there are reports that at 
least one of the four Shia executed was under the age of eighteen at the time 
of the offense.55 This shows that Saudi authorities will execute juveniles if 
they think no one is watching.56
C. China
The government of China is a communist state.57 The chief of state is 
the President, Xi Jinping, since March 14, 2013.58 The legal system runs by 
civil law influenced by Soviet and continental European law systems.59
The legislature is the unicameral National People’s Congress made up of 
2987 members who are indirectly elected by municipal, regional, and 
provincial people’s congress and serve five-year-terms.60
In 1983, there was a movement in the Chinese government called the 
“severe blows against serious criminal activities,” which hoped to put an 
end to the increasing crime trends.61 Throughout this time, many gang 
leaders and major criminals were executed, but at the same time, many 
minors were being executed along with those who were adults.62 Article 
Forty-Four of the Chinese Criminal Law states that, “[t]he death penalty is 
not to be applied to persons who have not reached the age of eighteen at the
time the crime is committed.”63 It went on to say that, “[p]ersons who have 
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56. Spencer, supra note 54.
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reached the age of sixteen, but not the age of eighteen may be sentenced to 
death with a two-year suspension of execution if the crime is particularly 
grave.”64 During this campaign, the death penalty was handed down to 
those under the age of eighteen numerous times.65 In 1997, the criminal
law was revised in Article Forty-Nine and only stated that the death penalty 
should not be imposed on “persons who have not reached the age of
eighteen at the time the crime is committed . . . .”66
It is likely that thousands of people have been executed in China, but 
the numbers remain classified.67 The death penalty data is treated as a state 
secret, so it is likely that the information released by the country is not the 
most accurate.68 However, Amnesty International has recorded two specific 
incidents where a juvenile was executed when they were under eighteen at 
the time the crime was committed.69 “Zhao Lin was reportedly killed in 
January of 2003 for committing murder when he was only sixteen years 
old.70 In March 2004, Gao Pan was reportedly executed for murder during
an attempted robbery he committed before the age of eighteen.”71 China 
signed on to the UNCRC in 1992, which prohibits the execution of 
juveniles, so they are clearly violating international law when this occurs.72
D. Iran
The legal system of the Islamic Republic of Iran is a “religious system 
based on secular and Islamic law.”73 The chief of state is the Supreme 
Leader Ali Hoseini-Khamenei, since June 4, 1989, and the head of the 
government is President Hasan Fereidun Ruhani, who has been in power 
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since August 3, 2013.74 The legislative branch is a unicameral consultative 
assembly, which has 285 members that are elected in single and multi-seat 
constituencies by a two-round vote.75
Iran continues to execute persons under the age eighteen when the 
crime was committed, which is a violation of international law.76 From the 
period of 2004–2007, Iran is known to have executed at least seventeen 
individuals who were under eighteen at the time the crime was committed, 
which is eight times more than any other country in the world.77 In 
addition, many of the death sentences violate Iranian domestic law 
requiring children under eighteen to be tried in special juvenile courts.78
The Islamic Penal Code came into effect in 2013, and has more 
favorable conditions regarding juvenile justice, but has not fully ended 
juvenile executions.79 The Islamic Penal Code allows the application of
capital punishment to juvenile offenders “unless the offender is found to 
lack the mental capacity to understand the nature of the crime or its 
consequences.”80 There have been reports that at least 160 juvenile 
offenders are on death row as of 2014 in Iran.81 Moreover, at least eight
juveniles were executed in 2014 who were below the age of eighteen at the 
time the offense was committed.82 The United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (UNHCHR) has expressed its concern that this practice 
was still occurring in Iran.83 They are in direct violation of the ICCPR and 
the UNCRC.84 The High Commission has said that no matter the 
circumstances of the crime, Iran was violating international human rights 
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laws when executing those who committed their crimes under eighteen.85
Iran has not denied that the practice was still occurring, but it has
maintained that Iran has shown a great deal of leniency and flexibility in 
dealing with juvenile offenders, including encouraging victims’ families to 
seek retribution, rather than execution.86 Further, Iran has responded that
although they do execute those under the age of eighteen, they will wait for 
execution until the juvenile matures to eighteen.87 The U.N., however, has 
said that this is still in violation of human rights laws, which bases 
sentencing on the time when the offense is committed.88 Iran has accepted 
a recommendation to halt juvenile executions, and the U.N. renewed its call 
in this report for Iran to take action and commute all juvenile death 
sentences.89
Amnesty International has faced considerable difficulty in obtaining 
information regarding the juvenile death penalty and has not been able to 
conduct human rights research in Iran for the last thirty years.90 Detailed 
information on child offenders is not readily available in Iran, and cases,
where the death penalty is imposed on juveniles, is not regularly reported in 
Iran or by the judiciary until the Supreme Court has confirmed the death 
sentence or until after the execution has been carried out.91
Notwithstanding this, lawyers and families of those juveniles with death 
sentences are hesitant to provide information or court documents, fearing
that this “could place them in jeopardy from Iranian security authorities” or 
they are unable to obtain the information themselves.92
In one particular instance, the U.N. urged the Government of Iran to 
stop the execution of Saman Naseem, who was sentenced to death for a
crime committed when he was only seventeen.93 “He had been convicted of 
moharebeh (enmity against God) and mofsed fel-arz (corruption on Earth) 
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for alleged involvement in armed activities on behalf of the Party of Free 
Life of Kurdistan.”94 He was tortured into confessing and the Iranian 
government stated that he was in prison and “his case was under review by 
the judiciary.”95
In addition, serious shortcomings in the Iranian criminal justice system 
remain.  Unfair trials are commonly conducted in situations where alleged 
child offenders face the death penalty.96 These failings include:
[L]ack of access to legal counsel and to a lawyer of one’s 
choosing; torture and other ill treatment in pre-trial detention; 
allowing confessions extracted under duress to be used in trial 
proceedings; the use of detention centers outside the official 
prison system; denial of the right to call defen[s]e witnesses; 
failing to give adequate time to the defen[s]e to present its case;
and imprisoning defen[s]e lawyers if they protest against unfair 
proceedings.97
The current Code of Criminal Procedure in Iran only gives defendants 
“the right to a lawyer after investigations are complete and the offender has 
been formally charged.  This allows for prolonged periods . . . ” without the 
assistance of a lawyer and allows for interrogations to occur without a
lawyer present, both of these will lead to the use of torture or other 
mistreatments to obtain confessions.98
According to the 2016 Amnesty Report, seventy-eight juvenile 
offenders remained on death row.99 Based on the 2013 Islamic Penal Code,
many of those who were below the age of eighteen when the crime was 
committed were granted retrials, however, they were re-sentenced to death 
after the courts determined that “they had attained sufficient ‘mental 
maturity’ at the time of the crime.”100 Many of the executions of the 
juvenile offenders were then stopped last minute due to “intense 
international pressure.”101
                                                     
94. Iran:  UN Experts, supra note 93.
95. Id.
96. Iran Report, supra note 90, at 16.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. AMNESTY INT’L, DEATH SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS IN 2016 GLOBAL REPORT 32
(2017) [hereinafter Amnesty 2016 Report].
100. Id. (internal citations omitted).
101. Id. at 33.
2017] Meyer 51
III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LAW
A. Similarities
The United States, Saudi Arabia, China and Iran are all a party to or 
have signed on the UNCRC, but the United States and Somalia are the only 
ones that have not ratified the treaty.102 However, these countries have all 
been some of the slowest countries in their progression of abolishing the 
juvenile death penalty and the death penalty, generally.103 It is clear,
though, that Saudi Arabia, China and Iran are violating the terms of the 
Convention and breaking international law because the juvenile death 
penalty is still occurring in these countries, in fairly unknown 
circumstances. Although it is difficult to find out clear information about 
these countries regarding the juvenile death penalty, various media outlets 
and undercover agencies have been able to document several cases of the 
death penalty being imposed.104 It is surprising that one of the most 
developed and rich countries in the world, the United States, is on the same 
level as under-developed countries such as Iran.
B. Discussion
In Roper, it is interesting to note Justice Kennedy’s more societal 
reasons in advocating for the abolishment of the juvenile death penalty.105
He makes the argument that it would not make sense to have a minor pay 
the ultimate price with his life if he has diminished culpability compared to 
an adult.106 Further, trained psychiatrists with diagnostic testing tools 
normally refrain from assessing anyone under eighteen with antisocial 
personality disorder, so it would not make sense for juries to make the 
decision that a person under eighteen is so irreparable as an individual that 
they should face the death penalty.107
It is also interesting to note that Justice Kennedy refers to the 
international community, even while acknowledging that the only issue in 
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the case is whether the juvenile death penalty is cruel and unusual.108
However, the Court has noted that previous Courts have referred to the laws 
of other countries and to international authorities as instructive, but not 
authoritative, for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.109 In looking 
at the international community, the Court noted the UNCRC.110 At that 
time, in 2005, every nation in the world had ratified this treaty which 
contained a prohibition on juvenile capital punishment, except for the 
United States and Somalia.111
The main reasons for any criminal punishment are retribution and
deterrence, but it is not clear that the juvenile death penalty accomplishes 
either of these goals.112 In Roper, Justice Kennedy points out that juveniles 
necessarily have lessened culpability than their adult counterparts and 
because of this we should hold them to a lower standard.113 The Court is 
correct in stating that if retribution is the way to express the community’s 
moral outrage or an attempt to right the wrong done to the victim, it is not 
necessarily fair if there is lessened culpability.114 Retribution would then 
not be “proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is imposed on one 
whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished” due to age or 
incapacity.115 He also notes that the deterrent effect is less apparent, but it 
would lead one to believe that if there is lessened culpability and
characteristic immaturity of juveniles, it would likely do little to deter other 
juveniles from committing the same crimes.116
As time progresses since Roper, the United States is going further in 
lessening harsh punishments for juveniles.117 In Graham v. Florida, the 
Court ruled that sentencing non-homicide, juvenile offenders to life 
imprisonment without parole “was unconstitutional under the Eighth 
Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause.”118 Justice Kennedy 
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wrote in his opinion while referring to developments in psychology and 
neuroscience, that juveniles are more capable of change than adults since 
“parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature through 
late adolescence.”119 Additionally, Justice Kennedy stated that life without 
parole is not exactly equivalent to the death penalty, but both sentences 
share common attributes.120 They are both irrevocable and diminish hope 
of release, except in cases of executive clemency, which is a “remote 
possibility of which does not mitigate the harshness of the sentence.”121
Other purposes of criminal punishment, which apply universally 
among all societies and legal systems are: 1) incapacitation, 2) 
rehabilitation, and 3) restitution.122 “Incapacitation refers to the technique 
of rendering a criminal powerless . . . .”123 “Rehabilitation refers to the 
process by which attempts are made to help former criminals reenter 
society as productive citizens.”124 This is done by ordering offenders to 
undergo certain things such as counseling, engaging in community service, 
or attending job training classes.125 Restitution is aimed at making the 
victim whole at the expense of the criminal in a material, property based 
sense, and is done, for example, by ordering a criminal to return stolen 
property to the victim or ordering a vandal to pay for repair of her victim’s 
damaged property.126
In addition to the conclusion that juveniles have lessened culpability, 
other important factors weigh against giving juveniles death sentences.
Most juveniles who commit crimes suffer “unthinkable circumstances at the 
hands of parents, community members, and overwhelmed government 
agencies for years prior to landing in the adult criminal justice system.”127
Juvenile offenders share many of the same common attributes: “robbed 
childhoods, disappointing circumstances, mistrust in adult role models and 
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regretful choices.”128 “Most juvenile delinquency stories demonstrate that 
governmental systems in place to protect these children fail to ensure their 
safe upbringing, but not for lack of trying.”129 These convicted felons are 
forced to acknowledge what they did was wrong, show their redeemable 
qualities and ask for an opportunity to demonstrate how they can be 
rehabilitated.130 Rehabilitation is not tailored to juveniles who are facing 
significant prison time and of course, not able to be shown if there is a 
death sentence.131 Further, if one is sentenced to death, we will never know 
their rehabilitative potential.132 In comparing adults versus juveniles, it is 
much more likely that a juvenile will have some small chance of 
rehabilitation.133
“International human rights law has now become an established, 
essential, and universally accepted part of the life of the international 
community.134 Individuals, including the citizens of the United States, are 
now understood to possess remediable rights based on international law.”135
The remainder of the countries should follow and adapt and to this custom 
of looking at the international community in deciding what laws are 
appropriate for their own country.
“Many international legal scholars [agree] . . . that the prohibition on 
the juvenile death penalty now constitutes a rule of customary international 
law . . . .”136 In order for a specific practice to become a customary rule of 
international law, four elements must be met.137 Over time, the practice 
must have developed consistently in a number of countries and opinion 
juris—which is a collection of countries who feel a certain level of conduct 
is required by international law—must also exist.138 Scholars have applied 
the circumstances to these four principles, noting the widespread and 
consistent rejection of the juvenile death penalty in the international 
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community, the development of the practice over the past fifty years, and 
the behavior of countries showing the general recognition of the 
prohibition.139 This has led to the conclusion that the prohibition on the 
juvenile death penalty is a customary norm.140
Some scholars have stated that the prohibition on the juvenile death 
penalty is a jus cogens norm.141 Jus cogens is defined as “a norm accepted 
and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a 
norm which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by 
a subsequent norm of general international law having the same 
character.”142 A practice must satisfy three conditions in order to be 
considered a jus cogens under international law.143 “First, a large number 
of states must consider it necessary for international public order.144
Second, multilateral agreements must prohibit the derogation from the 
norm.145 Finally, international tribunals must have applied the norm.”146
Based on the ICCPR and the UNCRC, it appears that the juvenile death 
penalty would be classified as a jus cogens norm.147 However, there was 
still much disagreement in the past as to whether the juvenile death penalty 
rose to the level of genocide, slavery, and torture, which are routinely 
condemned in the international community.148
However, some of the countries discussed have a basis and rationale in
their own law to prohibit the juvenile death penalty.149 In Iran, the initial
legislation having to do with children was the Formation of the Child 
Offenders Court Act, which said that minors convicted of crimes carrying a 
sentence of death or life imprisonment, should be held in a correctional and 
rehabilitative center.150 In addition, the Islamic Penal Code states that 
crimes committed by children are an absolute mistake and remuneration 
                                                     
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Feldman, supra note 136.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Feldman, supra note 136.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. NISRINE ABIAD & FARKHANDA ZIA MANSOOR, CRIMINAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF THE 
CHILD IN MUSLIM STATES: A COMPARATIVE AND ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVE 151–52 (2010).
150. Id.
 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 24:1
  
56
should be done by their guardian.151 It further states that children lack 
responsibility for crimes, and the age of adulthood is often based on 
physical characteristics, rather than a defined age, which is determined 
region by region.152 Although the Protection of Children and Juveniles Act 
was ratified in 2003, stating that those under eighteen would benefit from 
children’s rights, in practice, the law is not carried out regularly in Iran, and 
many judges have refused to accept that eighteen should be the age of legal 
protection and criminal responsibility.153 In Saudi Arabia, the trouble is 
that the age of majority is not well-defined and as of 2010, they did not 
have a law prohibiting the death penalty for juveniles.154 In China, 
children’s rights are very limited and rights and freedoms are only granted 
if they are useful to the state or society, with the Communist party deciding 
what is favorable.155 There has been little basis for children’s rights in 
China, especially with the one child policy, severely limiting the benefits 
afforded to the child if he is not the first.156
Furthermore, all jurists and those in the international community do 
not agree that the juvenile death penalty should be abolished in all 
circumstances.  Justice Scalia was one of the detractors of the abolishment 
and wrote adamantly about it in his dissenting opinion in Roper.157 Scalia
felt that that the United States should not necessarily compare itself to other 
countries when deciding which laws to abolish.158 Justice Scalia stated that: 
The Court’s special reliance on the laws of the United Kingdom 
is perhaps the most indefensible part of its opinion . . . . Instead, 
the Court undertakes the majestic task of determining . . . our 
Nation’s current standards of decency.  It is beyond 
comprehension why we should look, for that purpose, to a 
country that has developed, in the centuries since the 
Revolutionary War—and with increasing speed since the United 
Kingdom’s recent submission to the jurisprudence of European 
Court dominated by continental jurists—a legal, political and 
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social culture quite different from our own . . . . The Court 
should either profess its willingness to reconsider all these 
matters in light of the views of foreigners, or else it should cease 
putting forth foreigners’ views as part of the reasoned basis of its 
decisions. To invoke alien law when it agrees with one’s own 
thinking, and ignores it otherwise, is not reasoned decision-
making, but sophistry.159
At the time, no national consensus among legal scholars and individual 
citizens existed, and thus Justice Scalia believed this was reason enough for 
the Court to continue the possibility of executing juveniles.160 This opinion 
was written in 2005 and must be viewed with some hesitation, but the
United States and most of the international community have come a long 
way in reforming juvenile justice, although much remains to be achieved.161
There are still other arguments against the imposition of the juvenile 
death penalty, in addition to the traditional lack of maturity and diminished 
level of culpability arguments.  An especially interesting argument reveals 
the conflict between a state or country’s duty as parens patriae to protect 
children on the one hand, and its role in executing children on the other 
provides another reason why there should be no capital punishment of 
children.162 The concept of parens patriae refers to the state being the 
ultimate guardian of the child; and therefore, the state should be involved in 
providing for the child’s welfare and setting standards for their care.163
This concept is prevalent in other areas of juvenile justice and should “be 
applied in the context of the juvenile death penalty” if the best interests of 
the child are truly the goal of a society.164 It is clearly not in the best 
interest of a child to be executed, so countries utilizing the juvenile death 
penalty cannot maintain that they are interested in the general welfare or 
that they are looking out for what is best for the child.
Although the United States has put an end to juvenile executions, 
Saudi Arabia, China, and Iran have not stopped the practice.165 Many 
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factors weigh—even outside the United States—that the juvenile death 
penalty has a deleterious effect on children and should be ended.166
“Reports on the death penalty’s deterrent effect consistently conclude that it 
is no more a deterrent than lengthy prison terms.”167 In fact, many children
do not like to be enclosed for long periods of time.168 This would give 
weight to the idea that a life sentence would have more of a deterrent effect 
on a juvenile.  Of all the arguments against the juvenile death penalty, the 
one that harms society the most is the execution of innocent offenders, and 
this continues to occur in the United States and throughout the world.169 In 
Saudi Arabia, China, and Iran, it is troublesome that juveniles are being 
executed for low-level offenses, which are offenses not even criminalized 
in other countries.170
Furthermore, “[t]he existence of a stringent life sentence[, such as the 
option of life without the possibility of parole,] can either partially or 
completely eliminate the need for the death penalty.”171 For example, after 
the state of Maryland instituted the option of a sentence of life without 
parole, there were only eight new defendants added to death row in the next 
five years.172 It is possible that juries believe that criminals may serve a 
shorter time than their sentence, and would opt for the death penalty if they 
feared the offender would be back in society.173 In addition, many prison 
wardens report that those serving life sentences, commonly referred to as 
lifers, “are the best-behaved prisoners in the entire system.”174 Lifers also 
have the possibility of giving back to society and intervening early on by
mentoring others who are starting down the same path.175 Executions of 
offenders would cut off the possibility of any restitution to society of the 
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family of the victim.176 The United States has decided that non-homicide, 
juvenile offenders should not receive a life sentence without the possibility 
of parole.177 However, if the governments of Saudi Arabia, China, and Iran 
feel strongly that juvenile offenders need to be punished, they could use 
mandatory life sentences, and this would likely lead to a better behaved 
prison population and inmates that could pay part of their debt to society 
and to the victim’s family.178
IV. CONCLUSION
The death penalty has been a heavily debated topic across the globe 
for many years. The juvenile death penalty is even more controversial, and 
most would believe that it is not permitted anywhere in the world.179
Although juvenile executions are infrequently occurring in some 
countries—notably, Saudi Arabia, China, and Iran—many are being done in 
secret so that the international community will not be aware.180 However, 
Amnesty International and other undercover agencies have been able to 
highlight some of the instances where the death penalty has been imposed 
on juveniles.181
It is surprising to note that the United States took until 2005 to 
officially abolish the juvenile death penalty, which is much slower than
comparably developed countries.182 The United States has followed a slow 
path of juvenile justice reform, including abolishing the juvenile death
penalty, and the process of reform is still ongoing as it learns more about 
the maturity and psychology of individuals.183
Saudi Arabia, China, and Iran are some of the countries of the world 
that have had the slowest progression in putting an end to the juvenile death 
penalty.184 They are breaking international law and are not following the
terms of the treaties, which each party signed, every time a juvenile is 
executed. Furthermore, most juveniles have been through a tough 
childhood and certain circumstances, through no fault of their own, have 
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led them down the path of juvenile criminal behavior.185 The government 
of each country should have a parenting role in addition to the child’s actual 
parents and should be looking out for the best interests of the child.  If 
countries are imposing the death penalty on juveniles, there is no way they 
can have the best interests of the child at heart.
Saudi Arabia, China, and Iran should put an immediate end to the 
juvenile death penalty in their respective countries. The United States has
not been a model country to follow regarding the abolition of the juvenile 
death penalty, but Saudi Arabia, China, and Iran should follow the general 
rationale that the United States used.  The culpability and maturity levels of 
juveniles are less than their adult counterparts and, therefore, they should 
not face the most extreme form of criminal punishment.186 Further, 
juveniles are not fully developed emotionally, socially, and physiologically,
and do not understand all the implications of their criminal behavior.187
Saudi Arabia, China, and Iran need to keep this in mind when sentencing 
criminal juveniles and should use less harsh forms of punishment other than 
the death penalty. There has been significant progress in the world toward 
the goal of abolishing the death penalty for adults, and the first step would 
be to abolish the cruel and inhumane practice of imposing the death penalty 
on the most vulnerable of individuals, juveniles.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“Kurds are the largest ethnic and linguistic minority in Turkey.” 1
Kurds are perceived as a threat to Turkish national unity. Turkey has 
suppressed many attempts by the Kurds to ameliorate the protection of their 
human rights and stifled any plight for the recognition of their minority 
rights. The Kurds have no friends. Today’s great powers, as those of 
yesterday, benefit from a status quo that maintains the Kurds in their 
helpless position. My purpose in this paper is to argue for changing this 
status quo.
This paper will first introduce who the Kurds are and the area they 
inhabit to establish that the Kurds are a distinct group separate to the 
Turkish, Persian and Arab nations that occupied them. The distinctiveness 
of Kurds is a fundamental notion underlying the right to self-determination.
Second, the treatment of Kurds by the Turkish Government will be detailed. 
In doing so, this paper recognises the lack of accountability and systemic 
culture of oppression that underscores the reality for Kurds in Turkey.
The third section will adopt a human rights law analysis to elucidate 
the existing safeguards for minority rights and the right to self-
determination under international law. Section four will then highlight the 
failure of Turkish law to comply with the aforementioned international 
standards to protect Kurdish rights as a minority group and to recognise 
their claim to self-determination. To date, Turkey has prioritised a unitary
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state approach leading to the disenfranchisement of Kurds and the persistent 
violation of their fundamental rights.2
The fifth section will employ a legal analysis of the right to self-
determination under international law and articulate the necessary tests and 
criteria for a successful claim to self-determination by a group. The 
concept of a distinct group, a minority and indigenous peoples will then be 
discussed.
The sixth section of this paper will address Turkey’s stance on self-
determination and will then apply self-determination to Kurds. By claiming 
their right to self-determination, Kurds can effectively combat the systemic 
oppression and abuse of their fundamental rights by Turkey. Indeed, this 
paper determines that Kurds need to have an active role in their governance, 
which places them at the centre as champions of change. The final section 
recommends a strategy for the Kurds in Bakur to gradually achieve an 
independent Kurdistan through the “earned sovereignty” approach.
II. WHO ARE THE KURDS?
“Kurdun heval ninin bes ciya ([t]he Kurds have no friends but the 
mountains).”3 Before embarking on an analysis of the problem in issue, 
what is meant by the “Kurds” and “Kurdistan” must be defined and used 
consistently throughout this paper.  This section also demonstrates that 
Kurds are a distinct group who, by virtue of their distinctness, have rights 
as a separate group and have a claim to self-determination.4
A. Historical Characteristics
In the ancient lands of Mesopotamia in the Middle East, there exists a 
geographical region where the Kurds form a prominent majority—
Kurdistan.  Kurdistan encompasses the area from the southern end of the 
Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, and the Northern Zagros and Eastern Taurus 
mountain ranges.5
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Kurds, who are of Aryan descent, are a unique ethnic group distinct 
from the neighbouring Arabs, Persians and Turks.6 The Kurds speak their 
own language deriving from the Iranian branch of the Indo-European group 
of languages.7 An independent Kurdistan has long been the dream of 
Kurds.
B. Twentieth Century Treatment
The triumph over the Ottoman Empire during the First World War led 
to the creation of the modern Middle East by the Allies.8 In 1920, the 
Ottoman Empire and the United Kingdom stipulated the Treaty of Sèvres, 
which assured Kurdish independence.9
However, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s victory at the Turkish War of 
Independence barred the ratification of the Treaty of Sèvres and the Allies 
reneged on their promise of Kurdish independence.10 In 1923, the Treaty of 
Sèvres was nullified and the Treaty of Lausanne superseded, containing no 
reference to Kurdistan. 11 Atatürk’s nationalist movement led to the 
occupation of the Kurdish regions and the region was split between the four 
newly emerged states—Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Persia (now Iran). 12
However, the Kurds have not acquiesced to domination quietly.  Since the 
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early 1920s, there have been a myriad of Kurdish rebellions in Bakur:  
Koçkiri, Sheikh Said, Dersim, and Ararat.13
In 1927, the Kurds, backed by the United Kingdom (U.K.), declared 
independence and formed the ‘Republic of Ararat’.14 However, this self-
proclaimed state was short-lived and the Turkish military conquered it in 
1930.15 Between 1937 and 1938, an estimated 50,000–70,000 Kurds were 
killed and thousands were exiled in a dire crackdown on Kurdish 
rebellion.16
C. The Kurds Today
Today, Kurdistan comprises a region partitioned between four 
different sovereign nations—northern Iraq (‘Bashur’), southeastern Turkey 
(‘Bakur’), northwestern Iran (‘Rojhalat’) and northeastern Syria 
(‘Rojava’).17
Kurds, estimated to have a population of approximately 25–30 million 
people, are the world’s largest ethnic group without a state.18 Kurdistan 
remains divided by the repressive colonialism of these states who have 
stifled any attempts by the Kurds of securing freedom against domination
and their struggles for the recognition of minority rights.19 The Kurds have 
endlessly “faced oppression, discrimination, assimilation, ethnic cleansing 
and genocide” at the hands of their oppressors.20 As encapsulated cogently, 
“the Kurds are one of the most persecuted minorities of our time.”21
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I believe that the current state of Kurdish populations continues the 
oppression of the Kurds by occupying colonialist states which denies their 
fundamental rights.  This paper will thus seek to remedy this situation and 
argue the case for Kurdish self-determination.
III. KURDS IN TURKEY
“The Turks are the only lords of this country, its only owners. Those 
who are not of pure Turkish stock have in this country only one right, that 
of being servants, of being slaves. Let friend and foe, and even the 
mountains know this truth!”22
Kurds are the largest ethnic and linguistic minority in Turkey and “are 
concentrated in [the] provinces of the southeast, the same [region] that their 
ancestors inhabited . . . in fifth century B.C.”23 Although there are no 
accurate statistics on Kurdish populations, as Turkish censuses do not 
identify Kurds as a separate ethnic group, it is estimated that half of the 
world’s Kurdish population are located in Turkey.24 Due to the size of the 
Kurds in Turkey, they are perceived as the ultimate threat to Turkish 
national unity and have been subject to various efforts to thwart their 
progress.  The purpose of this section, therefore, is to understand how 
Kurds are treated in Turkey.  In doing so, I highlight that because of such 
treatment, the case for self-determination of Kurds is urgent.
A. Historical Treatment & Movements of Kurds in Turkey
Since the aftermath of the First World War, “Kurds in Turkey have 
been the victims of persistent [abuses] of their linguistic, ethnic, cultural, 
religious, economic and political rights by successive Turkish 
Governments.”25
In an attempt to eradicate all vestige of Kurdish existence, extreme 
measures were adopted in the 1920s. In 1924, a “mandate [outlawed]
Kurdish schools, organisations and publications,” the use and teaching of 
the Kurdish language entirely and the wearing of Kurdish dress as part of a 
policy of compulsory assimilation. 26 All “Kurdish insignia were 
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outlawed.”27 The Turkish Government (the Government) even banned the 
words “Kurds,” “Kurdistan,” and “Kurdish” from usage and the Kurdish 
language was banned by law.28 The mere acknowledgement of Kurdish 
existence was illegal.29
Kurdish language suppression has been one of the Government's key 
strategies for assimilating the Kurds.30 The use of Kurdish was deemed a 
threat to Turkey’s unity and indivisibility and the use of the Kurdish 
language has historically been perceived as a sign of separatist intentions.31
The Government perceived that the use of Kurdish language would 
strengthen the identity of Kurds, increasing moves towards separatism and 
threatening political unity.32 It has been argued that speaking one’s mother-
tongue language is an important component linked to the manifestation of 
one’s identity, a sense of belonging and affiliation as identity is embodied 
in language, culture and tradition.33
Turkey demonstrated a deliberate intent to destroy Kurds, as 
evidenced by the policy of assimilation directed at them and their language. 
The policy should be more appropriately termed ethnocide—the eradication 
of Kurdish ethnic identity. 34 The Government categorised Kurds as 
“Mountain Turks.” 35 Ismet Inonü, former President of Turkey, 
encapsulated the attitude towards Kurds when he publicly announced, “We 
shall, at any price, Turkicize those who live in our country, and destroy 
those who rise up against the Turks and Turkdom.”36 Notwithstanding 
vigorous attempts over a long period to disseminate the Turkish language 
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amongst the Kurds, a majority of Kurds have preserved their native 
tongue.37
The Kurds have sought the inclusion of Kurdish as a language of 
instruction and as a subject in public schools.38 Presently, Kurdish is still 
prohibited as a language of instruction in both public and private schools 
but is allowed in some schools as a subject.39 The freedom to use mother 
tongue language by minority groups is an essential means for expressing 
their cultural identity, yet, as illustrated in this section, the Kurds were 
repeatedly bereft of this right.
B. Kurds as A Minority Group in Turkey
The recognition of a group as a minority is pivotal to the rights and 
protection they are afforded. This section aims to elucidate Turkey’s 
approach to the identification and status of Kurds as a minority group, 
legally and politically. The failure to recognise Kurds as a minority 
contributes to the ongoing human rights violations by Turkey and thus self-
determination is the best solution to ensure their protection as a minority 
group.
While the genesis of the conflict between the state and Kurds stems 
from the Ottoman era, the political and legal underpinning of Turkey’s 
stance pertinent to their Kurdish minority arose in the start of the 
Republican epoch.40 From its inception, the Republic of Turkey built a new 
state ideology to shape a modern nation on European premises of a single 
secular national identity.41 The notion of Turkish identity was premised on 
social and cultural conditioning rather than ethnicity. All Muslims were 
Turkish notwithstanding their ethnicity. 42 This ideological perspective 
defined Islam as the “homogenising glue of the Turkish nation” and was 
used as a restraint to countervail the influence of Kurdish nationalism.43
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Turkish policy towards the Kurdish minority is encapsulated by the 
term denial:  denial that Kurds exist in Turkey and denial that Kurds are a 
distinct group to Turks. This denial has been an underlying notion since the 
establishment of modern-day Turkey.44 During the negotiations for the 
Treaty of Lausanne, the Allies sought the inclusion of all minorities, 
including ethnic minorities, within the Treaty’s terms.45 However, Turkey 
rejected any distinct status for non-Turkish Muslims and defined minorities 
on the basis of religion excluding Turkey's numerous ethnic, linguistic and 
cultural minorities, specifically the Kurds.46 It only recognised official 
minority status for non-Muslim religious minorities, for example, Greek 
Christians, Armenian Christians and Jews.47
Problematically, the Treaty of Lausanne only safeguards rights for 
non-Muslim minorities and fails to consider in any way the cultural, 
linguistic or ethnic minorities in Turkey, of which the Kurds make up the 
greatest proportion of.48 A report by the Human Rights Advisory Board 
mandated by the government found that the minority definition used in the 
Treaty was too restrictive and recommended that the law be amended to 
recognise that minorities exist where groups are ethnically, linguistically 
and religiously different.49 Shortly after, the authors of the report faced 
criminal proceedings under Articles 216 (incitement of racial hatred) and 
301(denigration of the Turkish nation) of the Penal Code due to their stance 
in the report.50
Despite Turkey’s refusal to acknowledge the existence of Kurds as a 
distinct ethnicity or to give Kurds formal recognition as minorities, Turkey 
offered the semblance of protection of their minority rights through the 
affirmative obligations under the Treaty of Lausanne.51 Article 39 assured 
“[n]o restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national 
of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, 
or in publications of any kind or at public meetings.” 52 It further 
                                                        
44. INT’L HUM. RTS. L. GROUP, WASHINGTON, D.C.: THE COMM’N ON SEC. & COOPERATION 
IN EUR., CRIMINALIZING PARLIAMENTARY SPEECH IN TURKEY 8 (1994).
45. HUM. RTS. ADVISORY BOARD, THE MINORITY RIGHTS AND CULTURAL RIGHTS WORKING 
GROUP REPORT: OCTOBER 2004 1 (2004) [hereinafter WORKING GROUP REPORT].
46. Id.
47. Treaty of Lausanne, supra note 11 (referencing art. 39).
48. Id.
49. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 45, at 2.
50. EDWARD GRIEVES, KURDISH HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, SUPPRESSING ACADEMIC 
DEBATE: THE TURKISH PENAL CODE - TRIAL OBSERVATION REPORT 1, 22 (Joanna Hunt et al. eds.,
2006).
51. See Treaty of Lausanne, supra note 11.
52. Id. at 971 (referencing art. 39).
70 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 24:1
guaranteed:  “adequate facilities shall be given to Turkish nationals of non-
Turkish speech for the oral use of their own language before the Courts.”53
Turkey has continuously breached the Treaty of Lausanne. 54
However, even strict adherence to it would not comply with contemporary 
international standards and the changing expectations; it does not afford 
proper legal protection to minorities in Turkey.
1. Turkish Reform of Minority Rights for European Union
Membership
Turkey formally applied for full membership of the European Union 
(EU) in April 1987, and was recognised as a candidate for EU accession in 
1997.55 In its endeavour to satisfy the minority protection element of the 
EU membership criteria stipulated at the June 1993 European Council in 
Copenhagen (Copenhagen Criteria), Turkey legislated various 
constitutional and legislative reform laws.56 These reforms sought to grant 
ethnic and linguistic minorities some language rights, at least in theory.57
The reforms precipitated greater freedom of expression; ended the ban 
of publications and broadcasting in Kurdish and ushered a series of laws for 
teaching Kurdish as an elective subject in schools.58 However, Turkey has 
avoided any express reference that might indicate official recognition of its 
minorities. By demanding restrictive conditions, the Government has made 
the implementation of their limited minority rights essentially impossible.
C. The Birth of the PKK & Kurdish Independence Movements
Due to the dissatisfaction with the lack of change and progress, many 
Kurds have taken matters into their own hands to fight the repression by 
Turkey and protect their identity. While many Kurdish groups have 
emerged in the plight to ameliorate their rights in Turkey, the Kurdistan 
Workers' Party Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK) has been the most 
persistent in their activism.
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In 1978, Abdullah Öcalan founded the PKK, an armed left-wing 
organisation based in Bakur.59 The PKK’s ideology was initially based on 
revolutionary Marxism-Leninism and Kurdish nationalism. 60 At its 
inception, the PKK sought to create an independent, socialist Kurdish state 
comprised of all its constituents—Bakur, Bashur, Rojhalat and Rojava—to 
be known as Kurdistan. 61 However, since Öcalan’s capture and 
imprisonment in 1999, the PKK’s objective has been moderated to asserting 
cultural and political rights as well as self-determination for the Kurds in 
Bakur; the urge for the establishment of a fully independent state has been 
abandoned.62
Öcalan’s imprisonment has become a defining factor of the Kurdish 
struggle. Many PKK members, supporters and sympathisers have insisted 
that Öcalan’s freedom would epitomise the freedom of Kurds.63 However, 
the reality is that the prospect of Öcalan’s release from prison, absent a 
special amnesty, is non-existent.64 Öcalan is no longer facing death row as 
the Turkish legislature revoked the death penalty in 2002 as part of the 
array of reforms in preparation for EU accession.65 Thus, his sentence was 
reduced to life imprisonment. 66 In 2005, in his appeal regarding the 
fairness of his trial, the European Court of Human Rights ruled in his 
favour, however, Turkey rejected its findings on the grounds that the ruling 
was not binding on Turkey.67
During his time in prison, Öcalan’s ideology underwent a 
transformational shift and he led the PKK to adopt a new political platform 
of “Democratic Confederalism.” 68 According to Öcalan, Democratic 
Confederalism is not modelled on or controlled by a state system; it is a 
non-state social paradigm.69 He states “[t]his kind of rule or administration 
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can be called a non-state political administration or a democracy without a 
state.”70 Democratic Confederalism centres on grass-roots participation and 
decision-making within the communities.71 He asserted that we should not 
leave history to the United Nations (U.N.) concept of the nation-state but 
should instead formulate alternative modes of ordering.72
Over time, the PKK has grown more diverse and today is better 
understood as a party-complex—a configuration of parties and 
organisations encompassing numerous parties and their guerrilla forces.73
In 2007, the Association of Communities in Kurdistan—Koma Civakên 
Kurdistan (KCK)—was established in accordance with the new political 
trajectory. 74 KCK is a societal organisation of Kurds from all regions 
embodying Öcalan’s Democratic Confederalism and presents itself as an 
alternative to the concept of the nation-state.75 The KCK is essentially a 
network of village, city and regional councils across Kurdish zones whose 
legislative body is called the Kurdistan People’s Congress—Kongra-Gel.76
With a focus on organising from the bottom up through village, town, 
and city council assemblies, the Democratic Confederalism is a movement 
“which struggles to establish its own democracy, neither grounded on the 
existing nation-states nor seeing them as the obstacle.”77 Öcalan envisages 
the KCK as model for the resolution of Kurdish problems through a new 
political paradigm.78
D. Continuing Armed Conflict in Turkey
Since its inception, the PKK has successfully mobilised a great 
proportion of the Kurdish population in Bakur. 79 The first armed 
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insurgency launched by the PKK against Turkey began in 1984.80 Ever 
since, there have been various periods of ceasefires ranging in length and 
subsequent revocations of the ceasefire when the PKK believed their 
attempts to negotiate with the Government about the long-disenfranchised 
Kurdish minority were continuously ignored.81 On July 25, 2015, the PKK 
announced the end of the most recent ceasefire stating that Ankara had 
welched on its promises.82 Violence subsequently spread in the wake of 
resurgence throughout Turkey by the PKK and the Government.83
Since the war between the PKK and Turkey began in 1984, over 
40,000 people have been killed and the Government forcibly evacuated 
more than 3000 Kurdish villages, resulting in the destitution of 3 million 
people.84
The changing international circumstances that arose out of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks had severe repercussions internationally. It had immense 
impact on the EU’s engagement regarding the PKK and Turkey.85 “[T]he
European Council [proclaimed] the ‘fight against terrorism’ as a priority 
objective and [released] a list of ‘persons, groups and entities involved in 
terrorist acts.’”86 PKK is now listed as a terrorist organisation by a number 
of states and organisations internationally, including the EU 87 and the 
United States (U.S.).88
Despite that the armed insurgency instigated by the PKK being a result 
of—rather than cause of—the war between Turkey and the Kurds, the 
violence has overshadowed the roots of the war, allowing Turkey to frame 
it solely as counter-terrorism.89 This allows Turkey to disguise its human 
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rights violations in Bakur behind the cover of counter-terrorism.90 Instead 
of addressing the rights of Kurdish minorities, Turkey’s persistent focus on 
enforcing counter-terrorism policies against the PKK equates to a refusal to 
address the root causes of the conflict. An unescapable cycle currently 
exists whereby the Government attempts to quash Kurdish insurgency, 
despite the fact that this insurgency is itself a reaction to Turkey’s lack of 
recognition of Kurdish rights.
This section has demonstrated that despite the actions of Kurdish 
independence movements, Kurds in Turkey have been consistently 
oppressed, targeted and marginalised as a minority both historically and 
today. Kurds are still not recognised and protected as a minority by Turkey 
despite Turkey’s semblance of commitment to reform. Hence, it must be 
recognised that the panacea to the conflict is likely linked to better human 
rights for Kurds in Turkey and this can be achieved through self-
determination.
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ANALYSIS
“Behind all law is someone’s story; someone whose blood, if you read 
closely, leaks through the lines. Text does not beget text; life does. The 
question—a question of politics and history and therefore law—is whose
experience grounds what law?”91
This section adopts a human rights law analysis as an attempt to 
remedy the situation for Kurds in Turkey. Key international instruments 
will be examined to identify Turkey’s international obligations to protect 
minorities. Lastly, the shortcomings of Turkish law in protecting its 
minorities will be analysed to support the case that self-determination is the 
best solution for Kurdish minorities whose rights have been abused.
Under international law, Turkey is obliged to guarantee rights to its 
minority population.92 It is a party to many international conventions and 
instruments that oblige Turkey to protect and promote minority rights.93
The rights which are of particular concern to Kurdish minorities in Turkey 
and which are systematically abused are the right to self-determination, 
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right to education, right to take part in cultural life, freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, right to life and the right not to be subject to torture 
or degrading behaviour.94
While Turkey is state party to various international instruments, it has 
been reticent to become a party to binding international standards protecting 
minority rights. 95 However, many fundamental rights safeguarding 
minority culture and language are identified in various key international 
instruments to which Turkey is a party, so it cannot escape international law 
frameworks entirely.96
International human rights law is governed by “the International Bill 
of Human Rights which comprises the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights [UDHR], the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights [ICESCR], and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights [ICCPR] and its two Optional Protocols.”97 Turkey is a 
party to all these international human rights instruments as well as the 
European Convention on Human Rights.98
A. Universal Declaration of Human Rights
“The UDHR is a milestone document,” the first in history, to 
encapsulate the fundamental human rights to be universally protected.99
Drafted by representatives from all regions globally with differing legal and 
cultural backgrounds, the UDHR was manifested “as a common standard of 
achievements for all peoples and all nations.”100
In essence, the UDHR guarantees free participation in the cultural life 
of the community.101 It guarantees the right to education and recognises it 
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as an instrument to “promote understanding, tolerance and friendship 
among all nations, racial or religious groups.”102 The UDHR guarantees the 
right to freedom of expression, including “seek[ing], receiv[ing] and 
impart[ing] information and ideas through any media . . . .”103 “Turkey was 
among the [forty-eight] countries that voted for and signed the [UDHR].”104
While the UDHR is not a binding treaty and only has recommendatory 
status, it is mostly like to be seen as evidence of state practice and thus 
binding as customary international law on states.
B. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The ICCPR requires state parties to respect the civil and political 
rights of individuals in their nation.105 The ICCPR ensures the right of all 
peoples to retain their cultural and religious heritage and way of life.106 It 
protects the fundamental right to equality.107 It prohibits discrimination or 
adverse distinctions based on race, language, religion, political or cultural 
opinions, national or social origin.108
The ICCPR and the ICESCR, guarantee the right to self-determination, 
namely the freedom to determine political status and economic, social and 
cultural development in Article 1.109 State parties are obliged to promote 
the realisation of the right to self-determination and respect it in conformity 
with the provisions of the U.N. Charter.110 The right to self-determination 
is a fundamental provision empowering minorities to determine how they 
are governed.
In addition, it also guarantees individuals from minority groups culture 
and language rights. The ICCPR prohibits state parties from denying their 
minorities the right “in community with the other members of their group, 
to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to 
use their own language.”111 The ICCPR guarantees the right to freedom of 
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expression, including seeking, receiving and imparting information and 
ideas through any media.112
While Turkey ratified the ICCPR in September 2003, it issued a 
reservation to Article 27 that this Article would be implemented pursuant to 
the Turkish Constitution and the Treaty of Lausanne 1923.113 The effect of 
Turkey’s reservation in practice means the exclusion of its application to 
Kurds.
C. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
The ICESCR, another international instrument that Turkey ratified in 
2003, guarantees the universal right to take part in cultural life.114 “The 
right . . . to take part in cultural life is ‘intrinsically linked’ to the right to 
education [in Article 13,] which [empowers] individuals and communities 
[to] pass on their . . . language and other cultural references . . . .”115 To 
realise these rights, individuals must be able to express themselves in the 
language of their choice,116 and to seek, receive and impart information on 
all manifestations of culture in the language of their choice.117
Crucially, states must employ measures and “spare no effort” so that 
education for minorities is carried out in their own language.118 This arises 
from states’ obligations “to recognize, respect and protect minority cultures 
as an essential component of the identity of the states themselves.”119 The 
ICESCR recognises education as a vehicle that should be used for
strengthening adherence with other fundamental rights and freedoms.120
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) 
requires states to ensure their education systems are available, acceptable, 
accessible and adaptable.121 Essentially, this means that the burden is on 
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the state to take affirmative action in ensuring “education is culturally 
appropriate for minorities . . . .”122 The state must ensure education is 
accessible to everyone without discrimination both in theory and in 
practice, and that it is accessible physically and economically.123 It needs to 
be adaptable to the demands of fluid and ever-changing societies and 
communities as well as meet the needs of all people within their diverse 
social and cultural circumstances.124 These standards posit a strong case for 
mother-tongue education.
The ICESCR emphasises the principles of non-discrimination and, 
crucially, underline that the right to education must “enable all persons to 
effectively participate in a free society . . . .”125 States should promote 
understanding amongst all ethnic, racial and religious groups and ensure 
that equal educational opportunities are afforded to all minorities.126
Despite Turkey being a signatory to the ICESCR, it has issued 
reservations to interpret and apply the ICESCR provisions regarding 
academic freedom consistent with the Turkey Constitution.127 Specifically, 
Turkey’s Constitution states that Turkish is the only official language of the 
State and denies the right to education in other languages.128 While states
are permitted to choose one or more national or official languages, they are 
not permitted to exclude, outside the spheres of public life, the freedom to 
express oneself in a language of one’s own choice.129
The CESCR has voiced its concern over Turkey’s reservation and 
recommended that Turkey withdraw its reservations to the ICESCR.130 The 
CESCR has further recommended that Turkey apply and interpret the 
ICESCR taking into consideration the jurisprudence of the CESCR. 131
Pertinent to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, state parties 
cannot submit a reservation that is “incompatible with the object and 
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purpose of the [Covenant].”132 This would be true of the reservations 
Turkey has made to the ICCPR and ICESCR. While Turkey has made 
reservations to certain provisions of the ICCPR and ICESCR, the 
reservations would only be applicable to the rights found in those 
provisions; they would not apply to the same rights that also make up 
customary international law.133 States are bound to customary international 
law.134
Turkey has still not taken positive measures in the negotiation and 
adoption of an optional protocol to the ICESCR. The adoption of an 
optional protocol would provide an avenue for victims seeking public 
accountability and the possibility of relief in relation to the violations of 
individual economic, social and cultural rights at an international level, if 
they are denied access to justice domestically.135
D. European Convention on Human Rights
Turkey is a party to the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). 136 The ECHR is pivotal:  individuals subject to Turkey’s 
domestic law have direct recourse, depending on meeting specific criteria, 
to subject to the jurisdiction of the ECtHR to complain of a violation of 
their rights under the ECHR.137
The right to equality is fundamental. However, Turkey has been 
reluctant to ratify Protocol 12 to the ECHR, which protects the free-
standing right to equality, despite signing it in 2001.138 The purpose of 
Protocol 12 is to promote equality beyond the limited scope afforded by 
Article 14.139 Effectively, Protocol 12 supplements Article 14. Article 14 
serves as a general prohibition against discrimination; however, it can only 
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be invoked if a circumstance is within the ambit of a right stipulated under 
the ECHR.140
Article 14 imposes an obligation “on the State and public authorities, 
acting within the scope of convention rights, not to discriminate on the 
[enumerated] grounds or any other status, . . . [without justification].”141
The possibility of justifying discrimination is a weakness which could 
diminish the force of the principle.
Some academics have criticised that the ECtHR habitually elects to 
decide cases based on other Articles rather than Article 14 even where 
discrimination is crucial to the case.142 Article 14 is not a stand-alone right 
and is only applicable in accordance with another provision under the 
ECHR, thus limiting its potential application.143 It is much narrower in its 
scope of application than the ICCPR equivalent in Article 26.144 Such 
weaknesses mark the failure of the ECtHR to embrace a substantive 
conception of equality which would confront systematic disadvantage and 
oppression.145 This failure underlies Judge Bonello’s dissenting judgment 
in Anguelova v. Bulgaria:
Kurds, coloureds, Muslims, Roma and others are again and again 
killed, tortured or maimed, but the Court is not persuaded that 
their race, colour, nationality or place of origin has anything to 
do with it. Misfortunes punctually visit disadvantaged minority 
groups, but only as the result of well-disposed coincidence.146
While studies of the ECtHR jurisprudence found that the ECtHR had 
taken steps to protect the marginalised in Europe, it still treads carefully.
The studies show that Article 3 and Article 8 were predominantly used for 
the protection of the marginalised, rather than Article 14.147
E. Turkish Constitution
Turkey’s ideology is based on the premise that the citizens’ first duty 
is to safeguard the integrity of the Republic. This is incompatible with the 
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inclusive and pluralistic culture of democratic tolerance advocated by 
international human rights standards. The emphasis of international norms 
is on the notion that it is the responsibility of nation states to safeguard the 
rights of its citizens. However, the cultural ideology of Kemalist Turkey 
demonstrates the opposite of these international standards.148
The fundamental law of Turkey is Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasi (the 
Constitution).149 As required by international standards, Article 10 of the 
Constitution states, everyone is equal before the law without distinction as 
to “language, race, colour, sex, political opinion, philosophical belief, 
religion and sect, or any such [grounds].”150 However, when read in light 
of the Treaty of Lausanne, the prohibition against discrimination is 
rendered ineffective in practice in regards to Kurds who are not recognised 
as a minority group under the Treaty of Lausanne.151
Article 3 identifies Turkish as the only official language, despite Kurds 
constituting a significant proportion of the Turkish population.152 Article 
42 emphasises this restriction further, stating “[n]o language other than 
Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any 
institutions of . . . education.”153 The requirement that education shall “be 
conducted along the lines of the principles and reforms of Atatürk . . . under 
the supervision and control of the State,” means that even a reformist 
administration wanting to advocate for the use of mother-tongue education 
is constitutionally bound to embrace a nationalist Turkish State.154
Turkey’s Constitution fails to address minorities and makes no 
reference to the word “minority” at all. In Turkey, no legal framework 
exists to date for the protection of minorities, whether directly through 
legislation explicitly protecting minority rights or indirectly through anti-
discrimination laws.155
The lack of a Turkish legal framework on non-discrimination and 
minority rights has not been overlooked and has been routinely condemned 
by U.N. monitoring bodies. 156 European bodies have also denounced 
Turkey’s refusal to safeguard the rights of Kurdish minorities and urged for 
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Constitutional reform.157 The CESCR has urged Turkey to enact legislation 
to protect against discrimination consistent with the ICESCR and its 
General Comment on non-discrimination.158 The CESCR has also raised 
concerns about the lack of a legislative framework for the recognition of all 
minority groups in Turkey, and the protection of their rights.159 Indeed, the 
CESCR formally called on Turkey to recognise all minorities within its 
territory and bestow full opportunities for minorities to enjoy economic, 
social and cultural rights.160
While the implementation of rights consistent with international norms 
has considerably improved recently, there are still immense shortcomings to 
be addressed. 161 Rights standards within international and European 
treaties are not fully implemented. There is an urgent need for Turkey to 
adopt a comprehensive legal framework on combating discrimination and 
protecting minorities in accordance with international standards. Turkey 
must adopt a more inclusive definition of minorities that meets international 
standards and that includes all minorities, not only non-Muslim minorities 
as currently under the Treaty of Lausanne. The Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe (PACE) has already proposed the following 
definition for minorities:
A group of persons in a state who: 
a) Reside in the territory of that State and are citizens thereof . . . ;
b) Maintain long standing, firm and lasting ties with that state; 
c) Display distinctive ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic         
characteristics;
d) Are sufficiently representative, although smaller in number 
than the rest of the population of the state . . . ; and
e) Are motivated by a concern to preserve together that which 
constitutes their common identity, including their culture, their     
traditions, their religion or their language.162
Turkey should adopt this definition of minorities to give effect to 
Article 2 of the ICCPR and ICESCR and ensure that Kurds as well as other 
minorities are captured under definition.
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F. Other Instruments
There are several other key international instruments that Turkey has 
either failed to ratify or has ratified but failed to meet which are 
fundamental to the protection of Kurds.
Despite international pressure, Turkey has not acceded to the 
Framework Convention on National Minorities (FCNM). Turkey’s 
ratification of FCNM is crucial, particularly due to Turkey’s reservation to 
Article 27 of the ICCPR and also considering the FCNM is the only 
multilateral binding treaty concerning minority rights specifically.163 PACE 
has persistently urged Turkey to accede to the FCNM.164
Additionally, Turkey has not ratified the U.N. Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Convention against Discrimination 
in Education 1960, the European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages or the European Convention on Nationality. 165 In light of 
Turkey’s historical and present relationship with its minority population, its 
unwillingness to implement international standards on minority protection 
and rights questions sheds uncertainty on the genuineness of its pledge to 
respect and uphold minority rights within its jurisdiction.
Using a human rights law analysis, it is thus clear that Turkey is 
failing to uphold and sustain international human rights standards in 
relation to Kurds in its territory. This status quo cannot go on any longer 
and hence I argue that self-determination is the most appropriate legal 
framework to change this.
V. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AGAINST KURDS IN TURKEY 
“[T]here’s really no such thing as the ‘voiceless’. There are only the 
deliberately silenced, or the preferably unheard.”166 Turkey is failing to 
comply with their international human rights obligations in guaranteeing 
fundamental rights for minorities under their national legal framework, both 
in theory and practice. As Kurban has stated:  “The crux of the Kurdish 
issue remains the structural inequalities against the Kurds . . . . These 
inequalities are deeply rooted in Turkey’s authoritarian political regime and 
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can only be addressed through structural reforms aimed at establishing 
substantive democracy and the rule of law.”167
This fundamentally stems from Turkey’s persistent reluctance to 
recognise minority groups, largely due to an ingrained fear of disunity of 
the nation state. Turkey’s refusal to officially recognise minority rights 
renders the guarantees stipulated in the Constitution futile. This is 
exacerbated by the broad restrictions entrenched in the Constitution on 
protecting Turkey’s indivisibility and unity, an instrument which could be 
exploited to stifle any perceived indication of separatist intention by the 
Kurds.168
The escalation of violence in the Kurdish regions of Turkey has raised 
significant concerns over human rights violations. The ECtHR has found 
that since September 2014 Turkey “violated the ECHR in [ninety-two]
cases [pertaining] mainly to the right to life, prohibition of torture, right to a 
fair trial, right to respect for family life, freedom of expression, freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion and right to liberty and security.”169
The fundamental rights of Kurds need to be strengthened in Turkey 
both in law and in practice. Turkey insists that it places great significance 
on the preservation of cultural heritage. It claims that tolerance and 
diversity are core notions underlying its policy and that these are protected 
by the fundamental rights to “freedom of religion and conscience, freedom 
of thought and opinion, freedom of expression and dissemination of 
thought,” freedom of press, “protection of the historical, natural and 
cultural heritage, and the promotion of arts.”170 While human rights are 
safeguarded in theory under the Constitution, in practice these rights are 
applied discriminatorily when they concern Kurds.171 Existing violations of 
human rights in Turkey include:
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a) The lack of protection of Kurdish language and cultural rights;
b) The exploitation of terrorism laws used to imprison members 
and sympathisers of legal Kurdish parties, students and 
                   journalists, for which there is usually insufficient evidence of 
                   violent activity;
c) The lack of accountability to date for breaches for thousands 
of causes of torture, forced disappearances and the death of 
civilians by state officials throughout the 1990s within the 
background of the conflict between the Government and the 
PKK.172
As discussed in Section III above, Turkey still denies the constitutional 
existence of Kurds and has systematically failed to protect its Kurdish 
minority population. A plethora of reports by various organisations 
dedicated to observing human rights compliance provide conclusive 
evidence of the extent to which malpractice and discriminatory laws have 
contributed to mass human rights violations against the Kurds. 173 The 
apparatus of the state has contributed to an atmosphere of lawlessness and 
impunity of the abuse of human rights violations against the Kurds.
ECtHR has consistently condemned Turkey for its abysmal human 
rights record.174 During the ECtHR’s fifty-year history, Turkey has had the 
highest number of violation judgments against it; more than any of the other 
forty-six signatory states to the ECtHR.175 Turkey was ranked the highest 
for convictions for rights violations by the ECtHR from 1959 to 2011.176
Many cases before ECtHR and the European Commission have a concerned 
trend of extensive and systematic human rights abuses against Kurds by the 
Turkish state and its agents.177
The cases are predominately focused geographically and ethnically, in 
Kurdish regions and related to either Kurdish victims or Kurdish cause 
supporters.178 In the decade following 1999, Turkey was found in breach of 
human rights in essentially all of the 1700 cases brought against it before 
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the ECtHR.179 The ubiquitousness of human rights violations against Kurds 
are indicative of widespread practice and illustrate how human rights 
violations by Turkey are carried out disproportionately against the Kurdish 
minority.
Notwithstanding the prevalence of human rights violation cases 
against it, Turkey continues to routinely engage in repressive measures in 
the face of what it deems a threat to the state’s unity:  the manifestation of 
Kurdish cultural and linguistic identity and their plight for rights and self-
determination.180 Turkey’s insistence on linguistic and cultural unity and 
the goal of establishing an immensely homogeneous state make it difficult, 
to recognise a legitimate space for ethnic diversity and thus lie at the root of 
the conflict.181
Turkey has repeatedly, and continues to, violate the human rights of
Kurds living in its territory.  Turkey thus fails to meet international human 
rights standards both in theory and law, and in practice. Hence, I will now 
argue that the right to self-determination is the best solution for Kurds to 
determine their future and end the injustice against them.
VI. THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION
“Self-determination is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle 
of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril.”182 Given 
their common background, history, language and culture, Kurds qualify as a 
distinct group in Turkey and have the right to self-determination. The right 
to self-determination needs to be recognised under both Turkish law and 
international law. This section will analyse self-determination as a 
fundamental principle under international law. It will set out the legal 
criteria which must be satisfied for a claim to self-determination, namely 
what constitutes a people, to make the case that Kurds meet the legal 
definition of a distinct “people” and thus have a right to self-determination.
A. Self-Determination Under International Law
The right of nations to self-determination is a fundamental principle in 
international law.183 It is considered a rule of customary international law 
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and is deemed as an erga omnes principle by the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ).184
Self-determination was introduced by Woodrow Wilson after World 
War I. 185 Wilson likened self-determination to the American ideal of 
democracy and advocated it as the “foreign extension of American norms 
of political fairness.”186 It has since been recognised as a universal right of 
peoples to be free from domination by oppressors.187 The U.N. Charter 
states that nations, based on respect for the principle of equal rights and fair 
equality of opportunity, have the right to freely choose their sovereignty 
and international political status with no interference.188 The notion of self-
determination is deemed an “inalienable” right of all peoples or an 
“essential condition” for the effective guarantee and the observance of 
individual human rights.189
The right to self-determination can be defined as “the capacity of 
people to control and participate in decision making in determining their 
political status, in pursuing their economic, social, and cultural 
development, and disposing of their natural wealth and resources.” 190
States are required to implement this right and to facilitate its realisation.191
This obligation became more pressing when the U.N. Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) required state parties to the ICCPR and the ICESCR to 
report on “the constitutional and political processes which in practice allow 
the exercise of this right.”192
Under international law, the right of distinct “peoples” within 
sovereign states to self-determination is recognised and their cultural, 
physiological, linguistic and religious differences from other groups in a 
given territory may be determinative of their status as a “peoples.” 193
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International treaties have upheld the right by reference to it as the right of 
peoples to self-determination. 194 Article 1(1) of the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR stipulate, “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By 
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”195 Article 1(3) of 
the ICCPR and ICESCR say that State Parties “shall promote the realisation 
of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right . . . .”196
Generally, under international law, no state or group of people have 
the right to violate the territorial integrity and sovereignty of another state. 
A state’s sovereignty is pivotal. However, “self-determination [can 
override] territorial integrity when a [state] has:  i) violated the “economic, 
social, and cultural development” of a people . . . ; and ii) the people have a 
valid territorial claim to the area that they wish to claim.”197
Many issues stem from the ambiguity around the right to self-
determination. It is unclear how the decision in relation to self-
determination is to be made, how the right is realised, or what the outcome 
should be—whether it should be independence, federation, protection, some 
form of autonomy or full assimilation. Neither the U.N. Charter nor the 
international treaties define what constitutes a nation for the purposes of the 
right to self-determination.
There are irreconcilable definitions and legal criteria for deciding 
which groups have a legitimate claim to self-determination.  Professor 
Alfredsson argues that the term “nation” was replaced with “peoples” by 
the U.N. for a practical rationale as the former was too ethnically loaded,
although the two terms can be used interchangeably.198 International law 
implies the solution is all in the label; if a group is labelled a “people” then 
the right to self-determination exists, if a group is labelled a “minority” then 
it does not. 199 Ultimately, these definitions can have severe legal
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repercussions.200 The failure of states to grant a group rights is an issue 
requiring better classification of groups. 201 Specifically, in relation to 
minorities, the lack of an encompassing definition is misused as a 
justification for not granting them the appropriate rights.202
B. The Requirement of A Distinct Group
For a group of people to attain the right to self-determination, they 
have to be sufficiently “distinct” as a people.203 The criteria for whether a 
people can attain this distinctiveness can be split into objective elements 
and subjective elements.204 The traditional two-prong test first examines 
the objective elements of the group to ascertain the extent of the shared 
“common racial background, ethnicity, language, religion, history and 
cultural heritage” of the group.205 Secondly, to satisfy the subjective prong 
of the test, the group members have to individually perceive themselves 
collectively as a distinct “people.”206 Some academics within international 
law discourse have defined peoples and nations using two very different 
methods:  the “territorial approach” and the “characteristics approach.”207
Each of these methods will be discussed in turn.
1. The Territorial Approach
The territorial approach focuses on persons within a defined territory, 
often the territory of a nation-state and identified them as a “people.”208 “A
people [means] one territory or one state with one people.”209 In using the 
territorial approach to defining a “people,” it is necessary to distinguish 
three key elements associated with self-determination:  “the situation on the 
ground [or the reality], the theory and the practice.”210 While you would 
expect reality and state practice to intersect, it is not always so with this 
approach.
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“The [notion] of self-determination was stipulated in the U.N. Charter 
and [enacted within] the context of the decolonisation of Africa.”211 The 
situation on the ground in Africa is clear in that sense that prior, during and 
following decolonisation, all concerned states were multi-national. 212
Crucially, prior to decolonisation, the colonies were also multinational.213
At this point, practice during decolonisation was to endow the right of self-
determination to peoples based on territorial grounds.214
Following the first ripple of decolonisation, the right to self-
determination was denied to groups in the recently independent states on 
the basis that they had already implemented that right in achieving 
independence.215 “Theoretically, [the right to] self-determination became 
international law [when it was elucidated] in the U.N. Charter.” 216
“However, General Assembly Resolution 1541 [fleshed out] self-
determination and decolonisation.”217 U.N. resolutions and international 
treaties clarify that it is possible for any one territory to have several 
peoples existing within its parameters, specifically by referring to “a 
territory and its peoples.”218
2. The Characteristic Approach
In contrast, the characteristics approach identifies a “people” by 
reference to the common characteristics of its constituent members. 219
“This means many peoples could exist within the same territory.”220 Under 
this approach, group composition and common characteristics ascertain the 
group’s category and whether they qualify for particular rights. 221
According to UNESCO, the common characteristics determining a 
“people” can be, but are not limited to, “a common historical tradition, 
racial or ethnic identity, cultural homogeneity, linguistic unity, religious or 
ideological affinity, territorial connection, and common economic life.”222
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To be identified as a “people,” the group needs to be “more than a 
mere association of individuals within the [s]tate,” however there is no 
prerequisite about how large the group must be.223 Furthermore, UNESCO 
stipulated that holistically the group “must have the will to be identified as 
a people . . . or the consciousness of being a people” and “have institutions 
or other means of expressing its common characteristics and will for 
identity.” 224 While the UNESCO criteria were written by experts and 
continues to have force in academia, it has never been adopted 
internationally.225
A “people” can be determined by either of the aforementioned 
approaches. Pursuant to the territorial approach, every state that has 
seceded, following the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples, has breached international law.226 “The 
territorial approach does not [accept] secession, [because] there can only be 
one people in one state.”227 In reality, we know that most states are not 
homogenous and are actually comprised of more than one group—who may 
be different culturally, ethnically and/or religiously.228 Therefore, I argue 
that an approach that takes all common characteristics into consideration 
when defining a “people” is pivotal if international law is to be relevant or 
applicable practically. The characteristics approach, which looks at the 
defining characteristics of a people, is very similar to the way minorities are 
defined.229
C. Minorities 
International law is lacking in terms of providing a clear binding 
definition of the term “minority.”230 Today, the most prevalent definition of 
a minority continues to be the definition Fransceso Capotorti, the then U.N. 
Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, proposed in 1977 in relation to 
Article 27 of the ICCPR:
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A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a 
State, in a non-dominant position, whose members?being 
nationals of the State?possess ethnic, religious or linguistic 
characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population 
and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed 
towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or 
language.231
The territorial approach has limited relevance in defining a minority; it 
is relevant primarily in considering whether a group is settled 
predominantly in a region or whether its constituent members are dispersed 
over regions as this can affect their rights.232 For example, if the Kurds are 
deemed a minority then the territorial approach is relevant to determining 
that its members are spread across four states and consequently this affects 
the realisation of their rights.
The implication for minorities in practice is that even if a binding 
definition was adopted, the existence of a minority simply due to a legal 
definition is not in itself sufficient. A state needs to recognise the group as 
a minority and their rights. While there is no condition that a state must 
recognise the minority for the theoretical definition, practically, without 
state recognition, definitions are rendered meaningless. Thus, there is an 
apparent gap between practice and theory. Generally, the view was that a 
definition of the term “minority” was a sine qua non to ensuring the 
international protection of minorities is a workable regime in practice; there 
are, however, proponents of the idea that theory is superfluous and what 
matters is that minorities realise their rights.233
The former United Nations Working Group on Minorities stipulated 
that individuals of an ethnic group may seek protection under minority 
rights and they may, when acting as part of a group, assert claims pertinent 
to the right to self-determination.234
A determinative factor in minorities realising their rights is the state in 
which they live in. While minority rights derive from international law, the 
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state maintains responsibility for guaranteeing them.  Without state 
recognition, minorities are bereft of their minority rights.235
D. Indigenous Peoples
In international law, the crux of the definition of an “indigenous 
people” is whether a group considers itself as distinct from other groups, 
whether there is a shared common ancestry with the occupants of a given 
territory before its domination by another group or series of groups, 
whether they live in a specific geographic area, and whether they share a 
language, culture, and history.236 A people’s indigenous status stems from 
them inhabiting a region before other settlers moved in as a result of 
conquest, occupation, colonisation endangering the indigenous peoples’ 
livelihoods and very existence.237
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP) recognises indigenous peoples’ right to unrestricted self-
determination. 238 The right to self-determination includes the right “to 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development.”239 Article 4 ensures indigenous peoples’ 
right “to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal 
and local affairs,” and Article 5 safeguards their right “to maintain and 
strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural 
institutions.”240 Article 26 states that “[i]ndigenous peoples have the right 
to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, 
occupied or otherwise used or acquired,” and it requires states to give legal 
recognition to these territories.241
In addition to UNDRIP, international human rights law contained in 
other treaties and international legal materials such as the ICCPR and
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ICESCR also guarantee indigenous peoples the right of cultural and 
religious self-determination.242
The right to self-determination is guaranteed in international law; 
however, the legal requirements, definitions and categorisation of groups 
are pertinent to establishing a claim to self-determination.  The law on self-
determination is appropriate to apply to the Kurds in Turkey who have been 
denied their fundamental rights and I will apply it in the following section.
VII. APPLICATION OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION
“Self-determination denotes the legal right of people to decide their 
own destiny in the international order.”243 The right to self-determination 
has been guaranteed for distinct “peoples” and indigenous peoples, 
however, the same right does not extend to minority groups.244 I believe 
there is a compelling case for applying self-determination to Kurds and that 
the test for self-determination can be substantiated regardless of which 
category is used. Kurds satisfy the criteria for a “peoples”—a minority and 
indigenous peoples—and have the right to self-determination. In this 
section the historical application of self-determination will be examined and 
then Turkey’s stance on self-determination. Lastly, I will apply self-
determination to Kurds and stipulate the specific demands of self-
determination by Kurds.
A. Historical Application of Self-Determination
Self-determination rights have been bestowed through various forms 
such as independence or at the very least autonomy to many peoples whom 
were subject to Ottoman imperialism including, the Armenians, Israelis, 
Lebanese, Iraqis, Syrians, Jordanians, and Saudi Arabians.245
The right to self-determination has also been extended to many 
peoples that were living within nation states that were established following 
World War II. 246 When the principle of self-determination was first 
introduced following the Great War, it was applied solely to nations and 
envisaged in its internal form.247 However since World War II, there has 
been a shift in the way the right is perceived and it has become a right for 
peoples.  The way self-determination has been stipulated through 
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international law more recently, it appears it is mostly applicable to peoples 
and indigenous peoples; there is limited discourse around the right of 
minorities to self-determination.
“The [nexus] between minority rights and the right to self-
determination [is legitimised pursuant to the fulfilment] of the principle of 
substantive equality, human rights, the right to identity and culture, and 
self-determination’s [significance] for democratic governance.” 248 Self-
determination can be realised through numerous avenues ranging from 
actual participatory democracy to legal pluralism in which rights such as 
the right to cultural, linguistic, and political autonomy are exerted.249 An 
analysis of the principle of self-determination, historically, illustrates an 
indissoluble connection between indispensability for minority protection 
and the right to self-determination. This connection became increasingly 
apparent in the International Committee of Jurists’ advisory report in 
relation to Åaland Islands where the protection of minorities and the right to 
self-determination were deemed as embracing “a common object to assure 
to some national [g]roup the maintenance and free development of its 
social, ethnical or religious characteristics.”250
B. Turkey’s Stance on Self-Determination 
In Turkey, there is currently no reference to the right to self-
determination in the Turkish Constitution or any other legislation. Even 
where rights exist in international law, the realisation of those rights depend 
on the state.  Without Turkey’s recognition, Kurdish are bereft of their 
rights. In the international arena, Turkey’s political and legal stance 
regarding the right to self-determination and minority rights has been 
unreceptive to changes in international law.
Turkey has a tendency to refuse to adopt or ratify internationally 
binding instruments that entail rights of people to self-determination, 
reassert the rights of minority groups as a separate legal category, or are 
international documents predominantly dealing with minority rights. 251
Turkey has not adopted “the European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages, 1992, the Framework Convention on National Minorities, 1995, 
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or the ECHR’s Optional Protocol 12 on discrimination.”252 Furthermore, 
Turkey has not ratified the U.N. Convention on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions of 2005, which is 
concerned with “[t]he protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural 
expressions . . . the recognition of equal dignity of and respect for all 
cultures, including the cultures of persons belonging to minorities and 
indigenous peoples.”253
Even when it has adopted international binding instruments, Turkey 
has been sure to make reservations in the face of anything that would 
constitute minority protection, reserving its right to interpret and apply the 
provisions of any treaty or document in accordance with the Constitution of 
the Republic of Turkey and the Treaty of Lausanne.254 Practically, this 
means it limits the application of any international protection to those 
identified in the Constitution as minorities such as the Greeks, Armenian 
and Jews, and rejects the potential application to the unrecognised 
minorities in Turkey, such as the Kurds, Alevis and Romas.
Turkey’s reservations to Article 1(1), which appear both in the 
ICESCR and the ICCPR, state that it will perform its obligations under 
those Covenants in accordance with the obligations under the U.N. 
Charter. 255 Ultimately, Turkey accepts “self-determination” as a 
“principle,” however, denies “self-determination” as a “right” and confines 
its application to colonial territories.256 Through its denial of the right to 
self-determination as a “right,” Turkey seeks to evade its legal implications, 
which require states to take action towards fulfilling the right to self-
determination.257
Turkey has persistently denied the relevance of self-determination to 
democracy.  A study on Turkey’s voting patterns in the U.N. General 
Assembly revealed that Turkey also routinely denied the relevance of self-
determination to groups within states.258 During voting in the U.N. General 
Assembly for strategies connecting the right of peoples to self-
determination and protection of substantive human rights, Turkey either 
voted against or remained absent.259
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Turkey has also voted against, or abstained from voting for, any 
resolution before the General Assembly advocating the protection of 
cultural rights or the collective facets of human rights.260 Turkey’s attitude 
to the right to self-determination demonstrates that it takes case-specific and 
very political stances. There have been scenarios where Turkey has 
willingly backed the right to self-determination, for example in the case of 
Northern Cyprus, or has manifested support for the exercise of self-
determination, for example in the case of Kosovo.261 The Turkish Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs’ said it would render its full support in “developing a 
positive and constructive dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia” in response 
to the ICJ’s advisory opinion that Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence is 
legal under international law.262 Turkey’s support of self-determination in 
the context of Kosovo may be attributed to the equivocal nature of the ICJ’s 
advisory opinion.
The most prevalent method the Government has used to persistently 
deny the Kurds their right to self-determination is the criminalisation of 
political and civil society organisations promoting Kurdish rights and 
freedoms.263 The Government, through associating political support for the 
Kurds with separatism, has taken advantage of the anti-terror laws to 
prohibit pro-Kurdish parties, remove them from positions in the political 
system and justify their subsequent arrest.264 This strategy of outlawing 
peaceful and genuine Kurdish political parties, systematically, has been 
used by the government from the early 1970s and has curbed the ability of 
Kurdish parties to effectively and meaningfully participate in the Turkish 
political system.265
C. Turkey’s Constitutional Court and the Right to Self-Determination
Within the Turkish legal system, the perspective on the right to self-
determination is encapsulated by the judgments of Turkey’s highest court, 
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the Turkish Constitutional Court—Anayasa Mahkemesi (AYM) on political 
party closures.
These cases arose when a series of Kurdish political parties were 
closed down for insisting on the right to self-determination and striving for 
rights including legal protection of their culture and language.266 They 
urged for a resolution to the “Kurdish problem” with proposals ranging 
“from federation, territorial autonomy to devolution of power.”267 The 
AYM’s main rationale for the closure of Kurdish political parties was 
grounded in Article 3 of the Constitution which states, “The Turkish State, 
with its territory and nation, in an indivisible entity.” 268 Article 3 is 
considered so important that it cannot be amended nor can its amendment 
even be proposed, as set out in Article 4.269
The phrase “the state’s indivisible unity with its nation and territory” 
[has been labelled a substitute] for the unitary state system.270 The phrase is 
repeated throughout the Constitution and is identified as “one of the 
fundamental aims of the state in [Article 5].”271 Articles 14, 26 and 28 
stipulate that “the state’s indivisible unity with its nation and territory” can 
trump fundamental rights and freedoms for its protection. 272 Anything 
contrary to the state’s indivisible integrity with its nation and territory is 
banned.273 Ultimately, Article 3 preserves the notion of “one state, one 
nation, one language, one country.”274
Under Article 80 of the Law on Political Parties 1983, political parties 
are prohibited from legally demanding and taking action to change the 
unitary nature of Turkey.275 This provision has routinely been used to 
collapse pro-Kurdish parties that promote decentralisation.276 Article 81 
states that political parties shall not “maintain that there are minorities in 
the territory of Turkey based on differences of national or religious culture, 
or race, or language,” and shall not “harm national unity by way of creating 
minorities in the territory of the Republic of Turkey through protecting, 
                                                        
266. Bayir, supra note 190, at 10–11.
267. Id. at 15.
268. Id. at 15–16; THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY CONSTITUTION, art. 3 (1982).
269. Bayir, supra note 190, at 15 n.41.
270. Id. at 15.
271. Id. at 15 n.42.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 15.
274. Bayir, supra note 190, at 16.
275. Id. at 15.
276. Michael M. Gunter, Turkey:  The Politics of a New Democratic Constitution, MIDDLE E.
POL’Y, Spring 2012, at 119, 120.
2017] Gardi 99
developing or spreading languages and cultures other than the Turkish 
language or culture.”277
The AYM has denied the relevance of minority protection and the 
right to self-determination to Kurds and has denied their connection to the 
safeguarding of human rights and to democracy overall.278 Essentially, the 
AYM’s narrow interpretation of the unitary state system has been used as a 
lawful justification in undermining Kurds’ demands.279
The AYM’s judgments identify, as one of the aims of the unitary state 
concept, the need to prevent the creation of a minority in Turkey.280 In one
judgment, the AYM declared that there is sole sovereignty in a unitary 
system, and thus there ought to be only one nation.281 The concept of 
federalism and autonomous regions are incompatible with this notion as 
they allow for many sovereignties belonging to various nations.
Sovereignty is a right belonging to the Turkish nation, and not the 
people.  The Kurds’ only right to sovereignty is being part of the sovereign 
Turkey. Thus, separatist ideologies aimed at the creation of a Kurdish 
nation bestowed with sovereignty are unlawful.282
To date, the AYM has only referred to the right to self-determination 
in its “external aspect [implying] secession.”283 As a result, by equating 
self-determination to secession, the AYM has made any claim for the right 
to self-determination illegal. 284 The AYM has asserted that discussing 
“ethnic differences in a national and a unitary state is [outlawed] by 
international law.”285 Furthermore, “to differentiate between Turks and 
Kurds, and seek the . . . right to self-determination for the Kurds . . . [also]
constitutes a breach of international law.” 286 Controversially, it has 
neglected the internal aspect of self-determination entirely.
Turkey’s vehement stance towards the closure of any political parties 
has been condemned on many occasions by the ECtHR as being in breach 
of the ECHR.287 The ECtHR disagrees with Turkey that an alternate system 
within a sovereign state such as a federation, autonomous region or the like 
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are contrary to democracy.288 Instead, the ECtHR has advocated that they 
are in fact consistent with the interpretation of the ECHR. 289 In its 
judgment of Socialist Party v. Turkey, the ECtHR held:  “It is of the essence 
of democracy to allow diverse political programmes to be proposed and 
debated, even those that call into question the way a State is currently 
organised, provided that they do not harm democracy itself.”290 Statements 
that Kurds have a right to self-determination are not undemocratic; they are 
the epitome of democracy.
In contrast to international norms, the AYM has interpreted the right to 
self-determination as a “one-off” right to be claimed at a “particular period” 
rather than as an on-going right.291 The AYM stated, “The right to self-
determination is not a new concept . . . . It was dropped from the agenda of 
the Turkish Nation with the Lausanne Treaty.”292
The reference to the right being dropped is relevant to the Kurds as the 
AYM asserts that they have “used their ‘one-off’ right to self-determination 
in Lausanne . . . by agreeing to live within the Turkish state.”293 The AYM 
thus denies that the Kurds have any other right to self-determination.294
More recently, the AYM has taken a more extreme view in its judgment 
asserting that there has been no oppression of or any bans against Kurds 
and held “the allegation that Kurdish people in Turkey are “oppressed and 
exploited on the basis of ethnicity” to be a “fictitious hypotheses.”295
D. Application of Self-Determination to Kurds
The Kurds meet the objective elements required to attain the legal 
right of self-determination based on their common language, religion, 
ethnicity, history, and culture.  The Kurds share the common language of 
Kurdish. While there are four distinctive dialects, the dialects are similar 
enough that they are all referred to as “Kurdish.”296 The Kurds in Bakur 
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share a common religion—being predominantly Sunni Muslim.297 Lastly, 
the Kurds are a distinct ethnicity with a common history.298 They are a 
distinct ethnicity that “dates back to 2000 BC when the first vanguard of 
Indo-European-speaking people arrived and settled” in the area known as 
“Kurdistan.”299 The Kurds’ struggle for autonomy over thousands of years 
shows that, notwithstanding all the turmoil and upheaval in the region, the 
Kurds are connected by their heritage and common history than by any 
arbitrary borders.
The Kurds also meet the subjective elements of self-determination, as 
they perceive themselves collectively as Kurds. The Kurds do not identify 
themselves as Turkish and want to have their own Kurdish state. They have 
fought endlessly for their rights and freedoms. Given that the Kurds see 
themselves collectively as Kurds and have been fighting for autonomy, 
there is little doubt that they satisfy the subjective element of self-
determination.
Pertinent to the definition of “indigenous peoples” in international law, 
Kurds satisfy this criterion also. Kurds consider themselves a distinct group 
from other groups living in their territory, namely Turks in Bakur, but also 
Assyrians, Chaldeans, Iranians and Arabs in Bashur, Rojhalat and 
Rojava.300 As the Kurds date back to the twelfth century and occupied a 
village deemed one of the oldest villages in the Middle East, prior to the 
establishment of modern day Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran, there is evidence 
of a shared common ancestry before its domination a series of groups.301
Furthermore, there is a plethora of evidence corroborating that the Kurds 
live in a specific geographic area they call “Kurdistan,” that they all speak 
Kurdish whether one dialect or another and that they share a rich culture 
and history.302 By all accounts, there is compelling evidence to suggest that 
the Kurds meet the criteria to be deemed “indigenous peoples” and should 
thus be guaranteed the same rights to self-determination.
Axiomatically, the Kurds also meet the criteria for being a minority 
people. They are a group numerically inferior to the dominant ethnically 
Turkish population in Turkey, maintain a non-dominant position and, while 
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being nationals of the Turkish State, possess ethnic and linguistic 
characteristics which differentiate them from the rest of the population.
There is strong evidence of a sense of solidarity as envisaged through the 
majority support of the PKK which is aimed at ameliorating their minority 
status and preserving their culture, traditions and language.
The Kurds as a group, whether deemed indigenous peoples or minority 
people, ought to have the right to decide on the form of their national self-
determination. This may take the form of autonomy, federalism,
confederalism or independence.
While originally the PKK sought external self-determination as the 
only solution to Turkey’s Kurdish question, as the reality of the quest sunk 
in they abandoned their secessionist policy. 303 The PKK eventually 
transformed their demands to one which could be embraced within the 
current nation state structure but which guaranteed territorial and cultural 
autonomy for the Kurds.304 As mentioned earlier, Öcalan now suggests a 
structure beyond the bounds of the rigid nation-state, consisting of a 
democratic republic, democratic autonomy, and democratic 
confederalism.305
The Kurds have a legitimate territorial claim to the right to self-
determination. Kurds have inhabited the same territory for thousands of 
years.  They have survived and retained their distinct culture in the face of 
genocide, assimilation, human rights abuses, and suppression at the hands 
of their oppressors.  They have remained on their homeland despite efforts 
to remove them.
When the Treaty of Lausanne failed to include an independent
Kurdistan, Kurds did not acquiesce silently. 306 They have persistently 
fought for autonomy and independence across all four regions.307 Kurds 
have a valid claim to the territory.
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E. The Demands for Self-Determination
On January 11, 2012, various Kurdish political organisations gathered 
in Amed and declared their position vis-à-vis the Constitution.308 They 
demanded Turkey constitutionally recognise their right to self-
determination and the realisation of their right through regional autonomy 
under the current state structure and further demanded the protection of 
their cultural and linguistic rights.309 Specifically, their demands are as 
follows:
a) The recognition and guarantee of Kurdish peoples’ identity; 
b) Compliance with international standards pertinent to the rights 
to associate and form political parties using the terms ‘Kurd’ 
and ‘Kurdistan’ in party names; 
c) The recognition of Kurdish as an official language of Turkey, 
the guarantee of the free use of the Kurdish language in every 
aspect of life—private and public, and the guarantee of 
education in the Kurdish language; and
d) Provision of political status for the Kurdish people on the 
geography of Kurdistan to guarantee their right to self-
determination.310
In 2013, the Amed Conference for Democracy and Peace took place 
with members across the Kurdish political spectrum congregating to form a 
resolution on the position of Kurds.311 They urged for Kurds to be granted 
the right to self-determination through autonomy, federation, or 
independence on the basis of their own decisions and approval. 312
Additionally, they reiterated the demands previously outlined that the new 
constitution ought to grant their ethno-cultural rights and expressed that a 
solution to the Kurdish problem cannot be attained without determining 
Kurds’ legal status.313 Therefore, they seek a contemporary democratic 
constitution that guarantees the right to full political mobilisation, the use of 
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Kurdish as a means of instruction and the recognition of Kurdish as an 
official language of Turkey constitutionally.314
The demands by the Kurds require de jure recognition of the Kurds by 
the Government as a distinct ethnic group. Furthermore, these Kurdish 
demands constitute a challenge to the Turkish legal system, particularly 
when taking into consideration that, to date, a myriad of political parties 
have been shut down specifically in relation to their claims for the exercise 
of the right to self-determination for the Kurds.315
In the absence of democratic decentralisation in Bakur, the ability of 
Kurds to participate meaningfully in the creation of national policies and 
laws is immensely limited. The creation of a truly representative 
decentralised body or bodies in Bakur is fundamental for the realisation of
the right to self-determination by Kurds as elucidated by Article 1 of the 
ICCPR and the ICESCR.316
VIII. THE FUTURE FOR KURDS
This section postulates recommendations for Turkey to implement in 
order to meet its legal obligations of protecting Kurds. Furthermore, a 
strategy is recommended for the Kurds in Bakur to claim their right to self-
determination through declaring a federal state and the prospect of a 
Kurdish state is touched on.
A. Recommendations for Turkey
No lasting solution to the Kurdish question can be achieved unless 
Kurds gain legal status in Turkey as a distinct and separate group. The 
failure to recognise Kurds as a distinct group and the persistent violation of 
their human rights epitomises the Government’s embedded culture of 
oppression and the marginalisation of Kurds. The lack of a legislative 
framework to safeguard minority rights and protect against discrimination 
as well as the lack of access to justice domestically reinforce a culture of 
repression against Kurds.
Despite being involved in the EU accession process since 1991, 
Turkey has failed to address its gross mistreatment of the Kurds. To 
achieve lasting peace, it is crucial for Turkey to commit to a genuine 
democratic transition by confronting abuses of rights, anti-democratic and 
discriminatory practices, and the inequalities which have perpetuated 
decades of conflict.
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Turkey must amend its Constitution to strengthen democracy and the 
protection of human rights. The Constitution must be consistent with 
international law by recognising all minorities within Turkey and protecting 
their rights. Further, the Constitution must replicate the ICCPR and 
ICESCR in protecting the right to self-determination of peoples. Turkey 
must meet the requirements of the international conventions it is a party to, 
as identified earlier in this paper. If Turkey has appropriate legal 
mechanisms in place, there can be a more legitimate space for Kurds to 
exercise their rights and to claim self-determination. However, given 
Turkey’s reluctance and lack of commitment to effectuate concrete changes 
towards an acceptable standard of human rights and minority protection, the 
Kurds cannot rely on the amelioration of their rights any time soon. They 
must take urgent action.
B. The Exercise of Self-Determination
Pertinent to ongoing human rights abuses, pressure against politically 
active Kurds, and, in light of the progress made by the Kurds in other 
regions, the Kurds in Bakur should claim their right to self-determination 
immediately. Given its constituents have succeeded in claiming self-
determination—in Bashur by establishing an autonomous region in the last 
decade, and more recently by the Kurds in Rojava by declaring a federal 
state317—Kurds in Bakur should also declare a federal state. By doing so, 
the Kurds will have more than just a seat at the table; they can organise 
themselves, participate, and engage in decision-making. By empowering 
Kurds, they can be champions of change for their own lives.
1. Earned Sovereignty
Once Kurds in Bakur have claimed self-determination in its internal 
form, they can work towards external self-determination—the formation of 
an independent state through secession from Turkey. Immediate secession 
is not a viable option presently as it may undermine stability in the already 
fragile region and thus jeopardise the prospect of sufficient international 
support to merit recognition.
The most feasible approach based on the probability of lasting success 
and reduction of short-term violence is through the “earned sovereignty” 
doctrine. “Earned sovereignty” “entails the conditional and progressive 
devolution of sovereign powers and authority from a state to a substate 
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entity under international supervision.” 318 Under “earned sovereignty,” 
Kurds in Bakur can eventually transition from Turkish authority to an 
independent Kurdish state and facilitate a peaceful end to armed struggle. 
The successful execution of “earned sovereignty” in ethnic conflicts across 
the globe, for example in Montenegro, Kosovo, and Northern Ireland, 
indicate its potential application to Kurds in Bakur.319
“Earned sovereignty” has three main elements:  shared sovereignty; 
institution building; and determination of the final status of the substate 
entity and its relationship to the parent state.320 Each will be discussed in 
turn.
The first element allows for the state and substate entity to 
simultaneously exercise sovereign authority.321 Through already-existing 
organisations such as Kongra-Gel, 322 KCK, 323 and others, and by 
establishing a federal state, Kurds in Bakur can demonstrate self-
government and satisfy the requirement for shared sovereignty in Turkey.324
The second element requires the substate to collaborate with the 
international community to establish the political infrastructure and 
government institutions required to manage the greater authority that comes 
with effectively governing a sovereign state. 325 Kurds have already 
established political infrastructures to facilitate grass-roots participation as 
well as a legislative body. With international support, the existing 
institutions can be bolstered and more can be established.
The third element can be determined via referendum or negotiations 
between the parent state and substate entity, however, the determination of 
final status for the substate entity relies on recognition by the international 
community. 326 Although recognition is not an element of “earned 
sovereignty,” lack of recognition would hinder Kurdistan’s political and 
economic ties with other nation-states. Working with the international 
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community to achieve independence is a powerful tool for attracting more 
support within the international arena. This support is crucial in the 
situation where the parent state does not recognise the substate entity, as 
evidenced by Kosovo’s successful secession.327
Through the “earned sovereignty” approach, Kurds in Bakur can 
achieve their dream of a Kurdish state and end their suffering at the hands 
of Turkey. I believe this is the most appropriate solution for Kurds to take 
to remedy their situation in Turkey.
IX. CONCLUSION
The oppression of Kurds is not a new phenomenon. Kurds have been 
victims of persistent abuses of their fundamental rights, discrimination, 
assimilation and genocide—all aimed at the eradication of their existence. 
Notwithstanding their history of persecution, Kurds have not backed down.
Since they were stripped of their right to independence by the Treaty of 
Lausanne, Kurds have made concerted efforts to fight for their rights and 
have persevered in their plight for independence. Turkey has actively 
stifled any attempts by the Kurds to seek protection of their rights and 
consistently refused to recognise Kurds as a minority.
In order to end the injustice suffered by Kurds and to afford them 
adequate protection as a people, Turkey needs to legally recognise Kurds as 
a minority. Turkey’s law has fundamental shortcomings in safeguarding 
human rights, rights for minorities and recognising the right to self-
determination. There is a culture of systemic oppression of Kurds. Turkey 
needs a transformation of its laws to comply with international standards. 
Despite condemnation from international bodies and the EU, Turkey has 
failed to effectuate real changes. The truth remains that there will be no 
solution to the Kurdish issue unless Kurds act urgently and for themselves
By claiming their right to self-determination, Kurds can escape the 
cycle of suppression and determine their own future. Kurds must play a 
central role in their own governance without interference. Once Kurds have 
asserted their right to self-determination, Kurdistan is achievable if 
strategically pursued through the “earned sovereignty” approach.
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X. APPENDIX
Marked red on the map of Kurdistan is the Kurdish territory divided 
among the states of Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria.328
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I.  INTRODUCTION
In 2010, the Secretary General of the United Nations (U.N.), Ban Ki-
Moon addressed the recent rise of migrants entering Europe illegally by 
sea.1 In his speech, Ki-Moon urged Europeans to refrain from demonizing 
the recent arrivals by denying them basic human rights, such as access to 
health care, and promoted the U.N. goal of social integration for this 
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vulnerable population of newly arrived migrants.2 As the current situation 
of the world continues to worsen in some areas due to war, famine, or 
poverty, immigration rises. As these immigrants settle in their new 
countries, many settling illegally, access to health care becomes an issue of 
global consequence as a basic human right.3 The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) has been interpreted to 
state that denying anyone, even an unauthorized migrant, access to 
healthcare as a part of a country’s policy is a violation of a human right.4
As of 2015, there were more than sixty million displaced migrants in 
the world seeking a place to live, especially in developed and rich countries, 
such as the countries in Western Europe and North America.5 For example, 
in 2015, there were approximately 4.7 million people who immigrated to 
one of the twenty-eight member states of the European Union.6 Of those 
4.7 million, more than half were from a non-member country.7 Exclusion 
from healthcare is a form of discrimination and it is especially egregious 
when immigrants’ health tends to be poorer than the native group
members.8 This form of discrimination leads to the eventual health 
problems and shorter life spans for those who are displaced.9
Currently in the United States (U.S.), under the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA), unauthorized migrants are not covered.10 Furthermore, they cannot 
qualify for subsidies through which they may purchase insurance through 
the market exchange.11 The proposed Trump Care bill, Better Care 
Reconciliation Act, seemed to be aimed at creating tax breaks for the those 
in the highest tax brackets in the United States, and as a result left the 
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possibility of achieving some sort of coverage for unauthorized migrants 
quite slim.12
Unauthorized migrants represent a unique class of people in today’s 
society that is seldom studied due to the lack of legal status.13 In most 
countries, migrants contribute economically to the country, yet hold no 
direct political power.14 Unauthorized migrants must be addressed, yet they 
are a challenge for host countries due to the moral and economic arguments 
that arise from their stay.15 Currently, the attitude toward immigrants, in 
particular Muslim migrants, is highly prejudiced.16 It is roughly estimated 
that six-in-ten Syrians have had to leave their homes due to the political 
turmoil in Syria.17 The conflict has displaced more than 12.5 million 
Syrians, creating a major surge in Syrian immigration in comparison to the 
one million that emigrated from Syria in 2011.18 Many Syrians end up 
relocating in countries such as Canada, the United States, or countries 
within Western Europe, in search of a better and more prosperous future.19
However, many of these countries try to control migration patterns by 
denying access to healthcare as a way to curb illegal immigration.  
Ethnographic studies have shown the societal groupthink of native citizens 
consider unauthorized migrants as undeserving of access to public health 
regardless of the legal entitlement they may actually have.20 Groupthink is 
a psychological concept that is used to explain a manner of group thinking 
that occurs when the members of a group accept a group viewpoint 
regardless of individual opinions on whether the viewpoint is correct or 
                                                     
12. See Adam Gaffney, Trumpcare is Like a Vampire, Set on Sinking its Teeth into the Poor,
GUARDIAN (June 23, 2017, 6:00), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jun/23/trump
care-vampire-sinking-teeth-poor.
13. Heide Castañeda, Illegality as Risk Factor:  A Survey of Unauthorized Migrant Patients in 
A Belin Clinic, 68 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1552 (Feb. 25, 2009) [hereinafter Castañeda Illegality]. Even 
though the term “undocumented immigrant” or “illegal immigrant” is preferred in the United States for 
purposes of this paper the term unauthorized migrant will be used because it better describes the group 
of people as migrants who may have some sort of documentation about how they entered the country, 
such as overstaying a tourist visa.  It is also useful to better describe people who applied for asylum, and 
were denied and still remained in the country.  Id.
14. Heide Castañeda, “Over-Foreignization” or “Unused Potential”? A Critical Review of 
Migrant Health in Germany and Responses Toward Unauthorized Migration, 74 SOC. SCI. & MED. 830, 
837 (2012) [hereinafter Castañeda “Over-Foreignization”].
15. See id.
16. Connor & Krogstad, supra note 5.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Susann Huschke, Performing Deservingness:  Humanitarian Health Care Provision for 
Migrants in Germany, 120 SOC. SCI. & MED. 352 (2014).
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 24:1112
not.21 It is often used to explain how a group mentality may control a 
group’s thinking regardless of personal opinions.22 Data regarding
unauthorized migrants is scarce due to unauthorized migrants not wanting
to run the risk of exposing themselves.23
This note aims to compare the various approaches of entitlement to 
healthcare that Western countries have implemented, specifically regarding
unauthorized migrant populations. First, this note will give a brief 
overview of the structure of four Western European countries’ governments 
(United Kingdom (U.K.), Spain, Germany, Italy) followed by an 
explanation of the funding and the laws that deal with health care access for 
unauthorized migrants in each of these countries. This note will then 
discuss the structure, funding and laws that deal with health care in two 
North American countries (Canada and the United States). Additionally, 
this note will compare the six countries’ laws and their levels of access.  An
opinion section will discuss how best to care for this marginalized group. 
This note will conclude with a brief summary of the points made in the 
discussion.
II.  LAWS AND VARYING DEGREES OF ACCESS IN DIFFERENT 
COUNTRIES
A. European Countries
1. United Kingdom
Great Britain and Northern Ireland make up the U.K.24 The isle of 
Great Britain includes England, Scotland, and Wales.25 England’s 
government is a parliamentary constitutional monarchy led by the head of 
the government, Prime Minister Theresa May (since July 2016) and the 
head of state, Queen Elizabeth II.26 There is a bicameral Parliament 
consisting of the House of Lords and the House of Commons.27 The House 
of Lords is comprised of 815 members of which there are hereditary peers 
(people who inherited their spot), life peers (people the prime minister has 
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appointed for life), and archbishops and bishops.28 The House of Commons 
has 650 members of Parliament, which are all elected by a constituency.29
In 2016, the U.K.’s population was estimated at 65,630,000.30 Calculating 
the total number of unauthorized migrants in the U.K. is difficult because
unauthorized migrants stay hidden without any relevant immigration 
documentation; the closest approximation to a population estimate is a 
figure from 2007 by the London School of Economics reporting an estimate 
of 533,000 unauthorized migrants at that time.31 There is no question that 
this number is low based on the more recent wave of immigrants seeking 
refuge in the United Kingdom.32
The Parliament, the Secretary of State for Health, and the Department 
of Health all control health care policy, especially access to health care.33
The United Kingdom funds the National Health Service (NHS) entirely 
through national taxation, creating an insurance system which covers 
England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales.34 Regardless of the fact 
that each region manages its system independently, the systems are similar 
in most aspects and are considered to be part of the same unified system.35
According to the Health Act of 2006, the Secretary of State for Health
“has a legal duty to promote a comprehensive health service that provides 
care free of charge, apart from services with charges already in place.”36
The NHS Constitution delineates the rights for those entitled to health 
care.37 Those eligible to receive health care have the right to access free
care without discrimination even though there may be certain time 
limitations to it as determined by Parliament.38 Once a person is deemed to 
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be eligible to receive access to health care, the coverage is universal.39
However, there is no absolute right to receive any particular treatment.40
Authorized residents and nonresidents with European Health Insurance 
Cards are entitled to receive free health care for primary and secondary 
care.41 Access to health care is limited for unauthorized migrants who are 
not entitled to receive universal healthcare however, they are entitled to 
receive treatment if a doctor finds that it is immediately necessary for 
emergency care or certain infectious diseases.42 Free health care that is 
available to all residents of the U.K., regardless of their legal residence 
status, includes the following NHS services:
i) services provided in an “accident and emergency department” 
(until the patient is admitted as an in-patient or an out-patient 
clinic, thus emergency treatment given elsewhere in the 
hospital) or walk-in [centers] in situation of emergency;
ii) family planning;
iii) services provided in the community where staff are not 
employed by a Trust (e.g. practice nurses);
iv) treatment of certain communicable diseases, like tuberculosis 
(excluding HIV/AIDS where it is only the first diagnosis and 
connected counselling sessions that are free of charge);
v) treatment given in or referred by sexually transmitted       
diseases clinics; and
vi) compulsory psychiatric treatment.43
All residents must register with a General Practitioner (GP) to access 
NHS services to receive primary care, and then to further receive secondary 
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care (outpatient care) with the clear exception of emergency care.44 If an 
unauthorized migrant is able to get on a GP’s patient list, then he is entitled 
to receive primary care free of charge.45 However, this creates a 
discretionary factor rather than actual entitlement for unauthorized migrants 
because access to free primary health care hinges on a doctor’s willingness 
to put the unauthorized migrant on his list.46 Doctors are given broad legal 
reasons to deny a person registration onto their patient list, such as their 
own personal discretion or on the basis that the patient may not be
geographically desirable (there is a doctor that is closer to the patient’s 
home that would better tend to him).47 Doctors are not allowed to refuse 
patients on the basis of “race, gender, social class, age, religion, sexual 
orientation, appearance, disability or medical condition,” however, doctors 
may easily disguise any personal bias using the broad discretion afforded to 
doctors to deny NHS registration.48
Since most unauthorized migrants work low-paying jobs due to their 
status, a way to prevent their access to the free healthcare system is by 
making them pay for services and treatments that may be too expensive; for 
example, unauthorized migrants are responsible to pay the full cost of any 
hospital treatment that may consist of “secondary care in out-patient 
department, in-patient care, ante and postnatal care, medicines and 
[antiretroviral treatment for the treatment of HIV].”49 Hospitals may also 
refuse to treat a patient who may need secondary care if the hospital 
realizes that the patient will have to pay for the treatment, but cannot afford 
to pay.50 Hospitals, like doctors, end up with the discretionary decision of 
who they choose to treat based on status and ability to pay, creating a lack 
of constancy in the people admitted for treatment.51 Some hospitals will 
check immigration status more than others and some may refuse to treat 
migrants in the emergency room if they decide that the migrant does not 
qualify for free emergency care.52 Therefore, unauthorized migrants in the 
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U.K. face both bureaucratic and economic obstacles restricting their access 
to health care, even though they may have legal access to certain services.53
2. Spain
Spain is a parliamentary constitutional monarchy comprised of 
seventeen autonomous communities and two autonomous cities.54 The 
head of the government is the Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy (since 
December 2011) and the head of state is King Felipe VI.55 Spain has a 
bicameral legislature known as the General Courts that consists of the 
Senate and the Congress of Deputies.56 The Congress of Deputies,
consisting of 350 members, is the lower house and the most powerful of the 
two.57 The Senate currently has 266 Senators of which the majority are 
elected by each autonomous region; in the minority, half are elected as 
regional representatives, and the other half are appointed per every one 
million residents of their region.58 In 2016, the population estimate in 
Spain was 46,370,000.59 There is no figure for the exact amount of 
unauthorized migrants currently in Spain, however there was an estimated 
11,624 unauthorized migrants that arrived in Ceuta and Melilla, consisting 
of mainly Syrian refugees, in 2015.60
In 1986, the General Health Law established the Spanish National 
Health System (SNHS) by expanding the social security system through 
general taxation creating a tax-based health system regulated by Spain’s 
autonomous communities.61 A 1989 decree further extended coverage to 
the poor not entitled to Social Security, thereby covering unauthorized 
migrants who did not have access to Social Security.62 In 2011, a public 
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health law extended coverage to cover those who were not expressly 
covered by previous decrees.63 Article 12 of the Organic Law 4/2000 (Law 
4/2000) on the Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain and their Social 
Integration gave unauthorized migrants living in Spain the same access to 
health care and education as Spanish citizens as long as they registered in 
their municipalities.64
However, in 2012 due to the economic crisis, Spain changed its laws 
and ended nearly universal access to health care restricting unauthorized 
migrants’ access to the publicly funded healthcare system.65 Royal Decree 
Law 16/2012 (RDL 16/2012) created coverage that was more explicitly 
linked to social security entitlement and revoked unauthorized migrants’ 
access to healthcare through Law 4/2000.66 Unauthorized migrants were 
left with only access to emergency care, maternal care, and child care for 
those under eighteen, and access for those seeking asylum and victims of 
human trafficking during a set period.67
After the passage of RDL 16/2012, ten regional governments chose to 
implement an alternative legal way for unauthorized migrants to receive 
access to health care.68 For example, the community of Navarre passed the 
Navarre Regional Foral Law 8/2013 reestablishing unauthorized 
immigrants’ entitlement to health care.69 The regions, on average, were 
able to grant access to coverage for primary and secondary health care for 
up to one year.70 The regions did vary in the requirements imposed upon 
migrants for granting access to health care.71 For example, Catalonia and 
Andalusia have granted greater access to health care for unauthorized 
migrants with varying degrees of requirements and benefits allotted, yet 
they have different regional policies that are influenced by the governing 
party and the local economy.72 Residency requirements varied from no 
time at all needed in Andalusia and Asturias, to one year of residency in 
Basque Country, to three months residency required to obtain primary care,
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but one year residency was required to obtain secondary care in Catalonia.73
Benefits such as lower-pharmaceutical co-payments were given in Aragon,
while in the Canary Islands, unauthorized migrants were not covered for 
any pharmaceutical benefit.74 Therefore, after the passage of RDL 16/2012, 
unauthorized migrant access to health care depended on which region the 
migrants lived in (whether more progressive or more adherent to RDL 
16/2012).75
Spain is a perfect example of how a regional autonomous government 
that does not agree with the central government’s policy can choose to 
implement other measures to ensure all who reside in the region a better
quality of life.76 This is especially true in the area of health care where 
central and regional governments share the responsibility of implementing 
the service to the people.77 The regions that were most likely to rule against 
the central government and create a more inclusive healthcare system for 
their particular region were those who were led by an opposition party to 
the one in power in the central government; those who were led by the same 
ruling party were most likely to abide by the RDL 16/2012 stipulations.78
However, there were regions that were led by the same ruling party and still 
decided to give unauthorized migrants access to health care, most likely 
because of the cost of providing only emergency care would be higher and 
ultimately more detrimental to the economy than granting access to health
care.79
The reason for implementing a severe health care adjustment, like 
RDL 16/2012, was to cut costs in a declining economy.80 However, any 
real savings that the government may have gained from blocking 
unauthorized migrants from obtaining health care, in the end, seems to be
the opposite of what actually happened in Spain.81 Specifically for Spain, 
unauthorized migrants constitute a very small percentage of the population
in comparison to Spaniards, so the cost cutting measure would not be one 
that would necessarily create a major impact.82 Ultimately, a strict 
implementation of this policy will cost tax payers more money because 
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unauthorized migrants can only resort to the emergency room, which is 
more costly than receiving preventive care through access to the SNHS.83
3. Germany
Germany is a federal parliamentary republic that has a bicameral 
parliament consisting of the Bundesrat and the Bundestag.84 The current 
head of government is Chancellor Angela Merkel (since November 2005) 
and the head of state is President Frank-Walter Steinmeier (since March 
2017).85 The Bundestag, the more powerful of the two chambers, currently 
has about 600 members, however the number is subject to change 
depending on election results.86 The Bundesrat has a considerably smaller 
number of members with just sixty-nine members that represent their 
respective Länder.87 As of 2016, it is estimated that there are 81,762,000 
people living in Germany.88 Germany has recently allowed a great number 
of migrants to come and resettle within its borders; approximately one 
million migrants within the last two years.89 The number of unauthorized 
migrants in Germany was estimated at 174,438.90
The health care system is set up by the Federal Ministry of Health and 
services rendered to the public are regulated by the Federal Joint 
Committee, which is comprised of public and private health insurance 
funds.91 “Germany has a predominantly income-based contribution health 
insurance system that is also partly financed by other statutory insurance 
scheme (e.g. civil servants), taxes, out-of-pocket payments and private 
health insurance.”92 An employee’s and an employer’s contribution to the 
Statutory Health Insurance System is on a case by case basis depending on 
monthly gross salary.93 Once a person is eligible for the Statutory Health 
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Insurance System, he may get further coverage through private health 
insurance that may supplement or compliment the coverage already offered 
by the State.94 Both the Länder and municipalities contribute to the funding 
of a national healthcare system, however, the health insurance funds and 
providers of insurance are the main regulators.95 The federal government is 
not the sole controller of health care policy, the Länder and community 
organizations also help shape the country’s policy.96 Both the private and 
the state funded healthcare systems use the same hospitals and doctors that 
will treat both public and privately insured people.97
Health insurance is mandatory for all citizens and permanent residents 
in Germany; it is provided for by health insurance funds (so-called sickness 
funds) from the statutory health insurance system and substitutive private 
health insurance.98 Health care coverage is universal for all legal residents99
who are able to gain access to the health care system through employment 
status, or through entitlement to state welfare.100 Low-income earners 
usually attain health care through the Statutory Health Insurance System 
since it is mandatory below a specific economic threshold; for those who 
earn above the stipulated amount, they have the option to get full coverage 
from private health care instead.101 Those who earn a very low income can 
receive access to healthcare by receiving social benefits that will pay for the 
insurance.102 Therefore, visitors who are not covered and those who are not 
legal residents, such as, refugees and unauthorized immigrants, are not 
entitled to universal health care coverage because they either cannot work 
legally, or they are not approved for social welfare due to the lack of 
residency documentation.103 Unauthorized migrants must apply for a 
“krankenschein”—a document that allows the person to see a doctor,
similar to a health insurance certificate—at a social welfare center in order 
to be registered to access the health care system free of charge under the 
condition that the migrants have no income.104 Unauthorized migrants
supposedly have access to the health care system to treat “serious illness or 
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acute pain and everything necessary for recovery, improvement or relief of 
illnesses, and their consequences, post-natal care, vaccinations, preventive 
medical tests and anonymous counselling and screening of infectious and 
sexually transmitted diseases.”105 Social security will only cover medical 
issues that are related to acute illness and pain, pregnancy, or childbirth.106
Due to being excluded from the national health care system,
unauthorized migrants are relegated to resorting to the use of non-
governmental organizations’ (NGOs) clinics, such as Medibüros or 
Medinetze and the Malteser Migranten Medizin, for access to basic health
care.107 Even though the use of these NGOs’ clinics is better than no access 
to medical care at all, the standard of care cannot match the German health 
care system.108 Especially in the case of treating chronic or complicated 
cases, such as cancer, lupus, or HIV, NGOs cannot offer care leaving 
unauthorized migrants without a recourse.109
Germany has a unique approach to immigration and it is clearly 
reflected in how it has constructed its health care policy and entitlement.110
In Germany, it is a felony to reside in the country illegally, a much more 
severe penalty in comparison to other countries who view it as a failure to 
abide by an administrative rule.111 Not only is it a felony to reside in the 
country without having legal status, but aiding a person who is known to be 
there unauthorized is considered a felony as well.112 According to Section 
87 of the Act on Stay, Employment and the Integration of Foreigners in the 
Federal Area if a public institution becomes aware of an unauthorized 
migrant’s presence in the country they have the duty to disclose that 
information to the Foreign Office.113 Furthermore, penalties will be 
imposed on anyone who is deemed to have helped an unauthorized migrant
“irregularly stay or enter in the German territory . . . if acting for his or her 
benefit for financial gain, if doing so repeatedly or for the benefits of 
                                                     
105. Id. at 62.
106. Blümel & Busse, supra note 91.
107. Huschke, supra note 20, at 353.
108. Id. at 354.
109. Id.
110. Castañeda “Over-Foreignization”, supra note 14, at 836.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Gesetz über den Aufenthalt, die Erwerbstätigkeit und die Integration von Ausländern im 
Bundesgebiet [AufenthG] [Act on Stay, Employment and the Integration of Foreigners in the Federal 
Area], July 30, 2004, BGBL I at 1950 § 87, last amended by Gesetz [G], July 20, 2017 BGBL I at 2780, 
art. 1 (Ger.), http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/aufenthg_2004/BJNR195010004.html#BJNR19501000 
4BJN G000101310; see also HUMA NETWORK, supra note 34, at 62–63, 62 n.11.
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 24:1122
several foreigners . . . .”114 In order to have access to the health care 
system, unauthorized migrants must first register for the “krankenschein,”
however, social welfare offices are bound by law, as well as any other 
public administrative institution, to report unauthorized migrants to the 
Foreigners Office; a failure to report migrants poses the risk of being 
penalized by the government thereby creating a state of heightened alert for 
unauthorized migrants.115 In order to be reimbursed for services rendered 
by Social Security, medical personnel must transmit information about 
people residing in the country illegally.116 While the law has been clarified 
to say that medical personnel will not be held personally accountable, there 
is still a need to report who the patient is to the social welfare centers to be 
reimbursed and in effect reporting the unauthorized migrant, creating the 
ever-present fear of deportation.117 The imminent threat of being reported 
to the Foreigners Office effectively bars all unauthorized migrants from 
seeking any type of health care, even for emergency situations, because the 
hospital must transmit the patients’ information to the social welfare centers 
in order to be reimbursed.118 Many supporters of limiting access to health 
care for unauthorized migrants reference the positive deterrent effect it has 
on migration because it supposedly:
1) dissuades migrants from wanting to move to the country in 
search of health care;
2) for those already present in the country, it dissuades them 
from using the national health care system; and
3) it ultimately serves to stop unauthorized migrants from
creating an expense on nationals.119
Furthermore, doctors have confirmed that patients are justified in 
being afraid of seeking health care because the doctors will report them and 
ultimately have them deported.120 Therefore, while unauthorized migrants 
are technically entitled to emergency care, that option is generally not a 
viable option for those who fear being deported.121 “By ‘illegalizing’
undocumented migrants, criminalizing assistance to them and requiring 
their ‘denunciation’ by all governmental and public institutions, the German 
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government has created a web of laws that effectively exclude 
undocumented migrants from claiming their human rights, including their 
right to health.”122
4. Italy
Italy is a parliamentary republic that has a bicameral parliament 
consisting of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.123 The current head 
of government is the Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni (since December 
2016) and the current head of state is the President Sergio Mattarella (since 
February 2015).124 All members of the Chamber of Deputies, the lower 
house, are elected through proportional representation.125 The Senate, the
upper house, has two methods of election: 1) proportional representation 
and 2) members who serve life terms that are appointed by the president 
and former presidents.126 Italy’s estimated population in 2016 was about 
60,815,000.127 In 2016, there were approximately 181,405 migrants that
arrived in Italy.128
The Italian Constitution authorizes the central government to control 
the distribution of tax revenue in order to fund public health care, which
every resident of the Italian regions is entitled to.129 The Italian 
Constitution specifically guarantees all individuals’ fundamental right to 
health care and specifically guarantees indigents the right to receive 
treatment free of cost.130 The revenue that funds Italy’s National Health 
Service (INHS) is corporate tax.131 The central government collects it, and 
then redistributes it among the regions in proportion to their contribution.132
Both the central government and the regional government share the 
                                                     
122. Castañeda Illegality, supra note 13, at 1554.
123. The World Factbook:  Italy, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/it.html (last visited July 7, 2017).
124. Id.
125. James M. Powell et al., Italy, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com
/place/Italy (last visited July 6, 2017).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Fabio Colombo, How Many Migrants Arrived in 2016, LENIUS (Jan. 3, 2017), 
https://www.lenius.it/migranti-2016/.
129. Andrea Donatini, The Italian Health Care System, COMMONWEALTH FUND, http://
international.commonwealthfund.org/countries/italy/ (last visited July 7, 2017).
130. Art. 32 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.); see also HUMA NETWORK, supra note 34, at 81.
131. Donatini, supra note 129.
132. Id.
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 24:1124
responsibility of insuring residents.133 The central government determines 
what is included in the basic benefit package that is free to those who are 
entitled, but the local authorities are the ones who must ensure the delivery 
of services to local residents.134 While this in theory seems fair, it does 
create financial inequalities among the richer and poorer regions and 
ultimately results in disparities among the regions in relation to peoples’ 
access to health care.135 The central government tries to level out the 
disparities by giving poorer regions a fixed proportion of the national value-
added tax to provide essential levels of care.136 Even though the central 
government handles the distribution of funds, the nineteen regions and the 
two autonomous provinces have considerable autonomy in determining the 
structure and delivery of local health care.137
All citizens and legal residents have automatic universal coverage.138
Private health care is generally used to complement the state funded system 
to provide for services not covered.139 Even though the basic benefit 
package is supposed to be free to all, there are certain services that are more 
in depth such as “specialist consultations, day hospitalizations after 
diagnosis procedures, some pharmaceuticals, and thermal assistance and out 
of clinic rehabilitation” for which a co-pay is required for all residents.140
Yet, the amount due will vary depending on the region that the patient is in 
and ameliorating factors such as age, income, and type of illness making it 
a subjective amount that may vary depending on who the person is.141
In order to have access to the INHS, citizens and authorized residents 
must register with the local health administration where they are provided 
with a health card that is used to access the system.142 Since the INHS is 
funded through corporate tax, applying for the health card is free for those 
who pay income tax, for those who are unemployed but are enrolled in an 
employment agency, refugees, asylum seekers, and any child of an 
authorized recipient.143 For people who do not meet the prerequisite 
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categories to qualify for health care, they may still be eligible to receive a 
health card if they pay a specific sum.144
Even though unauthorized migrants do not have access to the INHS, 
they may receive access to some limited services if they are able to receive 
a Stranieri Temporaneamente Presenti (temporary residing foreigner code)
(STP code).145 Some of the healthcare services that the STP code gives 
unauthorized migrants free access to or access upon payment are:
a) “urgent” and “essential” medical care (including continual 
treatment);
b) preventive care; and
c) care provided for public health reasons including prenatal and 
maternity care, care for children, vaccinations and diagnosis 
and treatment of infectious diseases.146
Unauthorized migrants must first apply to receive indigent status and 
then, free and anonymously, can apply at the local health administration
center for the STP code.147 Once granted, unauthorized migrants are still 
responsible for charges for medical treatment.148
While on paper unauthorized migrants do seem to have a legal means
to receive access to the INHS, theory must not be confused with actual 
application of the entitlement.149 As a marginalized faction of society, 
unauthorized migrants are hesitant to reach out to health care facilities due
to common obstacles such as a lack of language comprehension, a failure to 
actually know that they can receive access legally, fear of not being able to 
afford treatment, or actual reporting of their illegal status in the country.150
NGOs are used by unauthorized migrants as an alternate health care 
recourse without exposing themselves to the INHS, unfortunately NGOs are 
not able to provide more than just basic health care assistance.151
A migrant may be granted a permit to stay in Italy for humanitarian 
reasons, if a doctor determines that this person has a medical condition 
serious enough that medical care is necessary and there is no possible way 
to obtain treatment in his native country.152 However this does not happen 
                                                     
144. Id.
145. HUMA NETWORK, supra note 34, at 82.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 91.
150. HUMA NETWORK, supra note 34, at 91.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 92.
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 24:1126
often either due to the failure to report the patient’s information or because 
the doctor in Italy does not know what kind of health care system is in the 
patient’s home country.153 If granted, the medical permit must be renewed 
yearly and once a temporary residence permit is granted, the migrant may 
ask for the right to work which will grant them access to the INHS.154
B. North American Countries
1. Canada
Canada has a federal parliamentary democracy that is controlled by a
constitutional monarchy.155 The current head of government is Prime 
Minister Justin Trudeau (since November 2015) and the head of state is 
Queen Elizabeth II.156 Even though the Queen is the head of state, Canada 
is an independent federal state.157 Canada has a bicameral parliament 
consisting of the Senate and the House of Commons.158 The Senate 
currently has 105 members and the House of Commons has 308
members.159 There are approximately 36,222,000 people living in Canada 
as of 2016.160 President Trump’s election and his views on immigration 
have increased the flow of unauthorized migrants to Canada leading to at 
least half of all Canadians’ disapproval of unauthorized migrants in 
Canada.161
Canada has a publicly funded health care system called Medicare.162
Medicare is not a national plan, instead it is a regional plan that is managed 
by the thirteen provinces and territories that are responsible for ensuring the 
citizens of their respective province or territory.163 The federal government 
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and the provincial and territorial governments share the roles and 
responsibilities of delivering health care services to Canadian residents.164
“Both the public and private sectors finance Canada’s health systems.  
Public-sector funding includes payments by governments at the federal, 
provincial/territorial and municipal levels and by workers’ compensation 
boards and other social security schemes.  Private-sector funding consists 
primarily of health expenditures by household and private insurance 
firms.”165
Provincial and territorial governments are responsible for the control
and delivery of publicly funded services locally to the communities 
ensuring delivery of various aspects of community health care.166 The 
federal government must maintain national standards for the health care 
system by funding support to the regional health care systems, facilitating 
the delivery health care, and dealing with other health care matters.167 The 
Canada Health Act of 1985 states that regional health insurance plans need 
to be “publicly administered, comprehensive in coverage, universal, 
portable across provinces, and accessible.”168 Under Medicare, all 
Canadian residents that are entitled access to the health care system are able 
to receive medically necessary procedures for free.169 Each province and 
territory has the freedom to set its own residency requirement to determine 
which territorial residents are entitled to universal healthcare.170
Unauthorized immigrants are not covered by any federal or provincial 
program, however provinces and territories may provide limited services.171
As part of the new world countries, Canada has experienced waves of 
immigration from the moment it was “discovered.”172 Canada’s health 
policies have reflected the influx of people that came initially from Europe, 
and later migrants from Asia, Africa, the Middle East, the Caribbean and 
South America necessitating the need for new health screenings and 
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treatments.173 Authorized immigrants in Canada typically have to meet 
certain health requirements in order to be given visas to enter Canada, so a 
“healthy immigrant effect” is seen in which the migrants are generally 
healthier than their Canadian counterparts.174 Ultimately this is seen as a
cost-effective measure because migrants will not need to access the publicly 
funded health care system during their initial residency and will therefore 
not be a burden on Canadian tax payers.175 Screening potential legal 
migrants for health concerns that may be costly and a possible drain on 
public services has been a fundamental principal of the Canadian approach 
to migrant health care.176 However, for those who are not legal migrants 
this may be a different story since they are coming from different countries 
and do not have the same economic resources that a skilled worker who has 
been granted a Canadian visa has; unauthorized migrants may constitute a 
group who is in greater need of the health care system and who would 
ultimately create a greater expense if they are denied access.177 The 
growing demographic change of migrants who come to Canada results in 
health disparities that this new group of migrants may require.178 In the 
case of refugees who have been the victims of violence, torture, and trauma,
there are physical and mental health issues that the community can be 
possibly responsible for.179
2. United States
The United States is a federal republic that is currently led by 
President Donald Trump as both head of state and head of government 
(since January 2017).180 It consists of a bicameral congress made up of the 
Senate and the House of Representatives.181 The Senate, the upper house, 
consists of 100 senators that are elected two per state, and the House of 
Representatives consists of 435 Representatives that are elected and their 
seats are assigned in proportion to the population of congressional 
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districts.182 The approximate estimate for the population of the United 
States in 2016 is 323,349,000 people.183 As of 2016, there were 
approximately 11.3 million people living in the United States as
unauthorized migrants.184 About 8 million unauthorized migrants form part 
of the United States’ workforce, contributing to the economy.185
Immigration is not expected to wane anytime soon with a projected figure 
that around one out of five Americans will be an immigrant around the year 
2050.186 More striking is an estimated figure from 2007 where it was 
approximated that one out three immigrants in the United States was an 
unauthorized migrant.187
The ACA is aimed at ensuring that Americans have access to health 
insurance through a program that apportions coverage through the
government, employers, and individuals.188 Health insurance is provided 
through both private and public sources.189 States generally regulate private 
insurance and public insurance is generally regulated by the federal 
government.190 As of 2014, 49% of total health care spending came from 
public spending.191 For example, Medicaid is tax-funded and is run by the 
states within the general federal guidelines.192 Depending on the state’s per 
capita income, the state will receive matching federal funds.193 The ACA 
currently fully funds the Medicaid expansion, but this is subject to change 
with the new administration’s desire to repeal the ACA and implement a
new version of health care coverage.194 With the proposed Trump Care Bill 
failing on July 2017 as well as the President’s plan to let the ACA fail and 
not propose any replacement, the ACA will continue providing health care 
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coverage for Americans for the time being.195 One of the biggest reasons 
for Trump Care’s failure was the cutting of health benefits for low-income 
earners, which presumably could have affected low-income unauthorized 
migrants who were able to receive some sort of health care through the 
ACA.196
As of 2014, 66% of United States residents received health coverage 
through private voluntary insurance and 36.5% of residents acquired 
insurance through government coverage.197 While the ACA is an attempt at 
providing greater health coverage for Americans, it is not a universal 
healthcare policy.198 The ACA has increased the overall rate of health 
insurance coverage for uninsured adults. In 2016, the rate of uninsured 
adults decreased from 22.3% in 2010 to 11.9% in the beginning of 2016.199
“Both state and federal regulations limit immigrant access to 
healthcare.”200 Unauthorized immigrants are generally ineligible for public 
health care coverage.201 They are unable to purchase health insurance 
through the health insurance exchange since it requires proof of legal 
residency in the United States.202 As a result of the lack of coverage, even 
after the ACA, unauthorized migrants in the United States are less likely to 
go to a doctor and are less likely to be able to have a stable source of care in 
comparison to authorized migrants residing in the United States.203 Around 
two-thirds of unauthorized immigrants are uninsured, creating a potential 
cost and burden to the hospitals that treat them.204 Furthermore, 
immigration continues to be a highly debated topic in the United States with 
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polarizing views of the effects of immigrants on the economy, in particular 
unauthorized migrants.205 “It is highly contested whether the economic 
benefit of immigration, including all the taxes and contributions they pay, 
are enough to compensate for the immigrant use of public services such as 
healthcare.”206
Through the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act 
(EMTALA) unauthorized migrants are eligible to receive emergency care 
if, after an emergency medical screening examination, an emergency 
medical condition is found.207 Hospitals that accept Medicare funds must 
stabilize any patient with an emergency medical condition, this includes 
any unauthorized immigrant that would otherwise not have access to health 
care.208 Since EMTALA serves to create a safety net that applies to 
basically every person in the United States, most hospitals abide by it 
because failing to do so could result in losing considerable funding and 
possibly monetary penalties.209 However, states are sovereign entities that 
may choose to have different laws and policies regarding state funded 
health care thereby furthering the coverage of unauthorized migrants 
beyond the point of just:
1) stabilization;
2) coverage for unauthorized children; or
3) coverage for unauthorized pregnant women.210
“Although the taxes and contributions to public programs is positive at 
the federal level, and it is more often negative at the local level due to the 
types of taxes and services for each level of government.”211 Unauthorized 
migrant access to health care at the state level seems to be more of a cost on
the local tax payer prompting the restriction of access for unauthorized 
migrants to health care services.212 Inevitably, unauthorized migrants’ lack 
of access to health care hinges on the perception that they overuse the 
system and do not really contribute toward its funding even though there is 
evidence to the contrary.213
                                                     
205. Vargas Bustamante et al., supra note 203, at 147.
206. Id.
207. Irshad, supra note 186, at 806–07.
208. The U.S. Health Care System, supra note 188.
209. Irshad, supra note 186, at 807.
210. See id. at 805.
211. Vargas Bustamante et al., supra note 203, at 147.
212. See id.
213. Id. at 153.
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 24:1132
III.  COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LAWS
A. Similarities Among the Countries
England, Spain, Germany, Italy, and Canada all have universal health 
care that seeks to insure all citizens and the majority of all legal residents, 
however, the United States does not have universal healthcare and the 
upcoming Senate bill does not make it a possibility any time soon. All six 
countries described in this paper afford unauthorized migrants with some 
sort of access to health care to a varying degree, with the underlying theme 
being that unauthorized migrants are marginalized and end up suffering 
from their legal status. Health care access may also be compared in terms 
of each country’s funding of their health care system.
In this paper, there are systems that are financed out of tax 
contributions, social security contributions, and private health insurance 
carriers. The U.K.’s central government collects the taxes that fund health 
care as opposed to Italy and Spain that fund their systems through local tax 
collection.214 Germany has a social insurance that is funded through the
health insurance fund.215 Similarly, Canada’s health care system is a social 
insurance based system, however it is specifically taxed and managed by 
regional authorities.216 Meanwhile, this leaves the outlier of the United 
States, which has a mix of publicly funded health care for a few, but the 
majority of people must purchase private insurance in order to have access 
to health care.217 However, there seems to be no correlation, in the 
European countries, between funding systems and unauthorized access to 
health care, on the contrary these differences do not seem to affect access to 
health care.218 Similarly, between Canada and the United States, even 
though there are two entirely different systems, there does seem to be 
limited access for unauthorized migrants regardless of their status, for 
example, in the United States they cannot be turned away at the hospital for 
emergency care,219 and in Canada the provinces and the territories do offer 
limited services.220
There does seem to be a similarity between countries that grant greater 
power to their municipalities or their regional governments and the 
corresponding grant of greater access to healthcare to unauthorized 
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migrants.  Also, it does not necessarily stand to conclude that simply 
because an area may be heavily populated by migrants, it will have more 
restrictive policies.221 “[T]he proportion of undocumented migrants living 
in a country [is] a poor predictor of their entitlement to healthcare.”222
Many countries view the “healthy migrant” effect as a method of spending 
less on health care for newly arrived immigrants, but the common factor 
seems to be the many unauthorized migrants who are coming from poorer 
countries are in poorer health.223
B. Differences Among the Countries
A country’s health policy can be an essential factor in determining the 
level of access to health care that unauthorized migrants may have.224 The 
countries featured in this note should be viewed on a continuum regarding 
their respective traditions of being receiving countries.  The first level is the 
legislative level, where a country implements legislation determining what 
health care access migrants will receive; the second level is how the health 
systems actually puts the first level legislation into practice.225 “Countries 
with a longer tradition as receiving countries have formulated and 
reformulated their policies over time while countries where this 
phenomenon is more recent are in the process of formulating and 
implementing policies.”226 The countries chosen for this note are all 
receiving countries, but many have been for a longer period of time. The 
United States and Canada227 have historically been receiving countries for 
immigrants since they were founded as colonies; contrastingly, the 
European countries in this note have been thought of as receiving countries 
more recently, England has been considered a receiving country since the 
1950s;228 Germany since the 1950s;229 Italy since the 1980s;230 and most 
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recently, Spain since the end of the 1990s.231 All of the countries are on the 
second level regarding health care toward unauthorized migrants, but the 
regions of Spain who have implemented greater access seem to be further 
along the spectrum in comparison to Germany which has basically denied 
all health care to unauthorized migrants.232 The United States stands alone 
because it does not even offer universal health care to its citizens, so while 
it has tried to give unauthorized migrants access, the second level is 
currently in a state of flux considering the new administration.
Spain, Italy, and England implement an integration into the native 
population approach for migrant access to healthcare which seems to be a
bigger influence on furthering specific health policies than a history as a 
receiving country.233 Unauthorized migrants are not abiding by the native 
population’s rules and are therefore not able to integrate completely making 
them markedly different than authorized migrants which are welcomed.234
Just as health policy regarding new immigrants has developed with the rise 
of immigration for each country, so have the approaches regarding 
unauthorized migrants’ access to health care.235 As many countries further 
restrict access as a cost-cutting measure, like in Germany,236 the country’s 
economic situation is a direct factor in restricting access as was seen in 
Spain with RDL 16/2012.237
Even though all the countries have given unauthorized migrants some 
sort of health care access, Germany in particular has been criticized for its 
approach toward undocumented migrants in reference to other European 
countries.238 Germany has been criticized as being too “shortsighted” in its 
approach in an effort to protect native Germans.239 Germany has one of the 
most restrictive policies in the European Union, and even though it does set 
up roadblocks to limit the access of unauthorized migrants by threatening 
deportation if they seek help, a migrants’ unauthorized status is a significant 
roadblock that is related to the low usage of health care among this 
group.240
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Like the United States, Canada is a country that has been heavily 
influenced by immigration.241 Both of these countries approach to health 
care access for immigrants is reflective of the waves of immigrants that 
have helped shape the landscape of these countries.242 However, there is a 
difference between the two in their approaches to health care; Canada has 
universal health care for its citizens and some of its residents, while the 
United States does not have universal health care and is currently struggling 
to find a new health care measure through which people can actually afford 
to buy private insurance.243
IV.  OPINION
Access to health care is an overarching international subject of 
concern, not only because it is a basic human right, but because of the ease 
in movement of people creating a new generation of people that is more 
likely to live in a country other than his birth.  “[M]igration and population 
mobility are major factors underlying the processes of globalization. 
Changes in immigration health policy are needed to reflect these new 
realities.”244 There is no uniform approach on how to implement a more 
inclusive system since each country is different and factors such as different 
health systems, legal systems, immigrant stereotypes, and geographic 
location of the country (easily accessible countries will have a different 
outlook than landlocked countries).245 The risk of the spread of infectious 
diseases may be greater than the savings obtained by denying access to 
health care.246 Even though access to primary care may seem like an 
expense that countries do not feel they should shoulder for a population that 
does not directly contribute to its economy, especially in countries that are 
subsidizing their health care systems through employment tax, the cost of 
health care for a more serious health problem that results from a failure to 
get preventive care ends up being a greater expense to tax payers and is
contradictory to the reasons for not granting such access.247 While all 
countries do state that they will provide emergency care for unauthorized 
migrants the reality is more complicated because unauthorized migrants are 
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fearful of possible deportation if they seek help and this ultimately nullifies 
any notion of access to emergency care.
There is also a sociological fear and alienation that is perpetuated by 
denying unauthorized migrants access to health care.248 There is a group 
mentality of “us against them” that may promulgate and even legitimize 
racism.249 The validation of exclusionary labels, “us” and “them” leads to 
exclusionary practices whereby migrants are restricted from accessing 
health care.250 This fear can be overcome by stopping the exclusion of
unauthorized migrants which eventually is counter-productive to the goal of 
creating laws that help cut costs and wasteful spending.251 The laws 
implemented while aimed at limiting the over spending of scant public 
resources is counterproductive when unauthorized migrants’ way of life is 
taken into account, such as the higher risk jobs they must take and the fact 
that many come from poorer countries with poorer health care leading to a 
threat of disease spreading throughout the host population.252 Rather than 
segregating each other into groups based on nationality, a better 
redistribution of funds that is aimed at integrating and creating a more 
harmonious view of common interests may be a better approach at health 
care access.253
V.  CONCLUSION
Access to health care will continue to be an issue for countries around 
the world because people will always need access to some type of health 
care. Especially considering the rise in Nationalist policies aimed at closing 
borders and viewing immigration as way of siphoning off funds from 
citizens, countries policies on access to health care for immigrants, in 
particular unauthorized immigrants, is reflective of the underlying thoughts
that are being perpetuated.254 The issue eventually depends on how much 
should the government, and by default the tax payers, pay out per resident 
of a particular country. As seen above, a country’s health policy whether it 
be to grant universal health care coverage (as the majority of the countries 
featured in this note) or to let citizens buy their own personal coverage at 
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their own expense does not necessarily mean that those who are in the 
margins, such as unauthorized migrants, will be better off in in one country 
or the other. If health care is seen—as many NGOs have declared it is—as
a basic human right, then a government’s limitations on health care is
denying people a necessity, it is not a luxury.
In the end, it comes down to how a country views the cost of caring 
for those who are not seen as contributing toward the economy. However, 
if history has shown something it is the repeat pattern of people searching 
and moving for better economic opportunities.  Considering the current 
situation in many countries, war and poverty, are major motivating factors 
to leave one’s country and try to succeed somewhere else, not access or 
abuse of a country’s health care system as some may believe.255
Unauthorized immigration is a problem that has resulted from the constant 
moving of people.  This note does not aim to justify or legitimize the fact 
that people have broken the law in overstaying their visas, but unauthorized 
immigration will not be curbed any time soon.  The issue here is how to
handle those people who are already living in a country and to provide for 
them in the most humane way.  In a sense, the constant labeling of people 
as migrants, as not from “here,” as being in the country “unauthorized,” just 
serves to legitimize their exclusion from social welfare nets.  Many 
countries or autonomous regions, as explained above, that granted 
unauthorized migrants greater access did so because the cost to provide 
healthcare was eventually lower than keeping them out. This solidifies the 
conclusion that the cost of granting access is lower in long term costs than 
just granting limited access to emergency care.256 Furthermore, a summary
by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights concluded that in 
the instances of prenatal care and hypertension it was a better cost-cutting 
method to provide preventative care, than to restrict care just to emergency 
access.257 The restriction of access to healthcare eventually led to more 
serious health issues that eventually were more costly to treat rather than 
giving preventative care.258 The more people realize that there is no need to 
differentiate between the immigrant population and the native population,
the more the differences between both groups will diminish and lead to 
greater support for granting greater access to health care.259
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I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Japanese Constitution was adopted, the old Civil Code 
under the Meiji Constitution governed family life in Japan.  The old law did 
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not extend suffrage to women, who were also not recognized as being able 
to conclude contracts.  The eldest son, rather than the wife, inherited the 
home and farm upon the death of the father.  These traditions were derived 
from the feudal system of the Edo period.
When the Japanese Constitution of 1947 replaced the Meiji 
Constitution after World War II, universal suffrage was achieved, and 
equality between men and women was declared in Article 14 of the new 
constitution.1 In addition, Article 24 affirmed that a marriage may only 
take place with the mutual consent of both the husband and wife.2 The 
marriage must be maintained through mutual cooperation and on the basis 
of the equal rights of the husband and wife.3
Given these changes, it appears that the legal system that was 
introduced with the new constitution resulted in reforming the Japanese 
family law system.  However, the judiciary has struggled against the current 
of conventional and closed ideas in Japanese society.  The most famous 
case in this regard is the Supreme Court case known as the patricide case,
the facts of which are described later in this paper, which involved a girl 
who was repeatedly raped by her own father.4 She was prosecuted under 
Article 200 of the Criminal Code, which stipulated that a person who kills a 
parent or a spouse’s parent is punishable by death or life imprisonment with 
hard labor.5 At the same time, Article 199 of the Criminal Code stated that 
a person who kills another person shall be punished with death or 
imprisonment with hard labor for not less than three years.6 The Supreme 
Court struck down Article 200 on the basis of Article 14 of the Constitution 
and opined that the means of achieving the law’s goals were too harsh.7
However, it took twenty-two years after this decision for the article to be 
amended by legislature.8
This paper first reviews several cases involving human rights issues 
that have arisen under Japanese family law and the constitution, including 
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two relevant 2015 Supreme Court decisions.  The Court upheld the
constitutionality of Article 750 of the Civil Code, which requires married 
couples to choose either the husband’s or the wife’s family name, 
emphasizing the tradition of couples using the same family name.9 On the 
other hand, the court struck down Article 733 of the Civil Code, which 
prohibited women from remarrying within six months of a divorce.10 The 
court stated that 100 days was a reasonable period to wait before a woman 
should be permitted to remarry.11
Second, focusing on the justices’ opinions in these two cases, this 
paper will consider the constitutionality of these decisions and the Supreme 
Court’s function of imposing its interpretations on the two other branches 
of government:  the executive and the legislative branches.
II. HISTORY OF THE STATUS OF FAMILY AND WOMEN UNDER 
THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION
A. Drafting History of the Japanese Constitution
The Japanese Constitution was adopted on May 3, 1947.12 Under the 
previous (Meiji) constitution, only male adult suffrage was guaranteed with 
regard to the election of public officials, although women participated in the 
general election of the Imperial Diet in 1946.13 Moreover, women were not 
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able to form political associations or take part in political activities under 
the Maintenance of Public Order Act, known as Chian Iji Hou.14
Also, under the old Civil Code15 and the Meiji Constitution, the eldest 
son was the head of the family and succeeded to all property, including the 
house and the land, when the head of the household passed away. 16
Married women were not competent to take legal action, and in a divorce, 
women were not eligible for the right to the distribution of property.17 In 
addition, only women were subject to criminal liability for adultery under 
the old Criminal Code.18
When the United States General Headquarters (GHQ) and the 
Japanese government worked together to propose the draft of the new 
constitution, General Courtney Whitney hired Ms. Beate Sirota Gordon to 
work on provisions related to human rights. 19 She advanced women’s 
rights in the draft of the constitution.20 The provisions for women became 
more advanced at that time, and the equality of men and women was legally 
acknowledged.21 The articles she drafted included those related to both 
women and children.  For example, pregnant women and women with 
children would be protected under the new constitution and would be 
subsidized when necessary.22 Illegitimate children would not be legally 
discriminated against and would be given the same rights as legitimate 
children. 23 Adopting a child would require the consensus of both the 
husband and wife, and the adopted child would be treated equally as a 
                                                     
14. Chian Iji Hou [Maintenance of Public Order Act], Law No. 46 of 1925 (Japan) (The 
Maintenance of Public Order Act is also sometimes called the Peace Preservation Law).  See also
MASASHI TSUJIMOTO & YOKO YAMASAKI, THE HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN JAPAN (1600–2000) 71 
(2017).
15. KYŪ MINPŌ [OLD CIV. C.] 1898, art. 732, 749–51, 964 (Japan).
16. Id. arts. 754–55, 807, 964(3) (noting that there was an exception for a female head of 
household, although her authority was more limited than a male’s authority).
17. Id. art. 732 (Japan).
18. KYŪ KEIHŌ [OLD PEN. C.] 1880, art. 183 (Japan).  This system was abolished by 
amendments to the Civil and Criminal Codes in 1947.  Kanako Takayama, Reform of the Criminal 
Justice System in Japan, 82 INT’L REV. PEN. L. 245, 245 (2011); HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN SINCE 1868 
297–98 (Wilhelm Röhl ed., 2005).
19. BEATE SIROTA GORDON, THE ONLY WOMAN IN THE ROOM 104 (1st ed. 1997).
20. Id. at 106.
21. Id. at 107–08, 113–16, 125.  Later, Ms. Gordon noted that the United States Constitution 
did not have specific provisions for women’s rights. Id. at 107–08.
22. GORDON, supra note 19, at 111.
23. Id. at 117–18.
2017] Tsuji 143
member of the family.24 The privilege of the eldest son would be abolished,
and every child would be given equal opportunity in spite of the 
circumstances of his or her birth. 25 Compulsory education would be 
required for eight years in public school.26 Middle and higher education 
would be provided free of charge.27 The government would be authorized 
to support gifted children.28 All children would be eligible to receive free 
medical treatment for their teeth and eyes.29 School-aged children could 
not engage in full-time employment.30 Regarding adults, every adult person 
would be given the right to pursue an occupation.31 If he or she could not 
obtain it, the government would provide the necessary minimum financial 
support.32 Women would be eligible for any occupation, including political 
positions, and they would receive the same wage as that of males who 
provided the same service.33
The Japanese government objected to Ms. Gordon’s drafts, because 
the Japanese had no background to accept equality between men and 
women. 34 However, this twenty-two-year-old woman’s opinion was 
reflected in Articles 14 and 24 of the Japanese Constitution.35 She referred 
to Articles 109, 119, and 122 of the Weimar Constitution, the First 
Amendment of the United States (U.S.) Constitution, the Finland 
Constitution, and the 1924 Soviet Constitution.36
                                                     
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 118.
27. GORDON, supra note 19, at 118
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. GORDON, supra note 19, at 118.
33. Id. See also MIYOKO TSUJIMURA, KENPŌ TO KAZOKU [CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY] 79–
84 (Nihon Kajo Shuppan 2016) (Japan).
34. TATSUO SATO, NIHONKOKU KENPŌ SEITEI SI [HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN]
(Yuhikaku 1962) (Japan).
35. See NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], arts. 14, 24 (Japan).
36. U.S. CONST. amend. I.; Finland Constitution (Suomen perustuslaki), Ch. 2 § 6, 1999;
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNION OF SOCIALIST SOVIET REPUBLICS [SOVIET CONSTITUTION] Jan. 31, 1924 
(Soviet Union); DIE VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN REICHS [WEIMAR CONSTITUTION] Aug. 11, 1919, 
art. 109, 119, 122 (Ger.); GORDON, supra note 19, at 107–08.
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B. Three 1986 Statutes of Women in Society
A constitution typically binds the government in its relations with its 
citizens but not the relationships of private citizens among themselves.  It is 
controversial when the constitution is applied to relationships between 
private citizens.  One famous case is the Nissan automobile case in which 
Nissan set different retiring ages for males (sixty years old) and females 
(fifty-five years old).37 The Supreme Court ruled the employment provision 
void under Article 9038 of the Civil Code.39
The textbook on the Constitution of Japan classifies relationships
among private parties into three positions.40 The first position emphasizes 
constitutional values and that constitutional norms are not directly
applicable to the relationship between publishers and authors.41 The second 
position uses general basic provisions of the Civil Code to affect a 
constitutional norm between private parties. 42 If a contract exists, the 
constitutional norm applies through basic principles, such as the bona fide
(good faith) articles of the Civil Code used to interpret a contract.43 If there 
is no contract, as in the case of a traffic accident, then principles that guide 
public order and morality are applied.44
The third position recognizes no effect of a constitutional norm in 
relationships between private parties. 45 Only statutes can assist with 
providing a remedy.  The Japanese Supreme Court has not clarified which 
position it is likely to take.46 Currently, German constitutional theory is 
                                                     
37. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 24, 1982, Showa 54(o) no. 750, 35 SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 300, http://www.courts. go.jp (Japan).
38. MINPŌ [CIV. C.] art. 90 (Japan).
39. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 24, 1982, Showa 54(o) no. 750, 35 SAIBANSHO
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 300, http://www.courts. go.jp (Japan).
40. KOJI SATO, NIHON KOKU KENPŌ RON [JAPANESE CONSTITUTION] 164–69 (Seibundo 
2011) (Japan) [hereinafter SATO 2011]; TOSHIHIKO NONAKA, MUTSUO NAKAMURA, KAZUYUKI 
TAKAHASHI & KATSUTOSHI TAKAMI, KENPŌ I [CONSTITUTION I] 248–56 (Yuhikaku 2012) (Japan) 
[hereinafter NONAKA ET AL. I].
41. SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 165, 166–69; NONAKA ET AL. I, supra note 40, at 250–51.
42. MINPŌ [CIV. C.] arts. 90, 709 (Japan).
43. SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 165; NONAKA ET AL. I, supra note 40, at 249–50.
44. SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 165; NONAKA ET AL. I, supra note 40, at 249–50.
45. SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 165; NONAKA ET AL. I, supra note 40, at 249–50.
46. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 12, 1973, Showa 43 (o) no. 932, 27 SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 1536, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] 
July 19, 1974, Showa 42 (gyo tsu) no. 59, 28 SAIBANSHO SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 790, 
http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan).
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influential.  Advocates of German constitutional studies argue that the state 
has a duty and responsibility to protect the rights of private citizens against 
infringement by a private third party.47
Shigenori Matsui argues that the three above-mentioned classifications 
should be abandoned.48 Matsui classifies the relationship between statutes 
and private parties into four types.49 The first type is when a specific statute 
orders a certain action by a private party.50 The second is when a specific 
statute authorizes a private citizen to act.51 The third occurs when there is 
no statute.52 Finally, the fourth type occurs when a specific statute prohibits 
a private citizen from acting.53 Matsui argues that the “public welfare” 
doctrine would apply in the first and second cases.54 In the fourth case, no 
state responsibility arises.55 In the third case, private action is permitted 
and not prohibited by any statute.56
Even after the Japanese Constitution was adopted, the gender role 
model in the family was partially maintained.  Court decisions and the 
Japanese legal system, which are based on civil law, have influenced the 
lives of people as well.  For the family environment in Japan, three statutes 
enacted in 1986 promoted the social status of women, addressed lifestyle 
and work life, and provided opportunities for women to work outside.57
                                                     
47. TAKESHI OYAMA, KIHONKEN HOGO NO HŌRI [PRINCIPLE REGARDING PROTECTION OF 
BASIC RIGHTS] (Seibundo 1998) (Japan); see also SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 168.
48. SHIGENORI MATSUI, NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN] 325–26 (Yuhikaku 
2007) (Japan).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. MATSUI, supra note 48.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 324.
57. Danjo Koyō Kikai Kintou Hou [Act on Securing Equal Employment Opportunity and 
Treatment Between Men and Women in Employment], Law No. 113 of 1972, translated in (Japanese 
Law Translation [JLT DS]), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp [hereinafter Danjo]; Roudousha 
Haken Jidyou no Tekiseina Uneino Kakuho Oyobi Haken Roudousha no hogo tou ni Kansuru Houritsu 
[Act for Securing the Proper Operation of Worker Dispatching Undertakings and Improved Working 
Conditions for Dispatched Workers], Law No. 88 of 1985, translated in (Japanese Law Translation [JLT 
DS]), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp [hereinafter Roudousha] (noting this act is sometimes 
also called the Temporary Staffing Services Law (emphasis added)); Kokumin Nenkin-hō [National
Pension Law], Law No. 141 of 1947, translated in (Japanese Law Translation [JLT DS]), 
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp (as amended in 1959, and again in 2012 by Law No. 99) 
[hereinafter Kokumin].
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First, the Equal Employment Opportunity Law (Danjo Koyo Kikai 
Kintou Hou) prohibits gender discrimination in the workplace. 58 Its 
purpose was to promote equality in recruitment, employment, and 
retirement or dismissal.59 In 1997, this law was partially amended and 
regulations to protect women, such as the prohibition of overtime or 
midnight work, were abolished.60 According to its original goal, however,
the revised act does still require legally equal treatment in recruitment, 
employment, and retirement or dismissal.61
Second, the Temporary Staffing Services Law (Roudousha Haken 
Jigyou no Tekiseina Uneino Kakuho Oyobi Haken Roudousha no hogo tou 
ni Kansuru Houritsu) provides for certain employment conditions and 
guarantees the rights of employees.62 Employers typically hire temporary 
workers at cheaper rates than regular workers.  Workers can choose flexible 
working styles.  This Temporary Staffing Services Law has been amended 
several times.63 The 2006 revised Act provided an extension of part time 
workers’ contracts, as well as improvements to welfare expenses.64
Third, the National Pension Act provides tax reductions for female 
homemakers who belong to Category III Insured as defined by the National 
Pension (Kokumin-Nenkin-Dai-San-Gou-Hi-Hokensha).65
Only those with income under 1.3 million yen receive a tax reduction 
for filing income taxes as a husband’s dependent.66 This law classifies 
people in Japan into three categories. Category I is for self-employed 
persons, students, and unemployed persons.67 Category II is for public 
officials or salaried workers.68 Persons in this category receive the common 
national pension in addition to a welfare pension.69 Category III is for 
unemployed wives of persons in Category II.70 Unemployed wives do not 
                                                     
58. Danjo, supra note 57, at art. 5.
59. Id. art. 1.
60. Id. arts. 27–31.
61. Id. arts. 5–6.
62. Roudousha, supra note 57.
63. Id. (noting that the Temporary Staffing Services Law was amended in 1999 and 2006 
(emphasis added)).
64. Id. art. 40(2) (as most recently amended by Law No. 82 in 2016).
65. Kokumin, supra note 57, at art. 7(3).
66. Id.
67. Id. art. 7(1).
68. Id. art. 7(2).
69. Id. (noting, for example, that public officials need to pay welfare insurance premium).
70. Kokumin, supra note 57, at art. 7(3).
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have to pay tax, because they are their husbands’ dependents for the 
purpose of receiving a pension.71 If the wives work outside the home and 
earn over 1.3 million yen, they must pay employee pension and social 
insurance premiums.72
Another limitation has prevented wives from working outside of the 
home, a spousal deduction for housewives who can claim the deduction as 
long as their income is less than 1.3 million yen a year. 73 Japanese 
housewives have been reluctant to earn more than 1.3 million yen a year.  
The obligation to pay higher taxes associated with higher earnings may 
limit their revenue-making capacity when they decide to work outside the 
home.
In late 2016, the Japanese government revised the spouse dependent 
deduction from 1.3 to 1.5 million yen per year.74 This revision requires 
companies to change their regulations in order for spouses to receive 
additional payments.75 This is a reflection that family life in Japan is 
changing.
III. DECISIONS UNDER THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION
The Supreme Court is the last and highest court in the judiciary under 
the Japanese Constitution.76 Japanese lower courts have concrete judicial 
review under Article 81 of the Japanese Constitution. 77 The judiciary 
reviews disputes of law under the Court Act.78
                                                     
71. Id.
72. Haigūsha Kōjo [Spouse Deduction], National Tax Agency Regulation No. 1191 of 2014, 
http://www.nta.go.jp/taxanswer/shotoku/1191.htm (Japan).
73. Id.; see also Kokumin, supra note 57, at art. 7(3).
74. Haigūsha Kōjo Oyobi Haigūsha Tokubetsu Kōjo no Minaosi ni Tsuite [About Revision of 
Spouse Deduction and Spouse Special Deduction], NAT’L TAX AGENCY, https://www.nta.go.jp/
gensen/haigusya/index.htm (Japan) (last visited Nov. 5, 2017) [hereinafter About Revision of Spouse 
Deduction].  Nen Zeisei Taikō Wo Kakugi Kettei [Cabinet Decision on Fiscal Year 2005 Taxation 
Outline Deduction of Spouse Deduction etc.], NIKKEI SHIMBUN (Dec. 22, 2016, 13:32), http://
blog.goo.ne.jp/kzunoguchi/e/937b9d3c573216bece30277a3bd29bb1?fm=entry_awc(Japan) [hereinafter 
Fiscal Year 2005 Taxation].
75. About Revision of Spouse Deduction, supra note 74; Fiscal Year 2005 Taxation, supra
note 74.
76. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 81 (Japan).
77. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 8, 1952, Showa 27 (ma) no. 23, 6(9) SAIBANSHO
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 783, http://www.courts. go.jp (Japan).
78. Saibansho Hou [Japanese Court Act], Law No. 48 of 2013, art. 3(1), translated in 
(Japanese Law Translation [JLT DS]), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp.
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Under the new Japanese Constitution, pre-war family conventions 
have survived and have emerged in Japanese courts in several cases.  The 
Japanese judiciary took part in introducing human rights concepts to the 
Japanese people through Articles 14 and 24 of the Japanese Constitution.79
When the constitutionality of statutes, orders, regulations, or their 
disposition is in dispute and a precedent is overruled, the Grand Bench of 
the Supreme Court reviews the case.80 The Petty Court can review the case, 
if it is clear, by referring to Grand Bench decisions.81
Japanese Constitutional Law courses teach that Article 14 of the 
Japanese Constitution declares equal opportunities, not equal outcomes.  
One explanation is that the classes enumerated under Article 14 of the 
Japanese Constitution, which state that there shall be no discrimination in 
political, economic, or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social 
status, or family origin, have historically been used as justification for 
discrimination. 82 Per se distinctions based on these enumerated classes are 
presumed to be discriminatory.  The government must argue that 
differential treatment is reasonably constitutional.83 However, different 
treatment based on the effort and ability of the individual is considered 
constitutional.
In other differential treatment, in spite of effort and origin, people are 
sometimes in weak or fragile situations. Social rights as provided in 
Article 25 of the Japanese Constitution 84 take on the role of assisting 
economically fragile people. 85 A person who argues that differential 
treatment is unconstitutional takes on the burden of proving that it is 
unconstitutional.86
                                                     
79. See NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], arts. 14, 24 (Japan).
80. Id. art. 81.
81. Id. arts. 80–81.
82. Id. art. 14.
83. SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 196, 208; JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Belknap 
Press of Harv. U. Press, rev. ed. 1999) (discussing how Rawls theory has been influential on Japanese 
constitutional studies).
84. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 25 (Japan).
85. Some Japanese constitutional scholars think Article 25 represents the political agenda with 
no legal norm.  See SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 363; NONAKA ET AL. I, supra note 40, at 502–03.
86. Yuichiro Tsuji, Article 9 and the History of Japan’s Judiciary:  Examining its Likeness to 
American and German Courts, 68 TSUKUBA J.L. & POL. 35 (2016) (Japan); see also SATO 2011, supra 
note 40, at 196, 208; NONAKA ET AL. I, supra note 40, at 278.
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A. The Patricide Case and Article 200 of the Criminal Code
One of the most famous cases, referenced earlier in this paper, 
concerns patricide.  The case involves a junior high school student who was 
repeatedly raped by her own father.87 Her mother left the house after 
learning that her own daughter was pregnant by her husband. 88 The
daughter tried to leave as well, but in vain.89 She had five children as a 
result of the rapes, two of whom died.90 Another six were aborted and she 
later underwent sterilization.91 When she was twenty-nine, she met a man 
at her workplace that she was eager to marry.92 She did not run away at that 
point because her sister, who was still living at home, might have been put 
in danger.93 Upon telling her father about her work colleague, he became 
angry, put her in confinement, and raped her.94 Eventually, she became 
desperate and strangled him.95 At that time, she was twenty-nine years old 
and her father was fifty-three years old.96
                                                     
87. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Charles Qu, Parricide, 
Equality and Proportionality:  Japanese Courts’ Attitude Towards the Equality Principle as Reflected in 
Aizawa v Japan, 8 MURDOCH U. ELECTRONIC J.L. ¶ 4 (2001).
88. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Qu, supra note 87.
89. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Qu, supra note 87.
90. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Qu, supra note 87.
91. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Qu, supra note 87.
92. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Qu, supra note 87.
93. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Qu, supra note 87.
94. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Qu, supra note 87.
95. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Qu, supra note 87.
96. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Yuko Taniguchi, Songoku 
Satsujin Ga Kieta Hi [The Day When Patricide Crime Was Disappeared], CHIKUMA SHOCBŌ (1987) 
(Japan); Qu, supra note 87.
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In 1973, the Grand Bench of the Japanese Supreme Court97 struck 
down Article 200 98 of the Criminal Code.  While accepting the law’s 
purpose that children should respect parents, the court felt that the penalty 
was too harsh to be sustained, as compared to the punishment for regular 
murder provided under Article 199.99
Among the fifteen justices who reviewed this decision, Justice Takezo 
Shimoda’s dissenting opinion noted that Article 200 should be left to the 
legislature, not to the court.100 Six justices concurring still objected to the 
majority opinion approving special provisions for patricide.101 At the end, 
fourteen justices, with one dissenting, decided the case.102 Eight justices 
upheld the court’s reasoning, with six dissenting.103 Accepting this decision 
that declared the law unconstitutional, the Ministry of Justice sent an 
official notice that Article 199 should be applied, even in cases of 
patricide.104
In 1995, Article 200 was deleted by the legislature, after some twenty 
years.105 Some conservative members in the ruling party have objected, 
                                                     
97. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Hidenori Tomatsu, Equal 
Protection of the Law, 53 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 109, 112 (1990); Qu, supra note 87.
98. KEIHŌ [PEN. C.] ch. XXVI, art. 200 (Japan) (deleting art. 200 as last amended by Law No. 
91, May 12, 1995); Qu, supra note 87; Tomatsu, supra note 97.
99. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Qu, supra note 87; Tomatsu, 
supra note 97.
100. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan) (Shimoda, J., dissenting); Qu, 
supra note 87; Tomatsu, supra note 97.
101. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Qu, supra note 87; Tomatsu, 
supra note 97.
102. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan) (joining the majority opinion 
were Ishida, C.J., Iwata, Murakami, J., Sekine, J., Fujibayashi, J., Okahara, J., Kishi, J., and Amano, J., 
with concurring opinion written by Tanaka, J., Shimomura, J., Irokawa, J., Oshumi, J., Ogawa, J., and 
Sakamoto, J.); Qu, supra note 87; Tomatsu, supra note 97.
103. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Qu, supra note 87; Tomatsu, 
supra note 97.
104. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Tomatsu, supra note 97.
105. KEIHŌ [PEN. C.] (Japan) (deleting art. 200 as last amended by Law No. 91, May 12, 1995).
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favoring Article 200 of the Criminal Code, even after this decision. 106
Decisions declaring a law unconstitutional under concrete judicial review 
do not delete the provisions of the statutes.107 Under Article 41 of the 
Japanese Constitution, the sole and highest organ of the state to pass a bill 
is the Diet.108 Therefore, only the legislature can amend statutes at their 
own discretion.
This case shows an instance where the Japanese judiciary assumed the 
role of introducing the concepts of human rights and equality to the 
Japanese people.109
B. Article 900(iv), Constitutional Order of 1995
The Civil Code governs relationships regarding family and between 
couples.110 The first sentence of Article 900, Item iv of the Civil Code, 
provides different inheritance distributions between legitimate and 
illegitimate children.111
The Japanese judiciary determined Article 900 to be constitutional in 
1995.112 In this case, a girl named Masao Tabata was born in a very 
conventional family during the Meiji Constitution era and under the old 
Civil Code.113 Her older brother had already passed away.114 Her father 
Tonesaku Tabata wanted her to keep his family name, Tabata. 115 His 
daughter Masao married four times in attempts to keep the family name and 
two of the marriages were considered legal.116
                                                     
106. Small Committee on Judicial Affairs for Revision of Article 200 of Criminal Code, DIET
(July 17, 1973), http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/071/0081/07107170081003c.html (Japan).
107. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], arts. 76, 81 (Japan).
108. Id. art. 41.
109. See Yuichiro Tsuji, Constitutional Law Court in Japan, 66 TSUKUBA J.L. & POL. 65 
(2016).
110. MINPŌ [CIV. C.] pt. V, ch. III (Japan).
111. Id. art. 900.
112. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 5, 1995, Heisei 3 (kyo) no. 143, 49(7) SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 1789, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan).
113. See KYŪ MINPŌ (OLD CIV. C.) 1898, art. 732 (Japan).
114. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 5, 1995, Heisei 3 (kyo) no. 143, 49(7) SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 1789, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan).
115. Id.
116. Id.
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In this particular case, the father adopted Masao’s husband as his 
son.117 The second marriage to Gensaku, father of Katsuhiko Fukunishi, 
was not considered a legal marriage due to the strong objections of the 
father.118 Katsuhiko was born as an illegitimate child between Gensaku and 
Masao, but was taken away from them and given to the Fukunishi family.119
The Fukunishi family had no son at that time and Katsuhiko was, in fact, 
their sole heir.120 Two years later, the Fukunishi family had a son, and it 
became undesirable to adopt Katsuhiko as a legal son.121 The father of the 
Fukunishi family acknowledged Katsuhiko as an illegitimate child, even 
though the father of Fukunishi was not the biological father.122 Even after 
the old Civil Code was amended, the distinction between legitimate and 
illegitimate children still remained under Article 900 of the Civil Code.123
Some of the relatives in the Tabata family complained that the child 
Katsuhiko should not be eligible to succeed because he left the Tabata 
family and his children should not be eligible to succeed to their 
grandmother's inheritance.124 They pointed out that the new Civil Code was 
very beneficial for the grandchildren of Katsuhiko. 125 Katsuhiko was 
discriminated against by his birth family, the Tabatas, because he grew up 
with the Fukunishi family, and he was also discriminated against by the 
Fukunishi family for being born in the Tabata family.126
The majority of the Supreme Court thought that the distinction 
between legitimate and illegitimate was reasonable in so far as it respects 
legal marriage and protects illegitimate children, and its distinction was not 
clearly or remarkably unreasonable in relation to the legislative purpose.127
It seems that the 1995 order rested on the belief that the inheritance 
system was based on the individual, and that the provisions regarding 
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statutory shares of inheritance were designed to operate in a supplementary 
way in cases where there is no designation by testament.128 The 1995 order 
supported legislative intent in favor of constitutionality through a multitude 
of factors.  When designing the system, tradition, social environment, 
perception of the people, other factors have to be considered, and the 
system of inheritance in each country more or less reflects these factors.
Furthermore, a contemporary system of inheritance is closely related to the 
idea of family in a given country, and the system cannot be established 
without considering the rules of marriage and family in that country.  It 
should be concluded that the way the inheritance system is established is 
left to the reasonable discretion of the legislature by taking all these into 
consideration.129
The 1995 order noted: As long as the Civil Code adopts the principle 
of legal marriage, the provision gives preferential treatment to the spouse 
who has been in a marital relationship with the deceased and his or her
child(ren) in terms of the statutory share in inheritance, while at the same 
time, it assures that a child born out of wedlock will have a certain statutory 
share in inheritance so as to protect such child.130
This order held that legislative discretion was not excessively 
unreasonable in relation to the reason for enacting Article 900 of the Civil 
Code, and that it did not exceed the scope of reasonable discretion granted 
to the legislature.  There were concurring opinions from Justices Itsuo 
Sonobe, Tsuneo Kabe, Katsuya Onishi, Hideo Chikusa, and Shinichi 
Kawai.131
C. The Dissenting Opinion in the 1995 Order Would Become Mainstream 
in the Courts
Justices Toshijirou Nakajima, Masao Ohno, Hisako Takahashi,
Yukinobu Ozaki, and Mistuo Endo wrote dissenting opinions. 132 The 
dissenting justices thought that distinction by origin went unconstitutionally 
beyond the scope of the legislative purpose of supporting legal marriage 
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and protecting children.133 They explained that Articles 14 and 24 of the 
Japanese Constitution set the limitations of legislative discretion.134 These 
five dissenting opinions became the majority in the 2013 order.135 They 
were of the opinion that the children were subject to uncontrollable 
attribution beyond reasonable distinction.136 The purpose of the law and the 
means to achieve the distinction should be substantially related.
Reasonableness alone could not be sustained in this case.  Supporting 
legal marriage might be reasonable, but the distinction between legitimate 
and illegitimate children was beyond their will and effort.  The distinction 
gave the social impression that illegitimate children were inferior to 
legitimate children.137 The legislative fact might have been consistent at 
that time, but it has changed significantly since then.  Social impressions, 
changes in foreign countries’ legal systems, domestic movement to amend 
the statute or conclude treaty, and changed legislative fact should be 
considered when reviewing the provision.138
The dissenting opinion noted that the decision declaring the provision 
unconstitutional should not be retroactive in effect because it might infringe 
on the legal stability of this case.139 This opinion did not constitute the 
majority in 1995. Reading only the majority opinion, and not the dissenting 
opinion, it would be doubtful to conclude that the 2013 order referenced 
legislative facts in support of constitutionality so much changed that they 
were completely lost in the eighteen years since the 1995 order.  In the 
patricide case, it took twenty-two years before legislative action followed 
through.140 Legislative fact theory is a useful tool for a majority of justices 
to persuade others.  It might be easier for a justice to declare statutes 
obsolete and to ask the legislature to revise in order to avoid serious 
conflicts with the parliament.
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D. The 2013 Order That Declared the Provision Unconstitutional 
In the 2013 order, ancestor "A" passed away in July 2001, and the 
heirs argued that the provisions of Article 900(iv) were unconstitutional 
under Article 14 of the Japanese Constitution. 141 The Supreme Court 
vacated and remanded the case to the High Court by holding the provisions 
in Article 900(iv) unconstitutional.142
The Supreme Court explained that the inheritance system sets rules as 
to who is to inherit the property of the decedent, and in order to define the
inheritance system, the circumstances in each country such as the tradition, 
social conditions, and public sentiments should be taken into 
consideration. 143 Furthermore, since the modern inheritance system is 
closely related to the concept of a family, it cannot be defined without
ignoring the rules, people's perceptions, etcetera. regarding marital or 
parent-child relationships in the country.  It is left to the reasonable 
discretion of the legislature to define the inheritance system while 
comprehensively considering all these factors.  The major issue disputed in 
the present case was, within the inheritance system defined in that manner, 
whether or not the distinction made by the provision in terms of the 
statutory shares in inheritance between children born in wedlock and 
children born out of wedlock constituted discriminatory treatment without 
reasonable grounds.  “If there is no reasonable ground for making such 
distinction even when the abovementioned discretionary power vested in 
the legislative body is taken into consideration, it is appropriate to construe 
that said distinction is in violation of Article 14, paragraph 1 of the 
Constitution.”144
Differential treatment relates to the distinction of legal marriage and 
de facto marriage.  The Japanese Civil Code respects legal marriage over a 
de facto marriage.145
The Japanese Civil Code, revised in 1947, abolished the principle that 
the eldest son was the head of the family and preserved the right to 
succession.146 The code still stated, however, that the statutory share for a 
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child born out of wedlock would be one half that of a child born in 
wedlock, under Article 900.147
The 2013 Supreme Court Order held that the provision in Article 900, 
Item iv of the Civil Code was unconstitutional.148 The Supreme Court 
explained that this provision would control in the absence of a designation 
of the shares in inheritance by a will.149 The Supreme Court reviewed the 
limits of legislative discretion under Article 14 of the Japanese 
Constitution.  The factors to review, such as tradition, social conditions, and 
public sentiments, would change along with the times.
The judiciary constantly reviews individuals’ dignity and equality 
under the law.  The facts based on the 1947 Civil Code have changed.  In 
1947, the prevailing traditional obstacle for equal treatment under the new 
constitution was that the eldest son was the head of the family.150 At that 
time, when revising the code, the family law system and other systems of 
inheritance in other countries were referenced.  Since then, circumstances 
surrounding legal marriage in Japan have changed in line with changes in 
social and economic circumstances, and people's perceptions of marriage 
and family have changed as well.  People's lifestyles have also changed.  
All of these changes brought about the evolution in the inheritance system 
in the Civil Code.
Japan ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) in 1979. 151 However, the 1995 order recognized differential 
inheritance treatment between children born in wedlock and those born out 
of wedlock. 152 The United Nations Human Rights Committee advised 
Japan to remove the distinction.153 The 1995 order deemed Article 900 of 
the Civil Code to be constitutional. 154 Five justices dissented and 
questioned its reasonableness because, by that time, the form of marriage 
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and parent-child relationships had already changed.155 The reasonableness 
of supporting a distinction between children born in wedlock and those 
born out of wedlock was no longer supported.  It was deemed 
unconstitutional in July 2001.156 The reason why the court in the 2013 
order used this date is because the Japanese court had exercised judicial 
review on this issue in a concrete case in July 2001.157
It is not clear which factors made the court change its perspective, but 
Article 900(iv) was held unconstitutional in the 2013 order.158 However, it 
did not overrule the 1995 order.159 The losing party made a special appeal 
(Tokubetu Koukoku) to the Supreme Court and argued infringement of the 
statutes in the case.160 The Court made the decision in a special order.161
The standard of judicial review is puzzling, because the Supreme Court 
declared the 1995 order to be unconstitutional but did not overrule it.  
Yasuyuki Watanabe explains that not every judicial review holds the 
purpose and means to achieve a goal.162 Kazuhiko Ohishi explains that the 
general standard of judicial review did not change with the 2013 order and 
that only the legislative facts had changed, at least in July 2001, and the 
two-step review for the purpose and means to achieve a goal was not used 
in the 2013 order.163
One explanation is that legislative fact is included in the Civil Code, 
unlike other constitutional decisions,164 in relation to the Criminal Code.  In 
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cases in which the constitutionality of a certain criminal sanction is 
disputed, 165 actions such as conducting unauthorized business are 
prosecuted.  The court revealed a lack of attention by the legislature, but as 
in the 1995 order, changes in legislative fact were helpful to the justices in
asking parliament to amend the Civil Code—to avoid serious conflict and
allow a longer time to amend the statute so as to encourage the legislature 
to amend it.  However, legal stability regarding predictability may be lost in 
making such decisions.166 The 2013 order was based so much on reasoning 
surrounding human dignity that it did not even mention the provisions of 
the constitution.167
In sum, this 2013 order limited the effect of the unconstitutional 
decision by not overruling its precedent.  However, there is another way to 
restrict its effect by time scale.
E. Time Limit of the 2013 Order in Declaring A Law Unconstitutional
Three months after the 2013 decision, Article 900(iv) of the Civil 
Code was amended in the parliament with a very quick resolution compared 
with the patricide case.168 One of the reasons for the quick response was 
the effect of a decision declaring a law unconstitutional.  The 2013 order 
recognized that the unconstitutional conditions began in 2001, sending an 
easily understandable message to the legislature.
The Civil Code provides that succession occurs when an ancestor 
passes away.169 The new provision of the Civil Code regarding succession 
occurred after September 5, 2013.170 The amended provision of the Civil 
Code applies only to cases in which there is a legitimate and an illegitimate 
child. 171 The Supreme Court held the provision unconstitutional on 
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September 4, 2013.172 The 2013 order noted a few points for succession 
cases that occurred before September 5, 2013.  
The court noted that on July 2001 at the latest has no effect on any 
legal relationships that have already been fixed by rulings or other judicial 
decisions on division of estate, agreements on division of estate or other 
agreements, etcetera made on the assumption of the provision of the first 
sentence of the proviso to said item with regard to other cases of inheritance 
that have commenced during the period after July 2001 until said judgment 
is made.173
The Supreme Court reserved several comments on the time scale.  
First, Article 900(iv) was unconstitutional for inheritance cases beginning 
in July 2001.174 Second, the unconstitutional order did not control decisions 
or agreements for distributions of the family court from 2001 to 2013.175
The Ministry of Justice explains that the 2013 order has de facto binding 
power.176 The 2013 order applies to similar cases that occur thereafter.  In 
some cases, partition of inheritance takes time after the ancestor passes
away, even if succession already occurred.
After September 4, 2013, if an heir wanted to fix distribution for a case 
in which succession occurred between July 2001 and September 4, 2013, 
the distribution between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child would 
be the same.177 If the distribution for an heir had already been fixed by an 
agreement or judgment, the legal relationships had already been completed, 
and the 2013 order would not hold.  The Ministry of Justice explains that if 
the partition of inheritance is not completed, then the legal relationship is 
not yet fixed.178 An order by the family court or an agreement among heirs 
completes inheritance and fixes the legal relationship.179 The Ministry of 
Justice released a notice to keep legal stability, consistent with this instance 
of concrete judicial review.180 The 2013 order restricts the influence of the 
Supreme Court order on a time scale, based on legal stability of the family 
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relationship once twelve years has passed.181 Thus, it has de facto binding 
power.
The legislature has the responsibility to amend a statute after a 
decision by the Supreme Court declares it unconstitutional, but the Japanese 
Constitution does not specify a reasonable period for the legislature to 
amend or abolish a statute.182 The constitution granted legislative power to 
the Diet, but legislative inaction might permit a party to ask for damages 
under the State Redress Act (Kokka Baishou Hou).183
F. Nationality Act Decision of 2008
The Supreme Court held Article 3(1) of the Nationality Act184 to be 
unconstitutional in 2008.  The Supreme Court used the purpose and means 
review approach.  Here, two cases were decided on the same date—June 4.  
In the first case, the child of an unmarried Philippine mother and a Japanese 
father submitted an application for nationality to the Ministry of Justice on 
the grounds that the child received affiliation through the father after he was 
born.185 The ministry denied the application.186
In the second case, a son and a mother were ordered to leave Japan 
because they lacked Japanese nationality. 187 Under the Immigration 
Control and Refugee Recognition Act, 188 their objections were denied.  
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They argued that Article 3(1) of the Nationality Act was unconstitutional 
under Article 14 of the Japanese Constitution.189
The Japanese Nationality Act uses jus sanguinis to determine 
nationality.190 A child has the nationality of his or her father or mother, 
regardless of his or her birthplace.191 Article 2 of this act provides that a 
child is a Japanese citizen if his or her mother or father is a Japanese citizen 
at the time the child is born.192 Article 3(1) permits those under twenty 
years of age to acquire legitimate child status through parental marriage or 
legal acknowledgment by the father, a process known as “Ninchi” in 
Japanese.193
In Japan, the family relationship between a mother and child starts at 
birth.194 The child is a legitimate child of the mother.195 Under Article 3(1) 
of the Japanese Nationality Act, the father is eligible to acknowledge 
(Ninchi) only while the mother is pregnant, in cases where the mother and 
father are not married.196 However, illegitimate children may not acquire 
Japanese citizenship after birth, even when they are acknowledged by the 
father.197 These illegitimate children can acquire Japanese citizenship only 
after the mother and father become legally married.198
The Supreme Court majority held that Article 3 of the Nationality Act 
was unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of Article 14 of the 
Japanese Constitution.199 Article 10 of the Japanese Constitution provides 
that Japanese nationality is fixed by statute.200 The Japanese Nationality 
Act provides requirements for acquiring or losing Japanese nationality.201
The nation's traditional, political, social, and economic environment 
works to fix these requirements of nationality in the legislature.  The 
distinction caused by the requirements for nationality under the Nationality 
Act would be unconstitutional if this distinction were to have no reasonable 
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grounds for justification.  If the legislature acts beyond the scope of its 
discretion, the judiciary can regard the provision as unconstitutional under 
the equal protection clause of Article 14 of the Japanese Constitution.
Japanese nationality is a very important legal status that protects not 
only fundamental rights but also one’s eligibility to receive public 
assistance.  A child who is born cannot change his or her condition—
whether or not the parents are married—by his or her own effort or ability.
In 1984, the Nationality Act was amended to grant Japanese 
nationality only after the father and mother got married, apart from the 
process of legitimation (Jun-sei).202 On the other hand, children born of a 
Japanese father and a non-Japanese mother can receive Japanese nationality 
through acknowledgement by the father during the pregnancy of the 
mother.203 This amendment works to follow the principle of jus sanguinis.
The legislature was of the opinion that those children who could not acquire 
Japanese nationality by nature would be able to establish a “close 
relationship” with a foreign country, apart from Japan.204
Article 3(1) of the Japanese Nationality Act used jus sanguinis and the 
legal marriage between a Japanese father and a non-Japanese mother to 
mean a close relationship with Japan.205 The distinction in Article 3(1) of 
the Japanese Nationality Act was based on reasonability of purpose at the 
time it was amended in 1984.
In this case, the plaintiff submitted registration for Japanese nationality 
in 2003, at which time the legislative argument to support constitutionality 
had already been lost.206 The decision to strike down Article 3(1) of the 
Japanese Nationality Act as unconstitutional did not mean that all 
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provisions, including legitimation, became void in their entirety. 207
Legitimation to cover the principle of jus sanguinis still remained.208
The Supreme Court cited the patricide case and used the purpose and 
means to achieve a goal approach.209 A change of legislative fact was one 
of the critical factors.  Japanese concrete judicial review only addressed the 
individual plaintiffs in this case and excluded others in the same position.  
In any case, the legislature amended the Japanese Nationality Act in 
2008. 210 It is not clear how long the judiciary needs to declare that 
legislative facts have changed so as to make a statute obsolete.
IV. TWO FAMILY LAW DECISIONS IN 2015
In December 2015, the Japanese Supreme Court rendered two 
decisions in the area of family law.  The Court upheld Article 750 of the 
Civil Code as constitutional, requiring a married couple to choose either the 
husband’s or the wife’s family name. 211 The Court emphasized the 
Japanese tradition of using the same family name for a couple.212 On the 
one hand, the Court struck down Article 733 of the Civil Code, which 
prohibited women from remarrying within six months of a divorce.213 On 
the other hand, the Court stated that a 100-day waiting period was 
constitutionally reasonable.214
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A. Same Surname Decision in 2015
The Supreme Court upheld Article 750 of the Civil Code as 
constitutional in December 2015.215 The plaintiffs sought damages as a 
result of legislative inaction to amend Article 750 of the Civil Code.216
They argued that they had a right not to be forced to change their family 
name upon marriage, and that social pressure and discrimination to change 
the family name to that of the husband’s family name infringed upon their 
equal protection rights under Article 14 of the Japanese Constitution.217
Those who wanted to keep the wife’s family name could not get married, 
which infringed upon the freedom to marry as provided in Article 24 of 
Japanese Constitution and also violated the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.218
The Supreme Court responded that the right not to be forced to change 
one’s family name is a personal right and a symbol of one’s personality.219
The articles of the Civil Code regulate and control concrete personal rights 
in light of the constitution.  The Supreme Court thought that it was 
inappropriate to argue that being forced to change one’s family name upon 
marriage infringed upon the personal rights set forth in the constitution.220
The intent of the articles regulating the family under the Civil Code,
confirming that members using the same surname would belong to the same 
family, reflect a fundamental component of society. Their purpose is 
constitutionally reasonable. Change of family status is subject to an 
individual’s will upon marriage, and thus, females are not forced to give up 
their surname against their will.221 The family name has an identification 
function in relation to others, and the right to establish or change one’s own 
family name depends solely upon one’s own will.  A change of surname 
upon marriage is expected.
Responding to the argument that it is an infringement of equal rights 
under the constitution, the Supreme Court stated that Article 750 did not 
discriminate based on gender. No formal unequal treatment was caused by 
Article 750 because the majority of couples use the husband’s surname and 
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because husbands and wives discuss and conclude which family name is to 
be adopted.222
The Supreme Court explained that the purpose of Article 24 of the 
Japanese Constitution, which guarantees the right to choose whether to 
marry, whom to marry, and when to marry, is subject to individual 
choice.223 On the other hand, Article 750 of the Civil Code addresses the
effects of marriage.224 Giving up a marriage because of Article 750 does 
not necessarily lead to an infringement of Article 24 of the constitution.  
Married women can use their family name as their common name in their 
social lives.
The Supreme Court further explained that Article 24 of the 
constitution is only a suggestion and guideline for the legislature.225 The
family is regulated under the general perspective of relationships between 
parents and family, and couples are subject to the times in which they live.
These influences include national tradition, social factors, and 
circumstances surrounding the family. Personal rights and equal protection 
rights take various forms and legislative discretion is very broad.  The 
means to achieve the goal are further fixed by social status, the environment 
in which people are living, and the standpoint of the family as it changes 
from time to time.
The judiciary reviews the effects of this system under Article 24 of the 
Constitution and reviews the reasonableness of Article 750 in light of 
human dignity and equal treatment between males and females.226 The 
same surname tradition was established in 1898.227 It is reasonable to think 
that having the same surname is a fundamental component of being a 
family.  A child born between a husband and a wife using the same 
surname is then assumed to be legitimate and protected under their 
guardianship.
Five dissenting opinions saw Article 750 of the Civil Code as 
unconstitutional.228 Justice Kiyoko Okabe noted in her opinion that the 
number of females working outside the home is increasing and that it is 
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reasonable for a woman to keep her family name after marriage.229 Without 
exception, the use of a different surname for a woman could cause a loss of 
personal identification. The majority of couples using the husband’s 
surname reflects the actual power balance in our society.  A requirement to 
change one’s surname could be unconstitutional in so far as it infringes 
upon one’s personal identification and leads to a sense of losing one’s 
identity.230 One cannot use an alias in public documents and identification 
by an alias versus official name brings about new issues.  Women are 
participating more and more in society such that the background of the 
provision is becoming lost.  Losing one’s identity goes against the dignity 
of the individual and gender equality under Article 24 of the constitution.231
Furthermore, Justice Okabe emphasized that instances of divorce, 
remarriage, non-marriage, and late marriage are increasing and that the 
function of the surname is being lost.232
Justice Michiyoshi Kiuchi argued in his dissenting opinion that Article 
750 of the Civil Code should be unconstitutional because at least one 
person in the couple is obligated to give up his or her surname.233
Justice Kiuchi doubts that the sense of being a family member is 
cultivated through the same surname.234 Children are not born with a sense 
of whether they have the same surname as other family members.  Having 
the same surname is not proof of a relationship between a child and a parent 
or of being a married couple.
Justice Yoshiki Yamaura concurred with Justice Okabe and noted that 
the Diet has the responsibility to amend Article 750.235 He referenced a 
Korean Constitutional Court decision that held a similar provision in Korea 
to be unconstitutional.236 The same opinion has also been referenced by the 
Commission of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women.237
This decision was controversial among Japanese constitutional 
scholars.  The scholars criticized the majority for allowing broad legislative 
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discretion and denying personal rights that are protected under the 
constitution.  A name signifies a person under a legal system, which leads 
to attachment to that name.238
The Court explained that a surname has meaning as an individual’s 
name, because the family name and the first name work together to identify 
a person in society.239 Scholars criticized the majority opinion by stating 
that the family name belongs to society.  A certain uniform standard is 
needed. Unlike the first name, a family name has an important function in 
recognizing members of “one” family.240 A surname is assumed to change 
when family relationships change in instances such as marriage.241 Thus, 
Article 750 is related to personal rights protected under Article 13 of the 
constitution.
Kazuyuki Takahashi explains that a name is used to identify oneself in 
social life. 242 Recognizing the vital function of people living with 
autonomy in social life, this constitutional right is guaranteed.  Takahashi 
opines that the Court should have analyzed whether there is a legitimate 
public interest in changing a surname. 243 The majority opinion 
distinguished the surname from the first name, stating that a surname is 
granted by the government but is not guaranteed as a human right.244 For
Takahashi, this was an arbitrary interpretation.245
The legislature has discussed revising Article 750 since 1996. 246
Former Justice Tokuji Izumi argued that the mission of the judiciary had 
been abandoned because the cabinet did not propose a bill and the 
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legislature did not amend the law, leading the plaintiff to take the issue to 
court in this case.247
The majority opinion must have responded by saying that Article 750 
conflicts with the ICCPR.248 Miyoko Tsujimura was disappointed that the 
court did not mention the ICCPR and thinks that, in the future, the Court 
will allow all people to retain their surnames after getting married if they so 
choose.249 The right of a married couple to use separate surnames is within 
the legislature’s discretion.250
B. Prohibition of Remarriage Decision in 2015 
The Supreme Court251 held Article 733(1)252 to be unconstitutional 
beyond the 100-day waiting period. In this case, the wife-plaintiff divorced 
her former husband in 2008 because of domestic violence and because she
was pregnant by her current partner.253 She needed to wait for six months 
after the divorce before she could remarry. 254 In 2011, she claimed 
emotional damage, resulting from legislative inaction to amend Article 772 
of the Civil Code, in the Okayama District Court.255 The district court and 
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the Hiroshima High Court held the requirement to be constitutional.256 The 
plaintiffs argued that this provision was unconstitutional under Articles 14
and 24 of the Japanese Constitution.257 The Legislative Council of the 
Ministry of Justice advised in 1996 that Article 733 should provide a 100-
day waiting period, but conservative members of the Diet prevented an 
amendment to Article 733.258
It is necessary to examine Article 772 259 before analyzing Article 
733(1).  Article 772 of the Civil Code provides for three scenarios 
regarding the status of a child.260 First, a child conceived during marriage is
presumed to be the child of the husband.261 Second, a child born within 300 
days after divorce is presumed to be the child of the divorced husband.262
Third, a child born after remarriage is presumed to be the child of the new 
husband.263
When a wife gets a divorce and remarries immediately, a child born 
within 200 days after the divorce would be presumed to be the child of the 
ex-husband and not of the new husband. 264 Therefore, the period of 
prohibition of remarriage was provided for in Article 733(1). 265 A
duplication of presumptions occurs from the 201st to the 300th day, but 
Article 733 prohibited remarriage for a six-month period in any event.266
In December 2015, the majority opinion of the Supreme Court held 
that the purpose of Article 733(1) is to avoid duplication of the presumption 
of paternity so as to prevent paternity-related disputes.267 At the time the 
Civil Code was drafted, during the Meiji Constitution era, it was considered 
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reasonable to impose a remarriage ban of six months, which is longer than 
the present 100 days, not only for the couple but also in the interest of the 
child.
The legislature generally regulates family and couple relationships by 
taking into consideration national tradition, social factors, and 
circumstances surrounding the family.  Article 24 of the Japanese 
Constitution sets limits on legislative discretion.268 The judiciary reviews 
provisions in light of their reasonableness to sustain the constitutionality of 
these provisions as established by the legislative branch.  Today, as medical 
technology develops, this foundation is being lost.  The Supreme Court said 
that imposing a 100-day waiting period was reasonable and appropriate but 
imposing a period beyond 100 days would be unconstitutional and 
unreasonable.269
Justices Ryuko Sakurai, Katsumi Chiba, Takehiko Ohtani, Yoshinobu 
Ohnuki, Naoto Ohtani, and Tsuneyuki Yamamoto wrote concurring 
opinions.270 They agreed with the majority that a waiting period of 100 
days was constitutional under Article 14 or 24(2) of the Japanese 
Constitution.271 They believed that the prohibition period should be as 
short as possible.272 Even within 100 days, the prohibition of remarriage 
must be lifted in certain cases.273 The purpose of Article 733 was thought 
to be sustained as long as it avoided a presumption of two fathers and 
prevented disputes regarding paternity.274
The lack of presumption of paternity is not limited to cases where a 
child is born within 100 days under Article 733(2).275 There are cases 
where the biological mother was too old to be pregnant or paternity was not 
presumed, because the husband was missing for three years. 276
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Additionally, when the wife has undergone sterilization, it is clear that she 
cannot bear a child.277
When the couple registers a marriage, the officer reviews only the 
formal documentary items. 278 Thus, new couples must file medical 
evidence to rebut a presumption of paternity by the former husband if the 
woman has been previously married.279
Justice Kaoru Onimaru opined that all of Article 733 was 
unconstitutional because the overlap of the presumption occurs only in 
exceptional and limited cases.280 Even though the purpose of Article 733 is 
legitimate, a uniform prohibition to cover rare cases is too broad to 
maintain reasonableness under Articles 14 and 24 of the Japanese 
Constitution.281 Clear and simple regulations should be prepared by the 
legislature for family and couple relationships.
Justice Michiyoshi Kiuchi explained that scientific DNA data analysis 
can objectively clarify paternity. 282 Therefore, a prohibition period for 
remarriage to prevent confusion of paternity is no longer meaningful.
Justice Yoshiki Yamaura’s dissenting opinion argued that Article 
733(2) restricts women through a legal technique to prevent the 
presumption of fatherhood.283 There are very few instances where a woman 
bears a child where the question of paternity overlaps with the former and 
the new husband.  A prohibition covering all women is meaningless.  An 
individual remedy for children should be provided by the legislature. 
Justice Yamaura showed how a South Korean Constitutional Law Court 
held a similar provision of the Civil Code to be unconstitutional in 2005.284
The remarriage prohibition and the same surname decision in 2015 
illustrates several points.  First, the judiciary will refrain from acting 
beyond legislative discretion and restricts the scope of its decisions on
unconstitutionality.  It should provide guidelines for the legislature to 
follow in amending laws when necessary.  The members of the Diet are not 
legal experts.  A simpler and easier message would be helpful for them to 
react to court decisions.  In this case, the court struck down the additional 
eighty days as unconstitutional and held that a waiting period of 100 days 
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was constitutional. 285 The parliament should modify Article 733 
immediately.  Even though technology continues to develop, paternity 
disputes lead to litigation costs that can still be burdensome for the general 
public.286
Second, the minority opinion of the Supreme Court is not critical to 
the parties in these particular cases, but over time, it could function as the 
majority opinion.  Constitutional law scholars have the responsibility to 
disseminate these opinions throughout Japan.
C. Local Government and Same Sex Marriage
Under Article 24 of the Japanese Constitution, the phrase “the mutual 
consent of both sexes” is subject to interpretation.287 If this language means 
both females and males, it would be unconstitutional to admit same-sex 
marriage.  Otherwise, it would be constitutional to read that “of both sexes” 
means “of two parties.”  This interpretation would prohibit polygamy.
Several decisions of the Japanese Supreme Court show that it takes a 
long time to pass or amend statutes in the Diet.  Article 41 of the Japanese 
Constitution provides that legislative power belongs solely to the Diet.288
Deliberations in parliament under constitutionalism shall consider the 
opinions of the minority, marginalized people, and freedom of speech as
these are channeled between the legislature and the people.
When the deliberative floor of central Tokyo does not work well, the 
local government might be a model for the Diet. Chapter 8 of the Japanese 
Constitution provides for local self-government.289 A local government 
may pass ordinances for regions within its jurisdiction, but not for all of 
Japan’s territory.
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In 2015, Shibuya ward passed an ordinance to deal with relationships 
of same-sex couples in the same way as legal marriage.290 The reason for 
passing this ordinance was that some lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender (LGBT) couples could not rent rooms and were prevented from 
visiting their partners in the hospital for medical checkups or other 
procedures. 291 Shibuya ward approved eight couples and issued them 
registration documents.292
In Setagaya ward, the mayor issued a protocol for the registration of 
same-sex couples as partnerships. 293 Twenty-nine couples have 
registered.294 Yokohama city opened space for members of the LGBT 
community to communicate.295 In Chiba city, more than fifty percent of 
citizens are projected to register as same-sex couples.296
Registered same-sex couples do not receive the same tax and 
inheritance treatment as legally married couples. 297 These ordinances 
motivate the Diet to pass relevant statutes, although strong conservative 
members object to amending the Japanese Constitution.
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V. THE FUNCTION OF A DECISION THAT STRIKES DOWN A LAW AS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
In Japan, the effect of a decision on the constitutionality of a law 
applies only to the litigants in the case under concrete judicial review.  The 
decision on the unconstitutionality of a law by the Supreme Court has no 
function to automatically delete the provisions at issue because the law-
making power belongs solely to the Diet.  The drafting history of the 
Japanese Constitution shows that there was serious concern over leaving 
absolute power to the judiciary.  The concern was over the issue of where
sovereign power should reside.
Although a decision on the unconstitutionality of a law only binds the 
parties and the government in a particular case, it must be respected by the 
other branches of government.  As in Article 200 of the Criminal Code, the 
prosecutor applied the provision governing regular murder, Article 199 and 
not Article 200, for a murder case where a child killed his or her parents 
after the Supreme Court had rendered its decision on the relevant case.298
Soon after the remarriage prohibition case in 2015, the Ministry of 
Justice notified municipalities to accept marriage registrations as early as 
100 days after a divorce.299 The legislature must respect decisions on the
unconstitutionality of a law and rapidly amend or abolish the pertinent
provisions.  However, it took twenty-two years to amend the relevant 
statutes in the patricide case.
These cases illustrate some of the obstacles in the floor deliberations 
of the Diet.  There is no specific time limit obligating the legislature to 
amend or abolish statutes under the Japanese Constitution, although the 
Supreme Court indicates some guidelines for legislative action.
Decisions on the unconstitutionality of a law are retroactive only for 
litigants and do not generally hold for other cases under concrete judicial 
review and Article 41, as the Diet has the sole law-making power.
By analyzing the scope of the decisions on the unconstitutionality of 
various laws, it might be possible to distinguish criminal from civil and 
administrative cases.  In criminal law, court decisions generally apply 
retroactively, but final decisions would not automatically invalidate other 
past decisions.  In administrative or civil law cases, decisions in general do 
not apply retroactively.
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The Supreme Court announces decisions on the unconstitutionality of 
a law, and sends them to the cabinet and the Diet.  This means that the 
decision should hold for similar cases in the future.  Judicial review under 
the Japanese Constitution is a concrete rather than an abstract review.  The 
application of a decision on the unconstitutionality of a law means that the 
application of that law to the specific facts of a concrete case will be 
unconstitutional even as the text of the statute on its face remains 
constitutional.300
Regarding Article 900(iv), the order that rendered the provision 
unconstitutional in 2013, limited its effect to a specified time scale on the 
ground that the legal stability of family relationships for inheritance 
purposes needed to be maintained.301 If the distribution to an heir was 
already fixed by an agreement or judgment, the legal relationship would be 
complete.  The 2013 order did not overrule the 1995 constitutional order, 
but it managed to maintain legal stability through the uniform treatment of 
families—preventing confusion with other family relationships.302
These decisions did not set forth a time limit for the legislature to act.
In subsequent analyses, when voting on disparity cases, the Japanese 
Supreme Court reached decisions on the unconstitutionality of laws, even 
as these provisions remained effective through the Administrative 
Litigation Act. 303 In 1976, the Supreme Court adopted the Iken-Jotai
condition doctrine for the first time by invoking Article 31(1) of the 
Administrative Case Litigation Act in an action for revocation of an 
administrative decision. 304 It used an application by analogy method, 
known as Jijo Hanketsu. 305 The 1976 decision rejected the claim that 
                                                     
300. Saikō Saibanashō [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 28, 1962, Showa 30(o) no. 2961, 16 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 1593 (Japan) (involving confiscation of the property of third parties, this 
was a controversial decision as to whether the law at issue was unconstitutional on its face or in its 
application); see also SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 671; NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 164, at 323, 
332(c).
301. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 4, 2013, Heisei 24 (kyo) no. 985, 67(6) SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 1320, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan).
302. Id.
303. Yuichiro Tsuji, Vote Value Disparity and Judicial Review, SINGAPORE L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016).
304. Gyousei Jiken Soshō Hou [Administrative Case Litigation Act.], Act no. 139 of 1962, art. ?
31, translated in (Japanese Law Translation [JLT DS]), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp
/law/detail/?id=1922&vm=04&re=02 (Japan).
305. Id.
176 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 24:1
Article 219 of the Public Officer Election Act clearly prohibited the 
application of Article 31(1) of the Administrative Case Litigation Act.306
The Supreme Court explained that parliament must address 
unconstitutional states or conditions within a reasonable time.307 If it fails 
to do so, the judiciary can make a determination of unconstitutionality.  
Today, lower courts can declare unconstitutionality in cases of voting 
disparities.  In the disparity voting case referenced above, the effect was not 
retroactive for the litigants.
Dissenting or concurring opinions are not critical as precedent to bind 
future cases, but they play the role of sending a message to other 
government branches.  For the cases involving Article 733 of the Civil 
Code, the dissenting opinion of Yamaura noted that, under the Meiji 
Constitution, the old patriarchy had been maintained in the Civil Code, 
while Justice Kiuchi suggested the availability of advanced medical 
technology.308 Additionally, after the decisions on the unconstitutionality 
of the law but before amendment by the legislature, the Ministry of Justice 
ordered the office of municipalities to accept marriage registrations just 100 
days after divorce.309 As in the patricide case, the conservative members of 
parliament are reluctant to respond in some cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
Under the Meiji Constitution, women did not enjoy the same rights as 
men.  Female suffrage was not recognized and women could not form 
associations or take part in the parliament.  Under the old Civil Code, only 
the eldest son succeeded to the property of the family.
A young American lady who was raised in Japan suggested an 
advanced proposal for equal rights after working with the GHQ.  The 
Japanese government, however, rejected her proposal because they 
referenced traditions that did not exist in Japan.
The Japanese Constitution provides for equal rights in Articles 14 and 
24 by stating that marriage shall be based only on the mutual consent of 
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both sexes, and that it shall be maintained through mutual cooperation on 
the basis of equal rights between the husband and the wife.310
The constitution governs the relationship between the government and 
private citizens.  The judiciary uses the constitution in some cases to 
invalidate contracts between companies and laborers.  There are 
controversies with regard to whether constitutional norms directly apply to 
relationships among private citizens.
In 1986, three major statutes to guarantee equal protection were 
passed, impacting the fields of labor and national pension.311
Decisions of the judiciary have been influential as a remedy for 
unequal treatment in conventional family law.  Under concrete judicial 
review, the judiciary sends messages to the legislature to revise statutes.  
Article 41 declares that the sole law-making organ is the Diet, so the 
judiciary cannot amend the statutes being reviewed. 312 Under concrete 
judicial review, the judgment only applies to the parties in litigation.  In the 
patricide case, the Ministry of Justice did not prosecute under the article in 
question in similar cases.
In the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children, the 
Supreme Court held Article 900 to be constitutional in 1995.313 This case 
shows that conventional customs survive even under the current Japanese 
Constitution.  Dissenting opinions argued that children cannot choose their 
parents and are subject to uncontrollable attributions.314 Decisions on the 
unconstitutionality of a law may cause other similar family relationship 
issues.  The dissenting justice proposed that the decision should not be 
retroactive, but this proposal did not receive the support of the majority.315
In 2013, the Supreme Court announced by order that Article 900 was 
unconstitutional.316 The Grand Bench of the Supreme Court called all 
fifteen justices to change precedent and determine the constitutionality of 
the order and statutes.317 The 2013 order did not overrule the 1995 order.  
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The 2013 order noted that Article 900 would control in the absence of a 
designation of the shares of inheritance by a will and pointed out that some 
factors to limit legislative discretion such as tradition, social conditions and 
public sentiment, would change along with the times.318 First, this order 
shows that dissenting opinions may subsequently become mainstream in 
Japanese family law decisions.
Second, the Court may reveal a lack of attention by the legislature.  
The judiciary is obligated to constantly review statutes and hold them 
unconstitutional if the legislative facts that supported the statutes have 
changed.  Recommending a change of legislative fact is a helpful tool to 
receive majority support among justices, thus avoiding serious conflicts and 
delays in amending the statute.  It also encourages the legislature to amend 
statutes.  However, legal stability may be sacrificed through such decisions.  
The 1995 order supported legislative fact in favor of constitutionality by 
making reference to several influences including tradition, social 
environment, perception of the people, and other factors.  Justices do not 
have to change the general standard of judicial review but can depend on 
changed legislative fact.
Third, the Ministry of Justice can quickly respond when it receives 
understandable messages from the judiciary.  This limits the scope of an 
order declaring similar cases unconstitutional.  The judiciary cannot state a 
specific time limit for the legislature to amend a statute.  The 2008 decision 
under the Nationality Act shows that the judiciary may review legislative 
purpose and the means a law uses to achieve a goal even when that goal is
not yet clear.319 This decision supported the legislative fact carried forward 
from1984 even though it had been lost by 2008.  It is not clear how long it 
will take for the judiciary to declare that a legislative fact has changed and 
that statutes are now obsolete.  A 2015 decision also upheld the article in 
the Civil Code addressing surnames for couples.320 The Supreme Court 
stated that family traditions have not changed so much to allow the 
judiciary to declare this provision unconstitutional.321 Constitutional law 
scholars are mainly against this decision.  Another 2015 decision held 
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Article 733(1) to be unconstitutional regarding limitations on remarriage.322
In this case, national tradition, social factors, and other circumstances 
contributed to the decision.323 This case shows that a judicial decision can 
be used as a guideline for the legislature to amend a statute in question in a 
certain way.
Fourth, while a minority opinion of the Supreme Court may not be 
critical for the parties to the case at bar, it can function as a majority 
opinion in the future.
Fifth, several decisions of the Japanese Supreme Court show that it 
takes the Diet a significant amount of time to pass or amend a statute.  
Local government initiatives can serve as models for statutes in the Diet.
The decisions of the Supreme Court have led the dialogue on how 
couples and families should act in Japanese society.  The judiciary can gain 
trust as a fair umpire of the general public discourse through the 
persuasiveness of its decisions.  Tradition, legislative discretion, and 
legislative fact are some of the interpretive tools that judges may use.
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JOINT NOTIFICATION
ADDRESSED TO THE REGISTRAR OF THE COURT:
The Hague, 12 September 2016
On behalf of the Federation of the Clans of the Atan and the Kingdom of 
Rahad, and in accordance with Article 40(1) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, we have the honor to transmit to you an 
original of the Special Agreement for submission to the International 
Court of Justice of the Differences between the Applicant and the 
Respondent concerning the Sisters of the Sun, signed in The Hague, The 
Netherlands, on the twelfth day of September in the year two thousand 
sixteen.
Her Excellency Cheva Visier, His Excellency Ned Karol, Ambassador 
of the Federation, Ambassador of the Kingdom of the Clans of the Atan 
Rahad to the Kingdom of The to the Kingdom of The Netherlands 
Netherlands
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SPECIAL AGREEMENT
SUBMITTED TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
BY THE FEDERATION OF THE CLANS OF THE ATAN
AND THE KINGDOM OF RAHAD
ON THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM 
CONCERNING THE SISTERS OF THE SUN
The Federation of the Clans of the Atan (“the Applicant”) and the Kingdom 
of Rahad (“the Respondent”) (hereinafter “the Parties”);
Considering that differences have arisen between them concerning the 
Sisters of the Sun and other matters;
Recognizing that the Parties have been unable to settle these differences by 
direct negotiations;
Desiring further to define the issues to be submitted to the International Court 
of Justice (“the Court”) for resolution;
In furtherance thereof the Parties have concluded this Special Agreement:
Article 1
The Parties submit the questions contained in the Special Agreement 
(together with Corrections and Clarifications to follow) (“the Case”) to the 
Court pursuant to Article 40(1) of the Court’s Statute.
Article 2
It is agreed by the Parties that the Federation of the Clans of the Atan shall 
appear as Applicant and the Kingdom of Rahad as Respondent, but such 
agreement is without prejudice to any question of the burden of proof.
Article 3
(a) The Court is requested to decide the Case on the basis of the rules and 
principles of international law, including any applicable treaties.
(b) The Court is also requested to determine the legal consequences, including 
the rights and obligations of the Parties, arising from its Judgment on the 
questions presented in the Case.
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Article 4
(a) Procedures shall be regulated in accordance with the applicable provisions 
of the Official Rules of the 2017 Philip C. Jessup International Law Moot 
Court Competition.
(b) The Parties request the Court to order that the written proceedings should 
consist of Memorials presented by each of the Parties not later than the date 
set forth in the Official Schedule of the 2017 Philip C. Jessup International 
Law Moot Court Competition.
Article 5
(a) The Parties shall accept any Judgment of the Court as final and binding upon 
them and shall execute it in its entirety and in good faith.
(b) Immediately after the transmission of any Judgment, the Parties shall enter 
into negotiations on the modalities for its execution. 
In witness whereof, the undersigned, being duly authorized, have signed the 
present Special Agreement and have affixed thereto their respective seals of 
office.
Done in The Hague, The Netherlands, this twelfth day of September in the 
year two thousand sixteen, in triplicate in the English language.
Her Excellency Cheva Visier His Excellency 
Ned Karol
Ambassador of the Federation Ambassador of the 
Kingdom of Rahad
of the Clans of the Atan to the to the Kingdom of 
The Netherlands
Kingdom of The Netherlands
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**SPECIAL AGREEMENT**
THE CASE CONCERNING THE SISTERS OF THE SUN
ATANIA / RAHAD 
1. Applicant, the Federation of the Clans of the Atan (“Atania”), and 
Respondent, the Kingdom of Rahad (“Rahad”), are neighboring 
states that occupy the Nomad Coast. The Nomad Coast,
characterized by arid and semi-arid lands, is bounded to the north by 
the Great Garnet Desert and is otherwise surrounded by the Emerald 
Ocean.
2. Atania is a newly-industrializing state located in the eastern two-
thirds of the Nomad Coast. As of 1 January 2015, Atania had a 
population of just over 22 million. Seventy-five percent of the GDP 
of Atania is based on the extraction and exportation of hydrocarbons; 
the country’s other major sources of revenue are tourism and grain 
exports. In January 2010, the country’s GDP was US$102 billion, 
although by January 2016, it had fallen to US$80 billion.
3. The Kingdom of Rahad, a constitutional monarchy, occupies the 
western third of the Nomad Coast. The current Queen, Teresa Savali 
II, has executive authority to command the nation’s armed forces, to 
convene and dissolve the national parliament, and to appoint and 
dismiss government ministers. Rahad’s largest export is natural gas. 
Rahad’s GDP in January 2016 was estimated at US$11 billion. 
According to the February 2014 census, its population was 3.5 
million.
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4. The Greater Inata Aquifer (“the Aquifer”) is the largest underground 
source of fresh water in the Nomad Coast and is one of the largest 
aquifers in the world. People of the Nomad Coast have relied upon 
discharge from the Aquifer for many generations, but a definitive 
map of the Aquifer itself was not produced until 1990.
5. The Kin Canyon Complex (“the Complex”) is a group of three 
canyons cut by long-extinct rivers straddling the border between 
Atania and Rahad. The Complex covers approximately 300 square 
kilometers. The canyons that constitute the Complex are located at 
the deepest part of a greater wadi system. Each is over four 
kilometers deep, consisting largely of layers of brightly colored 
sandstone and limestone. Among the many historic sites located 
within the Complex is a walled fortress known as “the Stronghold,” 
an architecturally and archaeologically significant assembly of 
ancient dwellings and ceremonial structures. Also of great interest to 
archeologists and tourists is the Sunrise Mesa, a freestanding 
sandstone butte approximately 160 meters tall positioned 250 meters 
north of the Stronghold. When the rising sun strikes it, the butte 
appears to sparkle with red light. Two of the three canyons are within 
the borders of Atania; the third canyon and the Sunrise Mesa are 
within the territory of Rahad. 
6. First settled in the Neolithic Era, the Kin Canyons are a rich source 
of archaeological treasures. The Complex was described in a 2015 
issue of National Geographic magazine as “a continuing source of 
some of the most fascinating insights into early human civilizations.” 
Critical archeological discoveries within the Complex include 
terracotta figurines, flint axes, and jewelry all dating from between 
10,000 and 5,000 BCE. 
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7. The people of both Rahad and Atania descend from the Atan, the 
original inhabitants of the Complex. When the rivers that carved the 
canyons dried up more than 3,000 years ago, most of the Atan 
inhabitants migrated to coastal regions and separated into 17 clans. 
One of the clans, Clan Kin, remained in the Complex and provided 
for the protection of the Canyons, which they venerated as the 
birthplace of their ancestors.  
8. According to legend, in 500 CE, Teppa, a warrior of the Clan Kin, 
uncovered a plot by a warlord, Ifan the Desert Fox, to invade the 
Nomad Coast. To defend the Kin Canyons, Teppa persuaded all 17 
Atan clans to stand together against Ifan’s raiders, and under her 
leadership, the united clans defeated the invaders. Humbled by his 
defeat, Ifan offered his life to Teppa. Teppa forgave Ifan, raised the 
Ruby Sipar, a ceremonial shield laden with jewels, and declared 
peace. Teppa died a hero. Her exploits were the subject of poetry,
and her image was featured in pottery, mosaics, and coinage of the 
era.
9. In recognition of her pivotal role in saving the sacred canyons and 
uniting the people of the Nomad Coast, the Kin honored Teppa’s 
memory by establishing “the Sisters of the Sun,” an order of women 
dedicated to protecting and preserving the culture and traditions of 
the Kin. Although much of their history has been lost through the 
ages, the Sisters of the Sun continue to serve as social and cultural 
leaders within Kin society and as mediators in local disputes. The 
members wear miniature replicas of the Ruby Sipar around their 
necks as a symbol of their loyalty to the Sisters and to the founder of 
the order.
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10. After initial hostile contact with European explorers in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the 17 Atan clans held a 
peaceful ceremonial gathering in 1863. Anticipating future contact 
with other nations and in an attempt to unite in perpetuity, 16 of the 
clans elected to enter into the republican federation, Atania, which 
still exists today. Clan Rahad chose to remain independent and 
established the Kingdom of Rahad. Permanent boundaries between 
the two states were established at the gathering.
11. The Kin lived in the Complex until the formation of the two new 
states, when they migrated to lands east of the Complex in Atania. 
They remain largely culturally and politically isolated from the rest 
of Atanian society, avoiding modern technology and living off the 
land through farming, hunting, and gathering. As of 1 January 2013, 
the Kin accounted for 98% of subsistence farmers in Atania. 
12. For centuries, the original Ruby Sipar was believed to have been lost 
forever. In 1903, Dr. Gena Logres, an archaeologist from the 
University of Atanagrad, conducting an excavation in the Complex 
within the territory of Atania, discovered what appeared to be the 
original Ruby Sipar featuring more than 100 precious gems 
surrounding a large sun made entirely of rubies. Dr. Logres took the 
object to the University of Atanagrad, where it was placed on public 
display. Subsequent archaeological research confirmed its 
authenticity. 
13. In 1990, Atania and Rahad jointly proposed that the Complex be 
included on UNESCO’s World Heritage List as a cultural and natural 
heritage property. The joint proposal included a two-kilometer 
“buffer zone,” extending from the edge of the Complex in all 
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directions. The World Heritage Committee accepted the proposal 
and listed the Kin Canyon Complex as a mixed heritage site on 2 
May 1994. In 1996, the Ruby Sipar, identified as “on loan from the 
University of Atanagrad,” was moved to a newly constructed 
Cultural Center on the Atanian side of the Complex. The Complex 
and the Cultural Center have drawn on average 350,000 visitors each 
year.  
14. As a result of record low rainfall, the entire Nomad Coast 
experienced sustained drought conditions in each year from 1983 to 
1988. Both Atania and Rahad were forced to import water from other 
countries at great expense. In order to reduce its reliance on imported 
water, Rahad permitted the drilling of wells on public land for 
private, agricultural, and commercial use. 
15. In 1988, the Rahadi Ministry of Water and Agriculture hired a team 
of hydrologists from Alberta, Canada to map the sources of its 
subterranean fresh water. Using ground-penetrating radar, the 
hydrologists conducted the first in-depth study of the Greater Inata 
Aquifer. Their initial report, published in 1990, included a detailed 
map and concluded that the Aquifer covered more than 274,000 
square kilometers within the Nomad Coast, of which 65% was 
located in Rahad and 35% in Atania. The Ministry then 
commissioned the hydrologists to undertake a more in-depth study 
to monitor the recharge rate and salinization of the Aquifer over the 
next 10 years. 
16. On the first UN World Water Day, 22 March 1993, Queen Teresa 
and the Atanian President, Alexander Vhen, appeared together at a 
ceremony in Atanagrad, the Atanian capital, to recognize and 
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celebrate the importance of water to all peoples. In a nationally-
televised address, the Rahadi Minister of Water and Agriculture said:
The people of Rahad today join our Atanian 
neighbors and the world in recognizing the 
importance of water to all who live on the Nomad 
Coast. In honor of this World Water Day, Rahad 
promises to make every reasonable effort to 
preserve and protect the shared fresh water 
resources of our Nomad Coast and to ensure their 
equitable use. Future generations must be assured 
that they will never be denied access to these 
valuable, unique resources, on which life and 
prosperity depend, and without which we cannot 
survive.
The Minister’s Atanian counterpart responded with a message 
communicating the “appreciation of the Atanian people for this 
neighborly gesture of cooperation and brotherhood.”
17. In a speech on the 5th World Water Day in 1998, UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan recalled the Rahadi Minister’s statement:
Rahad’s commitment to preserve and protect the 
water resources it shares with Atania and to make 
sure that they are used equitably is a testament to 
the inspiration that lies behind the UN World 
Water Day. The world might well emulate this 
model of cooperation. Recognition must be 
universal that human dignity, indeed human 
survival, cannot be assured without access to fresh 
and clean water.
18. In 2000, the follow-up report from the team of hydrologists found 
that the Aquifer contained approximately 35 cubic kilometers of 
extractable fresh water. The report indicated that the major deposit
of the Aquifer’s waters occurred more than 10,000 years ago;
because of the arid climate of the Nomad Coast, the recharge rate of 
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the Aquifer is negligible, and any water extracted from it would not 
be replenished for many generations.
19. Drought conditions returned to the region, beginning in 1999 and
continuing to the present day, with record-low rainfall recorded 
throughout the Nomad Coast. In 2001, meteorologists in the Atanian
State Weather Service reported that there had been a 1.6-degree 
Celsius average temperature increase throughout the Nomad Coast 
during the period 1970 to 2000. The head of the Service repeatedly 
expressed concern that “the combined impact of these 
meteorological and climatological changes on fresh water sources in 
the Nomad Coast is likely to result in a long-term shortage of water 
for the peoples of both Rahad and Atania.”
20. In her annual birthday address on 16 June 2002, Queen Teresa stated 
that it was her government’s desire to improve access to the waters 
of the Aquifer, to ensure that the needs of the Rahadi people could 
be met. She described the Aquifer as “a fundamental natural resource 
of our country,” and declared that, “as a developing nation suffering 
the effects of extreme drought and climate changes, Rahad has the 
right and indeed the obligation to seek out ways of using that 
resource to sustain our people.” On the next day, she formally 
directed the Inata Logistic and Scientific Association (“ILSA”), a 
Rahadi government-funded scientific organization, to study the 
feasibility and long-term effects of directly tapping the Aquifer to 
meet Rahad’s domestic need for water. 
21. ILSA released its report on 17 January 2003. It concluded that, in 
light of projected consumption, growth and development, 
completely ending Rahad’s reliance on imported water and re-
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establishing self-sufficiency would require an alternative supply of 
approximately 1.2 cubic kilometers of water per year. Extraction of 
water from the Aquifer at this rate would deplete its total extractable 
fresh water reserve in approximately 30 years. The report was 
subjected to blind independent peer review before being accepted for 
publication in the International Journal of Hydrology. The study 
noted that, because the Kin Canyons were located near the Aquifer, 
care would need to be taken to ensure that any depletion of the 
Aquifer waters did not harm the structural integrity of the Complex. 
22. On 2 February 2003, Queen Teresa made a televised appearance to 
the nation, setting out her plans to address the increasingly serious 
water crisis in Rahad. Among other things, she announced:
Our nation is confronted with a very grave dilemma, 
and I want all of our people to understand how your 
government is proposing to deal with it.  We simply 
do not have enough water to sustain our farmers, 
who grow our food and provide our sustenance, and 
there is no obvious solution to this problem that is 
economically viable and practically possible. None, 
that is, except one. I am today ordering the Bureau 
of the Interior to begin implementation of a 
comprehensive program to extract water from the 
Greater Inata Aquifer. I certainly realize that this is 
a short-term solution. If we exhaust the Aquifer, we 
risk bankrupting our future generations. But we 
must do something. All of our people are affected by 
this crisis. So we will explore means of taking life-
giving water from the Aquifer so long as drought 
conditions continue, and so long as we have no 
other way of preserving the life and culture of the 
great Rahadi nation.
23. President Vhen responded by thanking the Queen for her remarks but 
noting his ongoing concern about the “equitable division of the 
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waters of the Inata Aquifer,” and “the integrity of the Kin Canyon 
Complex, which is of enormous cultural and economic importance 
to both countries.” President Vhen reminded the Rahadi government 
of its obligation to respect the commitment it made on 22 March 
1993, “when carrying out any plan to tap the largest source of fresh 
water on the Nomad Coast for its own exclusive domestic use.” He 
concluded, “unless and until my Government is assured that any 
Rahadi extraction of Aquifer waters will not negatively affect our 
use of the shared resource, we must express our serious concerns 
about the potential dangers that this unilateral action may provoke.” 
He called on the Queen to stop plans to tap the waters of the Aquifer 
immediately and to seek alternative sources. 
24. The Bureau of the Interior prepared a plan for a network of 30 pump 
wells located in Rahad’s northern territories to be connected by a 
subterranean pipeline system (“the Savali Pipeline”), which would 
provide a reliable source of water to Rahad’s farmlands and natural 
gas industry. Given the concerns about its potential impact on the 
Complex, Rahad submitted the Savali Pipeline plan to the World 
Heritage Committee on 30 September 2004. 
25. The Committee’s decision on the submission, published on 12 July 
2005, “note[d] with concern” potential issues regarding possible 
subsidence of lands superjacent to the Aquifer, and “strongly urge[d] 
Rahad to ensure that the proposed Savali Pipeline project develops 
and implements targets for improving the conservation of the Kin 
Canyon Complex, and that all plans, policies, and proposals 
potentially affecting it demonstrate that they will make a positive 
contribution to the achievement of those targets without risking harm 
to sites of outstanding universal value.” 
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26. Working to comply with the decision of the World Heritage 
Committee, Rahad limited drilling for the extraction of water to areas 
more than 15 kilometers outside of the Complex’s buffer zone. The 
Savali Pipeline project was completed on 20 February 2006, and 
pumping from the Aquifer began. Since 2006, 70% of the water was 
used for agriculture and 22% by the natural gas industry (the 
remaining 8% went to a variety of other uses). The Savali Pipeline 
continues, as of the date of this Special Agreement, to pump water 
from the Aquifer at a consistent rate of 1.2 cubic kilometers per year.
27. In 2009, Atanian farmers in the region south of the Complex reported 
that wells, springs, and small streams were drying up, and land that 
had been rich and arable five years earlier was becoming dry and 
difficult to farm. Alarmed by the loss of important farmland, the 
Atanian Ministry of Water and Agriculture commissioned an 
international panel of climatologists, geologists, and hydrologists to 
determine whether the changing hydrology of the region was the 
result of the Savali Pipeline project. 
28. The panel released a study in June 2010 that concluded that operation 
of the Savali Pipeline had caused a permanent lowering of the water 
table in the region. As a result, discharge from the Aquifer could no 
longer provide a sufficient natural source of water for Atanian 
agriculture. The study found that 20% of what had been Atanian 
farmland could no longer be farmed, and that within 10 years an 
additional 30% would be lost if extraction continued at the same rate.
29. President Vhen addressed the findings in a Parliamentary speech 
given on 6 July 2010, in which he said:
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Not long ago, our Rahadi neighbors agreed that 
the waters of the Greater Inata Aquifer are a 
shared resource. It is with great sadness that we 
must now observe the plundering of this resource 
to benefit economic interests in Rahad, with scant 
regard for the harm they are doing to the people of 
Atania. The destruction of our farmland has 
already cost Atania more than US$300 million 
annually in the loss of food and other agricultural 
products. If this terrible trend continues, these 
losses will double in 10 years. We must implore the 
government of Rahad to stay true to its commitment 
to ensure the equitable use of shared water in the 
Nomad Coast, and to end the disastrous pipeline 
experiment.
30. Meanwhile, by late 2010, foreign tourists began posting photographs 
on Twitter and Instagram using the hashtag #kincanyonscrumbling. 
These images showed what appeared to be environmental 
degradation in remote sections of the Complex. On 4 February 2011, 
President Vhen ordered a panel of geologists to investigate the 
veracity of the images. Weeks later, the geologists unanimously 
agreed that there had been clear structural degradation of the 
Canyons and the Stronghold within Atania. They attributed the 
problem to subsidence due to depletion of the Aquifer, but offered 
no opinion regarding whether continued extraction would lead to 
further damage. On 1 June 2011, The Atanian Herald reported that 
two Bhutanese tourists had barely escaped falling into a massive 
sinkhole that appeared when a busy pathway in the Complex 
collapsed. The Atanian government’s website announced that 
sections of the Complex were being closed to visitors immediately 
to ensure their safety. 
31. President Vhen sent a communiqué to the UNESCO World Heritage 
Committee on 7 July 2011, requesting that the Complex be added to 
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the List of World Heritage in Danger “due to the impact of the Savali 
Pipeline.” Annexed to President Vhen’s message were the results of 
the geologists’ investigation.
32. At its 37th conference in Saint Petersburg in June 2012, the UNESCO 
World Heritage Committee granted President Vhen’s application
and added the Kin Canyon Complex to the List of World Heritage in 
Danger.
33. Following the Committee’s decision, President Vhen requested a 
meeting with Queen Teresa to propose “the immediate suspension of 
Savali Pipeline operations until the situation, including potential 
hazards, may be better understood.” The Queen declined the 
invitation, and on 19 July 2012 the Palace issued a press release:
We respect the cultural heritage of the Kin Canyon 
Complex that we share with our Atanian brothers 
and sisters, and for that matter with all of humanity. 
Our pumping of waters from the Aquifer is being 
conducted in accordance with the highest possible 
standards of care, in conformity with our 
obligations as stewards of this marvelous treasure. 
We voluntarily commit to undertake regular studies 
of the long-term impact of this project on the region 
in general and on the Complex in particular. But we 
have no intention of surrendering our sovereign 
right to develop the natural resources with which 
our territory is blessed.
34. Faced with the continued loss of farmable land due to the absence of 
water seepage from the Aquifer, the Atanian government determined 
that additional water needed to be allocated to agricultural 
production. On 28 September 2012, the Atanian Parliament enacted 
the 2012 Water Resource Allocation Program (WRAP) Act, which 
set a quota on water supplied by the Atanian Public Water Works (a 
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government agency) to every household, farm, and business in 
Atania, to be in effect from 1 January 2013 until further notice. The 
Water Works was ordered to provide the government with quarterly 
reports of water consumption.
35. Under the WRAP Act, all farming operations were also required to 
purchase licenses to utilize public water. WRAP offered license 
exemptions for farms that sold more than US$75,000 worth of crops
per year. Nearly 86% of farming operations in Atania qualified for 
this exemption. Licenses were made available for purchase online or 
at local WRAP offices. The WRAP Act empowered the Bureau of 
Agriculture to prosecute anyone who used over-quota water and
farming operations that failed to obtain licenses under Atanian 
Criminal Code provisions for “theft of public property.”  
36. Fewer than 5% of Kin farmers applied for licenses before the end of 
2012, as required by law. The Bureau of Agriculture investigations 
also showed that in the first two quarters of 2013, more than 80% of 
Kin households and farms used water in excess of their quotas. In 
July 2013, all violators were sent notification of their failure to 
comply with WRAP. 
37. In August 2013, in accordance with the WRAP Act, the Department 
of Justice began the prosecution of two Kin farmers for use of over-
quota water and failure to obtain a license. Both defendants asserted 
that their cultural traditions prevented them from seeking permission 
from the state to make use of natural resources. They also argued that 
the law discriminated against the Kin because it favored profit-
generating farms, either because they qualified for an exemption or 
because they were able to pay for licenses. The two defendants were 
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convicted of theft of public property and were ordered to pay a fine. 
Neither complied, and both were thereafter sentenced, in accordance 
with provisions of the applicable Criminal Code, to prison terms of 
five years. Although the Department of Justice distributed flyers 
across Kin lands publicizing the results of the trials and warning that 
more prosecutions might follow, over the following four months 
there was neither a noticeable increase in the number of licenses 
purchased nor a detectable decrease in the overall consumption of 
water in Kin areas. 
38. In October 2013, the Atanian Parliament amended the WRAP Act to 
provide that farms using water in violation of the Act were subject, 
in addition to the existing criminal penalties, to the termination of 
their state-controlled water supply. Invoking those procedures, by 
the end of 2013, the government of Atania cut off water to the 
majority of farms in Kin lands.
39. United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (“FAO”)
Director-General José Graziano da Silva condemned the effects of 
WRAP in a speech to the General Assembly on 2 February 2014. He 
described numerous reports received from Kin villages in Atania
claiming that small farmers whose water supplies had been
terminated for failure to comply with WRAP and therefore had to 
abandon farming had no other means of securing sufficient food and 
were suffering severe deprivation. Dr. Graziano implored the 
government of Atania to stop the denial of access to water and to 
provide assistance to Kin villagers already affected by the changes 
to the water rights regime in the country. 
2017] Jessup Compromis 199
40. On 28 June 2014, the International Federation of the Red Cross and 
Red Crescent released a report entitled “It’s a WRAP: Starvation and 
Illness among the Kin.” Based on six months of interviews and 
surveys of Kin villagers by IFRC staff in the region, the report found 
rapidly rising rates of food-deprivation-related illnesses such as 
scurvy and beriberi among the Kin population. It also indicated that, 
of the 1.1 million Kin then living in Atania, more than 500,000 were 
undernourished. The report confirmed the FAO’s conclusion that the 
termination of the Kin’s water supply was depriving them of the 
ability to continue the traditional farming that had been their primary 
source of sustenance. 
41. On 17 July 2014, Carla Dugo, one of the elders of the Sister of the 
Sun, chained herself to a flagpole in the plaza outside the President’s 
residence in Atanagrad. She told reporters that she was engaging in 
a hunger strike to protest “the Atanian government’s persecution of 
the Kin” through what she called “the theft of our water, our food, 
and our way of life.” She also called on her fellow Sisters to “stand 
together” and “remember Teppa, and the true meaning of the Sipar 
that we proudly wear.” Within two weeks, over 5,000 Sisters of the 
Sun, hundreds of Kin, and their supporters had congregated in the 
plaza. 
42. The protest was widely reported in international media, which noted 
that numerous public buildings and other structures, including the 
seat of the Parliament, had been tagged with hand-painted Sipar 
symbols. Many international human rights NGOs tweeted messages 
of solidarity with the Sisters of the Sun. Thousands of demonstrators 
and onlookers began to assemble in the plaza and the immediate 
vicinity. Sisters led protesters to form human chains across major 
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roads into the city, blocking traffic and preventing employees from 
entering municipal offices. Sister Dugo spoke with reporters at the 
scene and used the media spotlight to raise her Sipar, invoking “the 
memory of Teppa,” calling on all Sisters of the Sun and the entire 
Clan Kin to “stand together against the persecution of our people” 
by the government. Other speakers, all of whom wore or carried 
replicas of the Ruby Sipar, called for “stronger and more resolute 
action until our representatives listen to our cries.” The crowds 
refused orders to disperse, and on 2 August 2014, the mayor of 
Atanagrad described conditions in his city as “chaotic, unsanitary, 
dangerous, and entirely unsustainable.” 
43. On 5 August 2014, President Vhen issued the following order:
The ongoing unrest and the seditious protests led by 
the Sisters of the Sun can no longer be tolerated. The 
untenable situation in our capital city requires that 
the Government take drastic action to preserve law 
and order for all of our citizens. Therefore, I am 
today deploying armed police to assist government 
officials working to maintain peace and to permit all 
of our people the opportunity to live their lives 
without disruption. We respect the history of the 
Sisters and are mystified by their apparent decision 
to sacrifice their peaceful traditions to promote 
social disorder and mistrust of the Government. The 
Ruby Sipar, once a symbol of respect and even 
veneration that represented the united cultures of 
our nation, has come to identify and to provoke 
disruptive elements within Atania. It must be 
banned. We can no longer accept its public display. 
All Ruby Sipar Pendants worn or carried in public 
shall be confiscated and destroyed by agents of law 
enforcement.
44. Following this order, Atania removed the Ruby Sipar from public 
display in the Complex Cultural Center and placed it in storage.
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45. Following President Vhen’s announcement, Atanian police cleared 
the plaza, arresting more than 800 Sisters of the Sun and Kin 
protesters. They were charged with disturbing the peace and 
violating orders to disband. The remaining demonstrators were 
driven from the plaza with tear gas and rubber bullets; no deaths or 
serious injuries were reported. The police seized all of the Sipar 
Pendants worn by the Sisters. 
46. In the following days, Sisters of the Sun throughout Atania publicly 
expressed what they called their “outrage over the ongoing treatment 
of the Kin and the government response to peaceful protests.” The 
Ministry of the Interior claimed that in many areas, demonstrations 
blocked roads, interfered with local businesses, and disrupted regular 
social activities, although again, there were no reports of deaths or 
serious injuries. Atanian police arrested more than 100 Sisters of the 
Sun and 900 other Kin demonstrators across the country over the 
following days. Hundreds remain in prison as of the date of this 
Special Agreement.
47. In early September 2014, Rahadi Immigration Department agents 
reported that as many as 100,000 Kin had crossed into Rahad over 
the previous two weeks. The Argentine daily newspaper La Nación,
which had sent a correspondent to interview members of Clan Kin, 
reported that while most of those crossing the border identified “fear 
of arrest” as their motivation, a substantial number claimed to be 
fleeing starvation.
48. On 18 September 2014, the Rahadi Parliament enacted the Kin 
Humanitarian Assistance Act (KHAA). The preamble noted that the 
Kin crossing into Rahad “were facing the desperate plight of people 
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forced to escape hardship and persecution in their homeland.” 
KHAA provided that Kin identified as Sisters of the Sun and their 
family members were deemed to be fleeing persecution and were 
therefore entitled to all of the rights and privileges of refugees under 
Rahadi immigration law. All other Kin entering Rahad were 
permitted to apply for refugee status, to be determined on a case-by-
case basis. Because of the volume of applications and other 
circumstances, including the unavailability of adequate funding, 
Rahad anticipated at least a 24-month period until it could begin 
review of those applications.
49. KHAA ordered that the Government, in cooperation with the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, establish three temporary 
camps in which all Kin entering the country were to be housed “until 
other arrangements can be made or until they deem it safe to return 
to their homeland.” As of the date of this Special Agreement, of the 
approximately 800,000 Kin who crossed the border into Rahad,
21,000 were found to be Sisters of the Sun, and an additional 134,000 
their family members; refugee status was provided to all of those 
individuals. Applications for refugee status of other Kin remain 
pending as of the date of this Special Agreement.
50. During intake interviews of a group of Kin at one of the camps on 3 
October 2014, Rahadi border patrol agents encountered Carla Dugo.
She told the agents that, a few days earlier, she had entered the Kin 
Canyon Complex Cultural Center in Atania under cover of darkness 
and removed the original Ruby Sipar from the vault in which it had 
been stored. She declined to provide more details (including the 
names of Center employees who she claimed had helped her) but told 
the border personnel that she had taken the treasure “to ensure its 
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protection from destruction,” and because “it belongs with the Kin, 
wherever we are.” Sister Dugo voluntarily turned over the Sipar to 
the border agents, who delivered it to the Rahadi Ministry of Culture.
51. The Rahadi Minister of Culture, Sophia Casa, notified her 
counterpart in Atania that she was in possession of the Ruby Sipar 
and that, given that its public display had been prohibited by 
President Vhen, it would be “inappropriate” for it to be returned. The 
Atanian Minister replied that the refusal to return the Sipar 
demonstrated “a blatant disregard for the cooperative relationship 
shared by our two states and a clear violation of international law.”
52. On 3 November 2014, Ms. Casa formally rejected the request for 
repatriation of the Sipar, which she described as the lawful property 
of Rahad. She said: 
Atania has publicly declared the Sipar to be a symbol 
of sedition and those who wear it to be enemies of the 
state. The campaign to eradicate all vestiges of the 
Sipar is incompatible with any claim to its ownership. 
We will keep this priceless treasure where it will be 
available to all who wish to see it, and we will treat
it with the respect and veneration that it deserves.
53. By August 2015, the International Rescue Committee, which had 
been invited by Rahad to monitor conditions at the camps, reported 
that the number of Kin in Rahad exceeded the capacity of the 
facilities created to receive them, and that national infrastructure 
“was being stretched beyond the breaking point.” The reports 
described sporadic power outages in 85% of the country lasting for 
more than four hours at a time, and reduced access to clean water for
more than 150,000 Rahadi families, as well as the Kin in the camps. 
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Members of the Rahadi Parliament introduced legislation to repeal 
the KHAA.
54. On 13 October 2015, The Rahadi National Times published a front-
page article reporting that of the thousands of Kin migrants who had 
qualified for refugee status and were being resettled into urban 
centers, some were engaging in petty crime, while others were 
sleeping in the streets, apparently unable to acclimate to the culture 
of Rahad. The article quoted numerous Rahadi citizens who 
expressed concern about the social and economic costs of attempting 
to integrate the Kin into their new society. Dismissed by government 
spokesmen as “xenophobic exaggeration,” the Times article was 
cited by members of the Rahadi Parliament urging repeal of the 
KHAA and the revisiting of what they called “the Kin question.”
55. After extensive debate, on 17 December 2015, Parliament adopted 
the Border Protection Act (BPA), whose preamble recited, in 
relevant part:
It is the opinion of Parliament that the Kin crisis and 
the burden it has placed upon our society and 
economy have been caused by internationally 
wrongful acts of the Atanian state including the gross 
mistreatment of the Kin in their homeland. 
Parliament therefore humbly requests that Her 
Majesty’s Government pursue all available means to 
achieve three objectives: (a) negotiating a cessation 
of the causes of the massive emigration of Kin from 
Atania; (b) devising a plan for the safe relocation of 
those Kin who do not qualify for refugee status; and 
(c) obtaining financial compensation from the 
government of Atania for the massive costs our 
nation has had to bear as a result of our 
humanitarian response to the influx of the Kin.
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56. In her keynote address at the annual meeting of an international NGO 
the following month, Queen Teresa directly addressed the issues 
raised by the Parliament:
Recently, our Parliament requested that I endeavor 
to obtain compensation for the economic burdens 
that the Kin are placing on Rahad’s economy. I have
instructed my Government to engage in discussions 
with Atania, whose treatment of the Kin has given 
rise, over the past few years, to a mass migration of 
members of that Clan into our country. When their 
legal and moral obligations are not sufficient to
compel states to treat their citizens with respect, it is 
improper for them to shift the economic 
consequences of such policies onto neighbors willing 
to provide shelter to people fleeing their homelands, 
in order to forestall even more serious catastrophes. 
This is a moment for political vision and bravery, and 
for insisting upon the sharing of humanitarian 
burdens.
57. On 18 January 2016, the Rahadi Ambassador to Atania submitted to 
the Atanian Foreign Ministry a memorandum itemizing expenditures 
associated with running the camps, relocating and integrating the 
Kin, and repairing damage to national infrastructure, all of which 
was said to be accruing. The list included particular costs claimed to 
have been caused by the influx, such as provision of food, sanitation, 
basic health and municipal services (including security services), 
building the camps, access to clean water, connections to the power 
grid, and road maintenance and construction. Deducting 
contributions provided to Rahad by foreign aid programs and 
international organizations, the net total was US$945,000,000, and 
the memorandum demanded compensation in that amount as well as 
for expenses continuing to accrue. Later that day, a spokesman for 
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the Atanian Foreign Ministry, during a weekly press conference, 
acknowledged the memorandum, but dismissed it as 
“unprecedented, inconsistent with international law, and unworthy 
of a reply.”
58. At the suggestion of the Secretary General of the United Nations, the 
governments of Atania and Rahad convened high-level discussions 
of the Kin issue in March 2016. The discussions quickly revealed to 
both parties that the crisis was part of a much larger dispute 
concerning all of the issues set out in this Special Agreement. In
April 2016, the parties agreed to refer all of these matters to this 
Court.
59. Atania and Rahad are both members of the United Nations, and are 
parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice; the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties; the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights; the 1972 World Heritage Convention; 
and the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (and its 
1967 Protocol). Atania is a party to the 1970 UNESCO Convention 
on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export 
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, which Rahad has 
signed with ratification still pending in Parliament. Neither state has 
made any reservations, declarations, or understandings with regard 
to any of these treaties other than Atania’s declaration regarding the 
1970 UNESCO Convention referenced below.
60. Upon its ratification of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, Atania 
deposited the following declaration with the Director-General of 
UNESCO:
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The properties designated as “of importance for archaeology, 
prehistory, history, literature, art or science,” in accordance with 
Article 1 of the Convention, include, without limitation, the 
following:
(a) All Atan archaeological objects regardless of 
material or value, dating from the year 1900 CE or 
before;
(b) All Atan paintings, drawings, water-colors, pastels, 
photographs, and pictures more than 50 years old 
and worth more than US$10,000; and
(c) All original Atan sculptures, bas-reliefs, engravings, 
and all copies thereof produced by the same process 
as the originals, made before 1900, regardless of 
their value. None of the above-referenced works 
may be removed from the territory of the Federation 
of the Clans of the Atan without an export license to 
be issued by, and according to regulations 
promulgated in the name of, the Ministry of Culture.
61. Applicant, the Federation of the Clans of the Atan, respectfully 
requests that this Court adjudge and declare that:
1. Extraction of water from the Aquifer violates 
international obligations undertaken by Rahad and 
constitutes an inequitable use of a shared resource;
2. The Savali Pipeline operations violate Rahad’s 
international obligations with respect to the Kin Canyon 
Complex and therefore must cease;
3. Rahad must immediately return the Ruby Sipar to 
Atania, its lawful owner; and
4. Atania owes no compensation to Rahad for any costs 
incurred related to the Kin migrants.
62. Respondent, the Kingdom of Rahad, respectfully requests that this 
Court adjudge and declare that:
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1. Rahad’s extraction of water from the Aquifer does not 
violate Rahad’s international legal obligations 
governing the proper use of shared resources;
2. Rahad’s Savali Pipeline operations do not violate any 
legal obligations relating to the Kin Canyon Complex;
3. Rahad is entitled to retain possession of the Ruby Sipar; 
and
4. Atania must compensate Rahad for all direct and 
indirect expenses incurred and accruing as a result of 
accepting members of Clan Kin fleeing from Atania.
2017 PHILIP C. JESSUP
INTERNATIONAL LAW MOOT COURT COMPETITION
CORRECTIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS TO THE SPECIAL 
AGREEMENT
The following corrections and clarifications to the Special Agreement 
have been agreed to by the parties, and the text jointly notified to the Court 
on 12 September 2016 should be considered amended accordingly. The 
Registrar of the Court reminds all parties and participants of the following:
a. The Special Agreement is, in essence, a negotiated stipulation of 
facts. Its words have been carefully chosen, and they are the result of 
extensive negotiation. The parties decline to “clarify” matters about 
which they are unlikely to agree. The parties will not stipulate as to 
which legal principles are relevant, or which arguments are 
acceptable or unacceptable.
b. Any request for clarification not addressed in the following 
paragraphs has been considered by the parties to be redundant, 
inappropriate, or immaterial, or the parties were unable to reach 
agreement on a mutually acceptable answer.
c. Except to the extent that corrections and clarifications are set out 
below, participants are to assume that the Special Agreement is 
accurate and complete in all respects. In particular, both parties 
stipulate as to the authenticity of all documents and of the signatures 
on all documents referenced in the Special Agreement.
d. With respect to the pronunciation of the various proper names used 
in the Special Agreement, all parties and the Court have agreed that 
they will not take formal or informal offense at any reasonable effort 
to pronounce proper names correctly.
e. Atania and Rahad are not parties to any bilateral or multilateral 
treaties, conventions, or accords other than those referenced within 
the Special Agreement or herein.
CORRECTIONS
1. In the fourth sentence of Paragraph 5, the reference to the depths of 
“four kilometers” of the canyons should be corrected to “1.4 
kilometers”.
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2. In Paragraph 32, the reference to the 37th Conference should be 
deleted and replaced with “36th Conference.” 
3. The second sentence of Paragraph 59 is deleted and replaced with 
the following sentence: “Atania became a party to the 1970 
UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing 
the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural 
Property in 1991, and Rahad deposited its instrument of ratification 
with UNESCO on 30 September 2014.” No other part of paragraph 
59 is changed.
CLARIFICATIONS
1. The Greater Inata Aquifer is an unconfined fossil aquifer. It is not 
subjacent to the Kin Canyon Complex.
2. The “Stronghold” is located within the Kin Canyon Complex in 
Atania’s territory.
3. The report issued by ILSA on 17 January 2003 included an 
environmental impact assessment undertaken and completed in 
compliance with Rahadi domestic law. This environmental impact 
assessment was included in Rahad’s 30 September 2004 submission 
to the World Heritage Committee.
4. The University of Atanagrad is a public university founded and 
predominantly funded by the Atanian Government.
5. The Kin Canyon Complex Cultural Center is owned and managed by 
the Atanian Ministry of Culture.
6. At the 2014 Meeting in Doha, Qatar, the World Heritage Committee 
began discussions with Rahad on a program of corrective measures 
regarding the Savali Pipeline and Kin Canyon Complex. The
Committee requested that Rahad present plans for implementation at 
the 2017 Meeting in Krakow, Poland.
7. Those arrested following the 17 July 2014 protest in Atanagrad were 
charged with inciting a riot, a felony charge under Atanian domestic 
law. They were provided with court-appointed counsel. Each
protester had an initial appearance and was remanded to custody 
pending trial. No trial dates have been set as of the date of the Special 
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Agreement. The pretrial detentions comply with Atanian domestic 
law.
8. The camps opened in Rahad pursuant to the KHAA were operated 
by and paid for exclusively by Rahad. The Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) participated 
only to the extent necessary to inspect the camps and to ensure that 
the camps met minimum UNHCR standards.
9. As of the date of submission of the Special Agreement, Atania 
continues to import water from third-party nations. Rahad has not 
imported water since 1 January 2007.
10. Atania and Rahad were admitted to the United Nations in 1962 and 
became parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
Each country has been party to the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights since 1975; Atania and Rahad became party to the 1972 
World Heritage Convention in 1981 and 1983, respectively, and the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (and its 1967 
Protocol) in 1971 and 1973, respectively. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Federation of the Clans of the Atan (“Atania”) and the Kingdom 
of Rahad (“Rahad”) have submitted by Special Agreement this present 
dispute concerning the differences between the parties concerning the Sisters 
of the Sun and other matters to the International Court of Justice (“I.C.J.”), 
and have transmitted a copy thereof to the Registrar of the Court in 
accordance with Article 40(1) of the Statute of the I.C.J. (“Statute”). 
Therefore, both parties have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court pursuant 
to Article 36(1) of the Statute.
Atania undertakes to accept the judgment of the Court as final and 
binding and shall execute it in utmost good faith.
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.
Whether extraction of water from the Aquifer violates international 
obligations undertaken by Rahad and constitutes an inequitable use of a 
shared resource;
II.
Whether the Savali Pipeline operations violate Rahad’s international
obligations with respect to the Kin Canyon Complex and therefore must 
cease;
III.
Whether Rahad must immediately return the Ruby Sipar to Atania, its lawful 
owner; and
IV.
Whether Atania owes compenstation to Rahad for any costs incurred related 
to the Kin migrants.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Descent from the Atan
Atania and Rahad are neighboring States that occupy the arid Nomad 
Coast. The people of both States descend from the Atan, the original 
inhabitants of the Kin Canyon Complex (“Complex”), a group of canyons 
cut by long-extinct rivers straddling the border between the States. When the 
rivers dried up thousands of years ago, the Atan inhabitants migrated to 
coastal regions and separated into 17 clans. Eventually, 16 of the clans 
elected to enter into the republican federation of Atania, while members of 
clan Rahad remained independent and established the Kingdom of Rahad. 
The Greater Inata Aquifer
The Greater Inata Aquifer (“Aquifer”) is the largest underground 
source of fresh water in the Nomad Coast. For generations, people of the 
Nomad Coast have relied upon the discharge from the Aquifer. On the first 
UN World Water Day, the Rahadi Minister of Water and Agriculture, 
speaking on behalf of Rahad, declared to the Atanian people that Rahad 
would ensure the equitable use of the Aquifer, and make every reasonable 
effort to preserve and protect it. 
The Kin Canyon Complex
The Complex has been recognized as a continuing source of 
fascinating insights into early human civilizations. Within the Complex is a 
walled fortress known as “the Stronghold” and the Sunrise Mesa, a 
freestanding sandstone butte. While two of the three canyons are within the 
borders of Atania, the third canyon and the Sunrise Mesa are within the 
territory of Rahad. In 1990, both States jointly proposed that the Complex be 
included in UNESCO’s World Heritage List. The World Heritage listed it as 
a mixed heritage site on 2 May 1994. The Complex and the Cultural Center 
draw on average 350,000 visitors each year. 
Droughts in the Nomad Coast
Due to record low rainfall, the Nomad Coast experienced sustained 
drought from 1983 to 1988. Both States were forced to import water from 
other countries at great expense. Unfortunately, drought conditions returned 
to the region in 1999 and continue to the present day.
Construction of the Savali Pipeline
Queen Teresa of Rahad announced to the Rahadi people her plan to 
extract water from the Aquifer. President Vhen of Atania noted his concern 
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about the equitable division of the waters, and the potential dangers of this 
unilateral action. The Queen did not reply to his objection. Instead, Rahad 
proceeded to plan a network of 30 pump wells to be connected by a 
subterranean pipeline system to provide for Rahad’s industries. In light of the 
domestic environmental assessment undertaken by Rahad, the World 
Heritage Committee noted potential issues regarding subsidence of lands 
superjacent to the Aquifer, which may harm the Complex.
Impact of the Extraction on Atania’s Agriculture
The rate of Rahad’s extraction was fixed to achieve its targeted 
growth and development. As of the date of the Special Agreement, Rahad 
has exhausted roughly one-third of all the water in the Aquifer, 22% of which 
has been used to develop its natural gas industry. As a result, discharge from 
the Aquifer could no longer provide a sufficient natural source of water for 
Atanian agriculture. According to studies of Atania, 20% of Atanian 
farmlands could no longer be farmed, and that within 10 years an additional 
30% would be lost if extraction continued at the same rate. 
Impact of the Extraction on the Complex
In 2010, foreign tourists noted the environmental degradation in the 
Complex. Geologists reported structural degradations to the Complex and 
attributed the problem to the depletion of the Aquifer. Moreover, tourists 
were endangered by a massive sinkhole that appeared when a busy pathway 
in the Complex collapsed. These incidents forced Atania to close off sections 
of the Complex to the public. Due to the impact of the Savali Pipeline, the 
World Heritage Committee granted Atania’s application to place the 
Complex in the List of World Heritage in Danger. President Vhen proposed 
to Queen Teresa to suspend the Savali Pipeline until the situation may be 
better understood, but she rejected the invitation to negotiate.
The WRAP Act
Atania enacted the Water Resource Allocation Program Act 
(“WRAP Act”) due to the absence of water seepage from the Aquifer. The 
WRAP Act set a quota on water supplied to households, farms, and 
businesses and required farming operations to purchase licenses to utilize 
public water. To encourage efficiency, the WRAP Act offered license 
exemptions for farms that sold more than US$75,000 worth of crops per year. 
Prosecution of the Kin
While many of the Kin refused to apply for a license, and used water 
in excess of their quotas, only two farmers were prosecuted under the WRAP 
Act. The Department of Justice distributed flyers across lands to warn the 
Kin, but they refused to obey the law. In response, the Atanian Parliament 
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amended the WRAP Act to allow for the termination of the water supply to 
farms that continuously violate the terms of the WRAP Act. 
Protests in Atanagrad
The Sisters of the Sun, an order of women dedicated to protect and 
preserve the culture of the Kin, participated in a series of protests in 
Atanagrad. Carla Dugo, one of the elders, chained herself to a flagpole and 
engaged in a hunger strike. Numerous buildings and structures, including the 
seat of the Parliament were vandalized. Human chains across major roads 
into the city blocked traffic and prevented employees from entering 
municipal offices. Because the protests were chaotic and dangerous, 
President Vhen dispersed the rallies and ordered for the confiscation of Sipar 
Pendants, which had become a symbol for sedition. The Ruby Sipar was 
placed in storage, away from public display.
The Ruby Sipar
The Ruby Sipar is a ceremonial shield that was raised by Teppa, the 
legendary warrior of the Clan Kin, upon the defeat of the invaders of the 
Nomad Coast in 500 CE. The Ruby Sipar is a symbol of respect and 
represents the unity of the clans within the Nomad Coast. In 1903, Dr. Gena 
Logres, an archaeologist from the University of Atanagrad, discovered it 
within the territory of Atania. 
The Kin Migrate to Rahad
A large number of Sisters of the Sun and Kin protesters were arrested 
and charged with disturbing the peace. Subsequently, members of the Clan 
Kin migrated to Rahad reportedly to avoid prosecution. As of the date of the 
Special Agreement, approximately 800,000 Kin have crossed the border into 
Rahad. 
The Theft of the Ruby Sipar
Carla Dugo was discovered at one of the camps in Rahad. Before 
entering Rahad, she clandestinely entered the Kin Canyon Complex Cultural 
Center in Atania and took the Ruby Sipar. She turned over the Sipar to Rahad, 
which claimed it as its lawful property. Rahad refused to return the Ruby 
Sipar to Atania despite requests made by the Atanian Minister of Culture.
Rahad Detains the Kin 
Only the Sisters of the Sun and their family members were granted 
the rights and privileges of refugees. All other Kin were permitted to apply 
for refugee status, but had to wait at least 24 months before Rahad would 
begin a review of those applications. Since 2014, over 600,000 Kin have been 
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detained in camps in Rahad. Rahad now demands US$945,000,000 from 
Atania for housing the Kin. 
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SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
Rahad’s extraction of water from the Aquifer violates 
international obligations undertaken by Rahad and constitutes an 
inequitable use of a shared resource. 
The Greater Inata Aquifer is a shared resource between Rahad and 
Atania, and is governed by the principle of equitable use under customary 
international law. The drought in the Nomad Coast does not amount to an 
emergency situation, which would dispense with Rahad’s obligation to 
equitably use the resource. Although every State exercises permanent 
sovereignty over its natural resources, its actions are limited by the rules of 
international law. 
Moreover, Rahad has undertaken a unilateral obligation to equitably 
use the Aquifer through the declaration of the Rahadi Minister of Water and 
Agriculture, who possessed the authority to bind Rahad. The obligation 
subsists as Queen Teresa did not validly revoke the declaration.
Rahad failed to equitably use the aquifer by not considering the 
interests of Atania. Moreover, Rahad has not extracted an equitable share of 
the water, and has used the water without considering the need to maximize 
its long term benefits for both Atania and Rahad.
The Savali Pipeline operations violate Rahad’s international 
obligations with respect to the Kin Canyon Complex and therefore must 
cease.
As a State Party to the World Heritage Convention, Rahad has an 
obligation to protect and to not deliberately cause damage to the Kin Canyon 
Complex. This obligation includes the duty to cooperate with Atania to 
protect the Complex, and to observe due diligence in order to prevent harm 
to the heritage.
Rahad violated its international obligations when it failed to notify 
Atania of its plans to construct the Savali Pipeline, to conduct an 
environmental impact assessment consistent with international law, and to 
negotiate with Atania in good faith. Rahad did not undertake active and 
effective measures to protect the heritage and failed to observe the 
precautionary principle. As a result, Rahad caused serious or significant 
damage to the Complex.
Rahad’s continued extraction of water from the aquifer amounts to a 
continuing breach which is substantive in character. Consequently, the 
operations must cease.
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Rahad must immediately return the Ruby Sipar to Atania, its 
lawful owner.
Atania enjoys the right of ownership over the Ruby Sipar. While 
cultural property is significant to all States, the principle of Common 
Heritage of Mankind does not divest Atania of ownership over the Ruby 
Sipar. Atania’s act of safekeeping the Sipar was consistent with its rights and 
duties under international law. In this light, Rahad must return stolen 
property to its lawful owner.
As a signatory to the 1970 UNESCO Convention, Rahad has an 
obligation to not defeat the object and purpose of the treaty which is to protect 
declared cultural property from illicit theft, import, export and transfer of 
ownership. Rahad defeated this object and purpose by adopting the acts of 
Carla Dugo in clandestinely taking the Ruby Sipar from Atania to Rahad. 
Rahad breached an obligation and as a means of reparation, Rahad must 
return the Sipar.
Rahad is under a customary obligation to return cultural property 
acquired illicitly. Thus, the Sipar must be returned.
Atania owes no compensation to Rahad for any costs incurred 
related to the Kin migrants.
Atania does not owe Rahad compensation as a means of reparation. 
In the first place, Rahad has no standing to espouse the human rights claims 
of the Kin. Rahad is also barred by the Clean Hands Doctrine because the 
Savali Pipeline operations caused the migration of the Kin. In any case, 
Atania has not violated the human rights of the Kin. The WRAP Act was not 
discriminatory legislation, and was enacted to maximize water within Atania. 
Moreover, the purpose of the WRAP Act was to protect the future use of 
water, as well as the cultural traditions of the Kin. 
Rahad has no basis to claim that Atania owes compensation under a 
quasi-contractual obligation. Rahad has the obligation to care for migrants 
within its territory, whether refugees or not. Moreover, Rahad has 
discriminated the Kin, and has arbitrarily detained them. 
Finally, Atania has not violated the principle of sic utere tuo ut 
alienum non laedas. The mass migration of the Kin was caused by Rahad’s 
Savali Pipeline operations.
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PLEADINGS AND AUTHORITIES
I. RAHAD’S EXTRACTION OF WATER FROM THE AQUIFER VIOLATES 
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY RAHAD AND 
CONSTITUTES AN INEQUITABLE USE OF A SHARED RESOURCE.
A. RAHAD HAS A CUSTOMARY OBLIGATION TO EQUITABLY USE THE 
GREATER INATA AQUIFER.
The Greater Inata Aquifer is governed by the customary 
obligation to equitably use shared water resources.
Shared water resources are governed by the principle of equitable 
use in customary international law. 1 States share a “community of interest” 
in these resources.2 Since Rahad and Atania share the Greater Inata Aquifer, 
this vital resource is governed by the principle of equitable use.
Moreover, there is a customary obligation to equitably use 
unconfined fossil aquifers.
To establish a development in custom, there must be settled state 
practice and opinio juris sive necessitates. 3 The practice surrounding
documented utilized transboundary fossil aquifers establish the existence of 
custom as regards equitable use of unconfined fossil aquifers.4
There is settled state practice of equitable use of 
unconfined fossil aquifers.
State practice of a sufficient number of states whose interests are 
specially affected by the rule must be extensive and virtually uniform.5 With 
                                                
1 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uruguay), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14 (Apr. 20) [“Pulp 
Mills”], ¶266; Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hun. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 [“Gabčikovo-Nagymaros”], 
¶85.
2 Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder, Judgment No. 16, 
1929, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 23, at 27.
3 Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.A.), Merits, 
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 [“Nicaragua”] ¶207; North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Ned.), 
Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3 [“North Sea”] ¶77; Michael P. Scharf, Accelerated Formation of Custom in 
International Law, 20 ILSA J. INT’L & C.L. 306 (2014).
4 Renee Martin-Nagle, Fossil Aquifers: A Common Heritage of Mankind, 2 J. ENERGY & ENVT’L
L. 39, 50 (2011).
5 North Sea, ¶74.
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respect to transboundary unconfined fossil aquifers, state practice exhibits 
the need to consider the interests of neighboring states.6 For instance, since 
the 1970s, Egypt, Libya, Chad and Sudan have been in negotiations 
concerning their common usage of the largest aquifer in the world, the 
Nubian Aquifer System. 7 Joint management systems have also been 
proposed for the Intercalaire Aquifer shared by Libya, Algeria, and Tunisia.8
State practice to the contrary is properly characterized as a breach of 
the customary rule.9 Saudi Arabia’s unilateral overextraction of the Qa-Disi 
Aquifer was objected to by a co-aquifer state, Jordan. 10 It treated the 
extraction as a breach, confirming the existence of a customary rule. 
The equitable use of unconfined fossil aquifers arises
from opinio juris.
Opinio juris may be deduced from the attitude of parties towards 
General Assembly resolutions. 11 The United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution adopted the Law of Transboundary Aquifers (hereinafter “Law of 
Transboundary Aquifers”), which codifies the rule on the equitable use of 
transboundary aquifers. 12 As this Court has affirmed in North Sea, the 
International Law Commission (“ILC”) is a body of experts, mandated to
codify customary international law.13 Article 4 of the Law of Transboundary 
Aquifers expressly provides that Aquifer States shall utilize transboundary 
aquifers according to the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization.14
                                                
6 Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, GA Res. 1803(XVII), pmbl., art. 1(1)-(2),(6)-
(7), U.N./A/5217 (Dec. 14, 1962) [“PSNR”].
7 Martin-Nagle, supra note 4, at 50.
8 Id. at 51. 
9 Nicaragua, ¶187.
10 Martin-Nagle, supra note 4, at 51.
11 Nicaragua, ¶188, 202-203.
12 General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 63/124, The law of transboundary aquifers, (2009), 
available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/66/TransAquifer.html [“Law of Transboundary Aquifers”]. 
See Joseph Dellapenna, The customary international law of transboundary fresh waters, 1 INT. J. GLOBAL 
ENVT’L ISSUES 264, 265 (2001).
13 North Sea, ¶¶50-51. 
14 Law of Transboundary Aquifers, art. 4.
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Rahad is not experiencing any emergency situation which 
precludes the application of the customary rule.
The Law of Transboundary Aquifers acknowledges that the 
obligation to equitably use a transboundary aquifer would not apply in case
of an emergency situation.15 However, for an emergency to exist, an event 
must cause, or pose an imminent threat of causing, “serious harm”, which 
must be more than mere “significant harm.”16
In lieu of this, the situation must pose a threat to vital human needs, 
like the need for drinking water.17 This is not the case, as the vast majority of 
water extracted from the Aquifer went to industrial or agricultural uses,18 and 
in any case, Rahad has shown that it can satisfy the needs of its people by 
simply importing water.19
B. THE PRINCIPLE OF PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL 
RESOURCES IS INAPPLICABLE TO RAHAD’S EXTRACTION OF 
WATER FROM THE AQUIFER.
The right to permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and 
resources20 is a rule of customary international law21 that requires its exercise
through the mutual respect of states based on their sovereign equality.22 Since 
flowing water respects no national borders, transboundary freshwater 
systems, which largely concern aquifers, fall into the realm of international 
water law and not within the purview of a single state’s sovereign rights.23
                                                
15 Law of Transboundary Aquifers, art. 17. 
16 International Law Commission (ILC), Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers, 
with commentaries, II.2 YILC 27, 74 (2008).
17 ILC, supra note 16, at 76.
18 Compromis, ¶26.
19 Clarifications, ¶9.
20 PSNR, pmbl., arts. 1(1)-(2),(6)-(7); General Assembly Resolution 2158, Permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources, (XXI) (Nov. 25, 1966); General Assembly Resolution 3171, Permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources, (XXVIII) (Dec. 17, 1973); see UN General Assembly, United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment, A/RES/2994 (1972) [“Stockholm Declaration”] principle 21; 
UN General Assembly, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 
Vol. I (1992) [“Rio Declaration”] principle 2. 
21 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (D.R.C. v. Uganda.), 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶244.
22 PSNR, art. 5.
23 Martin-Nagle, supra note 4, at 40. 
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Since 35% of the Aquifer is located within Atania’s territory, Rahad has the 
obligation to respect the former’s interest in the resource.24
State exploitation of unconfined fossil aquifers cannot be conducted 
in conformity to well-established regimes for oil and gas deposits. Unlike 
non-renewable resources that can be extracted with little impact on surface 
life, aquifer stores diminishes the arability of land. In fact, the rapid depletion 
of the Ogallala aquifer in the United States has reduced crop yields in half of 
what they were in the 1970s.25
C. MOREOVER, RAHAD HAS UNDERTAKEN A UNILATERAL 
OBLIGATION TO EQUITABLY USE THE AQUIFER.
Unilateral declarations by states may have the effect of creating legal 
obligations.26 The statement of the Rahadi Minister of Water and Agriculture 
(“Rahadi Minister”) in 1993 bound Rahad to equitably use the Greater Inata 
Aquifer (“Aquifer”) because (1) the Rahadi Minister possesses the authority 
to bind the State, (2) the declaration was clear and precise, and (3) the 
circumstances support the creation of a legal obligation.
The Rahadi Minister possesses the authority to undertake an 
obligation on behalf of Rahad.
Persons representing a state in specific fields may be authorized by 
the latter to make legally binding statements. 27 As held in the Armed 
Activities case, “holders of technical ministerial portfolios exercising powers 
in their field of competence in the area of foreign relations, and even of
certain officials,” can bind states with their declarations.28 In this regard, 
international courts have looked into the statements of Ministers of Defense29
and Ministers of Justice. 30 The Rahadi Minister was appointed by the 
                                                
24 Compromis, ¶15.
25 Martin-Nagle, supra note 4, at 40.
26 Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 253 [“Nuclear Tests”] ¶46; Land, Island 
and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond., Nicar. intervening), 1990 I.C.J. 146 [“Frontier 
Dispute”], ¶351; International Law Commission, Guiding Principles Applicable to Unilateral 
Declarations of States Capable of Creating Legal Obligations, (2006) principle 1.
27 Unilateral Declarations Guidelines, principle 4. 
28 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application) (D.R.C. v. Rwanda), 2006 
I.C.J. 6 [“Armed Activities”], ¶47. 
29 Nuclear Tests, ¶43.
30 Armed Activities, ¶48.
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Queen31 and manages and studies the use of the Aquifer. 32 Despite the 
Queen’s presence, it was the Rahadi Minister of Water and Agriculture who 
spoke on behalf of “[t]he people of Rahad” in a televised event during an 
international event regarding matters falling squarely within his 
competence.33
The Rahadi Minister made a clear and precise declaration.
The declaration defines the nature of the obligation.
In Nuclear Tests, the Court stated that a unilateral declaration may 
have the effect of creating legal obligations if it is stated in clear and specific 
terms.34 In Eastern Greenland, the Ihlen declaration, which contained the 
language “the Norwegian Government would not make any difficulties in the 
settlement of this question,” was sufficiently clear to recognize the 
sovereignty Denmark. 35 The statement of the Rahadi Minister was even 
clearer as it employed commonly used legal terms such as “ensure” and 
“equitable use.”36
The statement contains no reservations.
When a State provides multiple exceptions to a unilateral declaration,
it tends to prove that there was no intent to be bound by a legal obligation; it
was made for political accommodation.37 However, in this case, there was no 
exception. In fact, the Rahadi Minister’s statement that makes reference to 
“future generations” exposes the unmistakable intent to preserve the 
Aquifer.38
                                                
31 Compromis, ¶3.
32 Id., ¶15.
33 Id., ¶16.
34 Nuclear Tests, ¶43, 51, & 53; Unilateral Principles Guidelines, principle 7. 
35 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53, 95 [“Eastern 
Greenland”], at 52.
36 Compromis, ¶16. 
37 ILC, Eighth report on unilateral acts of States, A/CN.4/557 (May 26, 2005), ¶15.
38 Compromis, ¶16.
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The circumstances support the creation of a binding 
obligation.
The legal effect of a statement depends on the circumstances in 
which it was made. 39 Even though other States need not accept the 
obligation,40 particular importance should be given to the reaction of other 
States in determining a statement’s legal effect.41 Unilateral declarations are 
not made in vacuo, and the declarant is bound to assume that other States 
might rely on them.42 The statement was made in honor of World Water Day, 
in the capital of Atania, in a nationally televised address.43 The Atanian 
Minister’s counterpart thanked the Rahadi Minister for the statement.44 UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan even urged other States to abide by the model 
of cooperation.45 President Vhen later reminded Rahad of the binding nature 
of their declaration.46
Rahad has not validly revoked its unilateral obligation.
According to the ILC, once a State has undertaken a unilateral 
obligation, it may revoke it so long as revocation is not done arbitrarily.47
However, none of the grounds for a valid revocation exists in this case.
Atania has relied on Rahad’s undertaking.
According to the ILC, a revocation may be arbitrary depending on 
the extent to which those to whom the obligations are owed have relied on 
such obligations.48 This is known as the principle of estoppel, whereby one 
party has detrimentally relied on the statement of another.49
                                                
39 Armed Activities, ¶49; Nuclear Tests, ¶51; Frontier Dispute, ¶39-40.
40 Nuclear Tests, ¶46.
41 Unilateral Declarations Guidelines, principle 3. For examples, see ILC, Guiding Principles 
applicable to unilateral declarations of States capable of creating legal obligations, with commentaries 
thereto, II.2 YILC 369, 372 notes 937-40 (2006).
42 Nuclear Tests, ¶53.
43 Compromis, ¶16.
44 Id.
45 Compromis, ¶17.
46 Id., ¶29.
47 Unilateral Declarations Guidelines, principle 10.
48 Unilateral Declarations Guidelines, principle 10.
49 North Sea, at 26; Elettronica Sicula (U.S. v. Ita.), Judgment, 1989 I.C.J. 15 [“Elettronica”], ¶54.
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Atania has relied on the declaration. Firstly, Atania acknowledged 
the declaration and thanked Rahad for making it.50 Secondly, President Vhen 
would frequently refer to the same in calling on Rahad to cease its extraction 
operations both when Queen Teresa revealed her intent to build the pipeline51
as well as when the pipeline’s effects on Atanian agriculture became 
apparent.52 Moreover, Atania has suffered damage due to its reliance. In the 
belief that Rahad would not exhaust the aquifer, Atania has refrained from 
extracting water and continued to import water53 and even imposed a water 
quota.54 Atania did not unilaterally extract water from the Aquifer even if 
they already lost arable land.55
There was no fundamental change of circumstances that 
would justify revocation.
A revocation may be valid if it was done pursuant to a fundamental 
change in circumstances. 56 The elements of a fundamental change in 
circumstance57 are not present in this case.
i. Rahad’s access to water was not an essential basis for 
establishing the unilateral obligation.
A circumstance forms an essential basis of consent if its change or 
absence would have led States Parties to draft a treaty differently, or not enter 
into it at all.58 Its essential basis was “the importance of water to all who live 
on the Nomad Coast.”59 The declaration was made without qualification.
                                                
50 Compromis, ¶16.
51 Id., ¶23.
52 Id., ¶29.
53 Clarifications, ¶9.
54 Compromis, ¶34.
55 Id., ¶28.
56 Unilateral Declarations Guidelines, principle 10; See Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, ¶104; I UN
CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF TREATIES [“UNCLOT”], OFFICIAL RECORDS 365, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.39/11 (1968) ¶22; II UNCLOT 116. ILC, Draft articles on the law of treaties with commentaries, 
(1966) 2 YILC 187, 257.
57 ILC, supra note 41 at 381, note 984. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 
1969, 115 UNTS 331 [“VCLT”], art. 62; Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Judgment, 1973 I.C.J. 3 
[“Fisheries Jurisdiction, U.K. v. Ice”], ¶36; Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, ¶104.
58 Gerald Fitzmaurice, Second Report on the Law of Treaties, 2 YILC 16 (1957) ¶171, 
U.N./A/CN.4/107.
59 Compromis, ¶16.
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ii. The droughts were foreseen.
A fundamental change in circumstances must be “not foreseen by the 
parties.”60 The entire Nomad Coast had experienced a drought in the past61
and the temperature had been on a steady rise since 1970.62 Moreover, the
Great Garnet Desert borders the Nomad Coast and arid and semi-arid lands 
characterize the region.63 Rahad must have foreseen the later droughts.
iii. The droughts did not radically transform the extent of 
Rahad’s obligations.
Obligations radically transform when they are “something 
essentially different from that originally undertaken.”64 While obligations 
need necessarily not become impossible, their continued performance must 
somehow be much more onerous or unreasonable.65 Although the drought in 
1999 could have made it more difficult to preserve the Aquifer,66 Rahad’s 
previous importation of water67 means it would not be unreasonable for them 
to do so again.
D. RAHAD HAS NOT EQUITABLY USED THE GREATER INATA 
AQUIFER.
Rahad has not equitably68 used the Greater Inata Aquifer because (1) 
Rahad has not considered the interests of Atania, (2) Rahad has deprived 
Atania of a reasonable share of the Aquifer, and (3) Rahad has not aimed at 
maximizing the long-term benefits derived from the use of the water.
Rahad has not considered the interests of Atania in the 
Aquifer.
In Pulp Mills, the Court ruled that utilization is not equitable if the 
interests of the other State and the environmental protection of the resource 
                                                
60 VCLT, art. 62(1); Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, ¶104.
61 Compromis, ¶14.
62 Id., ¶19.
63 Id., ¶1.
64 Nicaragua, ¶207; North Sea, ¶77; Scharf, supra note 3.
65 A. Racke GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, 1998 ECR I-3655, ¶¶54-55, 57; Fitzmaurice, 
supra note 58, at 60.
66 Compromis, ¶19.
67 Id., ¶14.
68 Law of Transboundary Aquifers, art. 4(c).
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were not taken into account.69 Rahad’s extraction of water was made without 
contemplating the benefits derived by both aquifer states. Rather, Rahad only 
considered its own projected consumption, growth and development.70
Rahad has not extracted an equitable share from the Aquifer.
In Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, Czechoslovakia’s act of “unilaterally 
assuming control of a shared resource” was deemed inconsistent with 
Hungary’s right to an equitable share of the River Danube.71 Czechoslovakia 
appropriated for its benefit a majority of the waters of the Danube 
notwithstanding the fact that it was a shared international watercourse.72
Rahad has extracted about a third of all the water from the Aquifer,73 without 
regard to factors relevant to equitable extraction, such as population size, 
existing usage, and its role in the ecosystem. 74 This extraction likewise 
ignores the greater cost of extracting water from the deeper recesses of the 
Aquifer, which is what Rahad forces Atania to do should the latter ever 
choose to extract water itself.
Rahad has not aimed at maximizing the long-term benefits 
derived from the use of the water from the Aquifer.
Aquifer States must take into consideration present and future needs 
in assessing and establishing a comprehensive utilization plan in order to 
maximize the long-term benefits derived from the limited water contained in 
unconfined fossil aquifers.75 The duty to maximize a non-renewable resource
requires lengthening its availability for future use.76 Instead of implementing 
such a plan, Queen Teresa merely acknowledged that the extraction was 
merely a “short-term solution.”77 Rahad proceeded to extract water at a 
continuous rate notwithstanding warnings of complete exhaustion in 30 
years.78
                                                
69 Pulp Mills, ¶177.
70 Compromis, ¶21.
71 Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, ¶85.
72 Id., ¶78.
73 Compromis, ¶26.
74 Law of Transboundary Aquifers, art. 5(a), (e) & (i).
75 ILC, supra note 16, at 42.
76 Stockholm Declaration, principle 5.
77 Compromis, ¶22.
78 Id., ¶21.
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II. THE SAVALI PIPELINE OPERATIONS VIOLATE RAHAD’S
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE KIN CANYON 
COMPLEX AND THEREFORE MUST CEASE.
A. RAHAD VIOLATED ITS DUTY TO COOPERATE IN PROTECTING THE 
KIN CANYON COMPLEX.
As States Parties to the World Heritage Convention (“WHC”),79
Rahad and Atania identified and delineated the Complex as important 
cultural and natural heritage property, rightfully belonging in the UNESCO 
World Heritage List.80 The WHC imposes obligations on all States parties to 
cooperate in the protection and conservation of the cultural and natural 
heritage found in the territory of other States.81 In light of the customary rules 
of treaty interpretation,82 Rahad has failed to cooperate in protecting the 
Complex.
Rahad failed to notify Atania of its plans to construct the 
Savali Pipeline.
The obligation to notify other States of plans that may have 
transboundary impact is intended to create the conditions for successful 
cooperation between the parties.83 It enables parties to assess the risks of the 
plan and negotiate possible changes.84 Notification must be made through 
diplomatic channels and other formal declarations.85 Information coming 
through the press is not sufficient to discharge the obligation.86 Queen Teresa 
of Rahad only made a televised appearance addressed to the people of Rahad 
                                                
79 World Heritage Convention, Nov. 16, 1972, 1037 UNTS 151 [“WHC”]. See VCLT, art. 26.
80 Id., art. 3. See William Lipe, Value and Meaning in Cultural Resources, APPROACHES TO THE 
ARCHAEOLOGICAL HERITAGE 1 (Henry Cleere ed., 1984); Irini Stamatoudi, The National Treasures 
Exception in Article 36 of the EC Treaty: How Many of Them Fit the Bill?, 3 ART ANTIQUITY AND L. 39, 
47 (1998); See also Compromis, ¶6.
81 WHC art. 4, 6(1) & (3).
82 VCLT, art. 31(c). 
83 Pulp Mills, ¶113.
84 Id., ¶115.
85 Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djib. V. Fr.), Judgment, 2008 I.C.J. 
177 [“Mutual Assistance”], ¶150; Pulp Mills, ¶109-110. 
86 Id., ¶150.
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regarding the plan to extract from the Aquifer.87 Atania was not directly 
notified through channels recognized in international law.88
Rahad conducted an environmental impact assessment
inconsistent with international law.
States are obliged to undertake an environmental impact assessment
(“EIA”) when there is a risk that a proposed industrial activity may have 
adverse impact on a shared resource.89 The assessment must address the 
substantive obligations of the parties, taking into account the possibility of 
alternatives, the populations likely affected, and the consultation with 
affected parties in the context of the environmental impact assessment.90
Rahad, through ILSA, studied the feasibility and long-term effects 
of directly tapping the Aquifer to meet Rahad’s domestic need for water.91
However, Queen Teresa declined President Vhen’s invitation for a meeting 
to better understand the potential hazards of the operations,92 and did not 
address the Atania’s “serious concerns regarding the potential dangers that 
the unilateral action may provoke.”93
Rahad failed to negotiate with Atania in good faith.
The duty to cooperate, in light of the principles of treaty 
interpretation, 94 implies a duty to negotiate in good faith, 95 such that 
                                                
87 Compromis, ¶22.
88 Id., ¶23.
89 Pulp Mills, ¶204.
90 Pulp Mills, ¶¶205-06; See XUE HANQIN, TRANSBOUNDARY DAMAGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4
(2003); See also United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 
[“UNCLOS”], art. 206; MOX Plant Case (Ire. V. U.K.) Order, Request for Provisional Measures, ITLOS 
Case No. 10 (2001); Rio Declaration, principle 17; Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by 
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter art. 11, Aug. 30, 1975, 1046 UNTS 138; United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) Res. GC14/25 (1987); Convention on Environmental Impact 
Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Sept. 10, 1997, 1989 UNTS 309.
91 Compromis, ¶20.
92 Id., ¶33.
93 Id., ¶23.
94 VCLT, art. 31.
95 Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (Macedonia v. Greece), Judgment, 
2011 I.C.J. 644, ¶¶131-132, citing VCLT, art. 26; Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of 
Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.A.), Judgment, 1984 ICJ 292, ¶87; Fisheries Jurisdiction, U.K. v. Ice., ¶33; 
Nuclear Tests, ¶46; North Sea, ¶46.
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negotiations are meaningful.96 While there is no obligation to come to an 
agreement,97 negotiations must be genuine, and not mere formalities.98 As 
held in Lake Lanoux, bad faith includes interrupting communications or 
causing unjustified delays.99
In this case, Rahad failed to negotiate with Atania despite persistent 
objections from President Vhen.100 Rahad even declined an invitation to meet 
regarding the Savali Pipeline operations (“Savali Pipeline”).101 On the other 
hand, Atania did not show an unconditional and arbitrary opposition to 
Rahad’s plans.102 Taken together, these facts establish that Rahad did not 
negotiate in good faith.
B. RAHAD DELIBERATELY CAUSED DAMAGE TO THE KIN CANYON 
COMPLEX.
Each State Party to the WHC undertakes not to take any deliberate 
measures that might damage directly or indirectly the cultural and natural 
heritage identified and designated as such under the treaty.103 This obligation
should be interpreted in light of the sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (“sic 
utere”) principle,104 which provides that a State must not knowingly allow 
activities within its control and jurisdiction to cause injury to the rights of 
another State.105 This is otherwise known as the principle of prevention, 
which has its origins in the due diligence required of a State in its territory.106
                                                
96 Interim Accord, ¶¶131-132; North Sea, ¶85.
97 Railway Traffic between Lithuiania and Poland, Advisory Opinion, 1931, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, 
No. 42, at 116.
98 Lake Lanoux Arbitration (Spa. v. Fra.), 24 ILR 101 (1957) [“Lake Lanoux”], at 15-16.
99 Id., at 23.
100 Compromis, ¶23 & 29. 
101 Id., ¶33,
102 Lake Lanoux, at 23.
103 WHC, art. 6(3).
104 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶29; 
Pulp Mills, ¶101.
105 Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4 [“Corfu”], a t 22; Trail Smelter 
Arbitration (U.S. A .  v. Can.) 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941) [“Trail Smelter”], 1965; Stockholm 
Declaration, principle 21.
106 Pulp Mills, ¶101. See also Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, ¶115; XUE, supra note 90, at 163.
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The Kin Canyon Complex suffered transboundary damage.
The damage to the Complex was serious or significant.
The transboundary damage suffered by a State must be proven by 
clear and convincing evidence, and must be “serious”107 or “significant.”108
Damage must be greater than mere nuisance or insignificant harm. 109
Deliberately damaging heritage is unlawful especially if it is not necessary to 
meet basic survival or subsistence needs.110 In Temple of Preah Vihear, this 
Court emphasized that States should not deliberately cause damage to World 
Heritage sites so as to deny the public access to these properties.111 Because 
of the damage, the Complex was closed to ensure visitors to ensure their 
safety.112
The Savali Pipeline was implemented in light of Rahad’s projected 
consumption, growth and development, and desire to completely end reliance 
on imported water and re-establishing self-sufficiency;113 it was not due to a 
need for survival. The damage to the structural integrity of the Complex was 
significant as to include the Complex in the List of World Heritage in 
Danger.114 A panel of geologists unanimously agreed that there had been 
clear structural degradation of the Canyons and the Stronghold within Atania, 
and attributed the problem to subsidence due to depletion of the Aquifer.115
                                                
107 Trail Smelter, at 1965.
108 In the Arbitration Regarding the Iron Rhine Railway (Belg. v. Neth), 23 R.I.A.A. 35 (Perm. Ct. 
Arb. 2005), ¶59.
109 J. Barboza, Sixth Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of 
Acts not Prohibited by International Law, March 15, 1990, UN Doc. A/CN.4/428, arts. 2(b) & (e). 
110 WHC, art. 4 & 6; see Kanchana Wangkeo, Monumental Challenges: The Lawfulness of 
Destroying Cultural Heritage During Peacetime, 28 YALE J. OF INT’L L. 1, 268 (2003).
111 Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case Concerning the Temple of Preah 
Vihear (Cam. v. Thai.), Judgment, 2013 ICJ Reports 281, ¶106.
112 Compromis, ¶30.
113 Compromis, ¶21.
114 Id., ¶30.
115 Id.
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The damage is proven by clear and convincing evidence.
To prove damage, the independence of experts is not determinative 
of the probative value of expert evidence. 116 Resort to news reports or 
photographs may be had if the same is corroborative of other pieces of 
evidence. 117 In practice, the World Heritage Committee would place
property in the List of World Heritage in Danger if it has been threatened by 
serious and specific dangers.118
The photographs of foreign tourists and the reports of local 
newspapers contribute to corroborating the existence of a fact, as illustrative 
material additional to other sources of evidence.119 The inclusion of the 
Complex in the List of World Heritage in Danger “due to the impact of the 
Savali Pipeline” further proves the damage.120
Rahad failed to observe due diligence to prevent damage to 
the Complex. 
This principle of due diligence has been described in Pulp Mills as 
the duty of each State to possess a certain level of vigilance in the 
enforcement of rules and measures, including the monitoring of activities 
undertaken, to safeguard the rights of the other party.121 The measures should 
be effective and active,122 and appropriate and proportional to the degree of 
risk of transboundary harm.123 Further, states have a duty to consider any 
alternatives that are less damaging.124
Rahad’s report did not reflect an assessment of harm or evaluation 
of measures with a view towards the prevention, reduction, and control of the 
                                                
116 Pulp Mills, ¶¶166-168.
117 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 [“Tehran”], 
¶¶12-13; see Nicaragua, ¶63.
118 World Heritage Committee (“WHComm.”), Dresden Elbe Valley (Germany), 33 COM 7A.26; 
WHComm., Arabian Oryx Sanctuary, 31 COM 7B.11 [“Arabian Oryx Sanctuary”].
119 Tehran, ¶¶12-13. See Nicaragua, ¶63.
120 Compromis, ¶¶31-32.
121 Pulp Mills, ¶197.
122 WHC, art. 6(1). See Arabian Oryx Sanctuary.
123 ILC, Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities
[“Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm”] art. 3, ¶11.
124 See Wangkeo, supra note 110, at 270, in relation to WHC, arts. 4 & 6.
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harm. 125 The Complex was included in the List of World Heritage in 
Danger, 126 but Rahad continued its operations knowing the risks. The 
extraction of water in areas more than 15 kilometers outside of the buffer 
zone127 does not satisfy due diligence as water seeks its own level leading to
damage to areas remote from the pumping zone. The importation of water 
from third-party nations remains to be a viable option.128
C. RAHAD FAILED TO OBSERVE THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE.
The inclusion of the Complex in the List of World Heritage in 
Danger indicates that it is threatened by serious and specific dangers. 129
Whenever action may cause significant harm, even if the possibility or extent 
of the exact harm is unproven, precautionary measures, including cessation,
must be applied.130 While the findings of geologists regarding further damage
due to continued extraction were inconclusive,131 the evidence established
the possibility of harm to the structural integrity of the Complex, as noted in 
the Decision of the World Heritage Committee.132 Rahad was obliged to 
observe precautionary measures necessary to prevent environmental 
degradation, including cessation until a program of corrective measures 
regarding the Savali Pipeline was implemented.133
                                                
125 Pulp Mills, ¶204.
126 Compromis, ¶32.
127 Id., ¶26.
128 See Clarifications, ¶9.
129 WHC, art. 11(4); Intergovernmental Committee for the Protection of the World Cultural and 
Natural Heritage, Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention
(2013) [“WHC Operational Guidelines”], ¶177(b).
130 Rio Declaration, principle 15.
131 Compromis, ¶30.
132 Id., ¶21, 24-25.
133 Clarifications, ¶6.
2017] Distinguished Brief 249
D. RAHAD HAS AN OBLIGATION TO CEASE THE SAVALI PIPELINE 
OPERATIONS.
The commission of an internationally wrongful act gives rise to an 
obligation to cease that act, if the act is a continuing breach.134 Rahad’s 
breaches of its continuing obligations justify an order for cessation.
Rahad’s breach is continuing. 
A continuing breach is one that has been commenced but has not 
been completed at the relevant time.135 Since 2003, Rahad has extracted 
water from the Aquifer without cooperating with Atania and performing due 
diligence to prevent damage to the Complex. The Savali Pipeline continues 
to pump water from the Aquifer as of the date of this Special Agreement.136
Rahad breached substantive obligations.
The duty to cooperate is integral to the discharge of the due diligence 
standards. 137 In Pulp Mills, the Court held the view that procedural 
obligations may have a functional link with substantive ones.138 Since the 
project violates substantive obligations, ordering cessation would be an 
appropriate remedy.139
III. RAHAD MUST IMMEDIATELY RETURN THE RUBY SIPAR TO ATANIA,
ITS LAWFUL OWNER.
Cultural property constitutes one of the basic elements of civilization 
and national culture.140 Every State has an obligation to respect the cultural 
                                                
134 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Nov. 2001, Supplement No. 10 
(A/56/10) [“Articles on State Responsibility”], art. 30(a); Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. 
Ital., Gre. intervening), 2012 I.C.J. 99, ¶137.
135 ILC, Draft articles on Articles on State Responsibility, with commentaries, II.2 YILC 31 (2001), 
at 60, art. 14, ¶5. 
136 Compromis, ¶26.
137 Owen McIntyre, The Role of Customary Rules and Principles of International Environmental 
Law in the Protection of Shared International Freshwater Resources, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 157, 180-86 
(2006). See also Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, ¶109.
138 Pulp Mills, ¶79.
139 Id., ¶275.
140 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer 
of Ownership of Cultural Property, Apr. 24, 1972, 823 UNTS 231 [“1970 UNESCO Convention”], prmb.
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heritage of all nations.141 In the Temple of Preah Vihear, this Court stated 
that cultural restitution is “implicit in, and consequential on, the claim of 
sovereignty itself.”142
A. RAHAD MUST RETURN THE RUBY SIPAR PURSUANT TO ATANIA’S
RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP.
Atania is the owner of the Ruby Sipar.
A State is presumed to have sovereign authority over property found 
within its territory.143 There is a presumption of state ownership of cultural 
property.144 Furthermore, the principle that a state has a right to acquire 
discovered property found to be of interest to science, history or art is a 
general principle of law.145 In this case, an archaeologist from the University 
of Atanagrad, a public university of Atania,146 discovered the Ruby Sipar 
within the territory of Atania.147 Thus, the Ruby Sipar is Atania’s property.
The principle of Common Heritage of Mankind does not 
defeat Atania’s ownership over the Ruby Sipar.
The principle of Common Heritage of Mankind is not a rule of 
customary international law, but is merely a philosophical framework of 
protecting cultural property. 148 In any case, the principle of Common 
Heritage of Mankind merely emphasizes the importance of international 
                                                
141 1970 UNESCO Convention, prmb.
142 Temple of Preah Vihear (Cam. v. Thai.), Merits,? Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. 6, ¶36.
143 Rosalyn Higgins, The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in International 
Law, 176 RECUEIL DES COURS 259, 280 (1982); Koen De Jager, Claims to Cultural Property Under 
International Law, 1 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 183, 190 (1988).
144 Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc. 
United States Court of Appeals, 917 F.2d 278 (1990); Expert Committee on State Ownership of Cultural 
Heritage, Model Provisions on State Ownership of Undiscovered Cultural Objects, provision 3.
145 Armory v. Delamirie, cited in JESSE DUKEMINIER AND JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY (5th Ed.), 
(2002) 120. See, e.g., Treasure Act 1996, c.24, §4 (U.K.); The Antiquities and Art Treasures Act 1972 
(Ind.).
146 Clarifications, ¶4.
147 Compromis, ¶12.
148 Craig Forrest, Cultural Heritage as the Common Heritage of Humankind: A Critical Re-
evaluation, 40 THE COMP. & INT’L L.J. OF S. AFR. 124, 127 (2007).
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cooperation in protecting cultural property.149 It facilitates the best possible 
preservation and protection of cultural property by obligating other states to 
assist the owner state in preserving and protecting the same. 150 This does not 
extend to depriving the owner state of the property. In fact, the principle 
prohibits the illicit trade of cultural property.151
Atania’s treatment of the Ruby Sipar is not inconsistent with 
its right of ownership.
The abuse of rights doctrine prohibits the exercise of a right for a 
purpose different from that for which the right had been created and as a 
result injury is caused.152 The relationship between the measure taken and the 
legitimate policy must be evaluated.153 Atania’s act of safekeeping the Ruby 
Sipar within the Complex was a legitimate measure to ensure its
protection.154
B. RAHAD MUST RETURN THE RUBY SIPAR FOR VIOLATING THE 
OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF THE 1970 UNESCO CONVENTION.
Although the Ruby Sipar was taken at a time when the 1970 
UNESCO Convention was not yet in force,155 Rahad, as a signatory, was still 
obliged to refrain from acts, which would defeat the object and purpose of 
                                                
149 Economic and Social Council (UNESCO), Declaration concerning the Intentional Destruction 
of Cultural Heritage (Oct. 17, 2003); Alan Marchisotto, The Protection of Art in Transnational Law, 7
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 689, 717 (1974).
150 Id.
151 John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 THE AM. J. OF
INT’L L. 831, 843 (1986).
152 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE PCIJ (1934) 164; 
LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE (8th Ed., 1955) 345; MARION PANIZZON, GOOD 
FAITH IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE WTO 27 (2006); Alexandre Kiss, Abuse of Rights, in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (Rudolf Bernhardted, 1992); Beyeler v. Italy, 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Application No. 33202/96, Judgment (Jan. 5, 2000) 
[“Beyeler”]. See also Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Gua.), Second Phase, Judgment, 1955 ICJ Reports 4 
(Apr. 6), ¶¶20-26.
153 Appellate Body Report, US–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/AB/R (Nov. 6, 1998) DSR 1998:VII, 2755; Corfu (Alvarez, J., separate), at 4.
154 Compromis, ¶¶43-44.
155 UNESCO, Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the Convention on the Means of 
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property
[“Operational Guidelines Cultural Property”] ¶21. See Corrections, ¶3; Compromis, ¶50.
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the treaty.156 In Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. The Barakat 
Gallery Limited, the court affirmed the significance of abiding by the 
principles of the 1970 UNESCO Convention even if the treaty was not in 
force when the acts were committed.157
The object and purpose of the 1970 UNESCO Convention is 
to protect declared cultural property from illicit theft, 
import, export, and transfer of ownership.
The interim obligation, which requires States to refrain from 
violating the essential provisions of a treaty constituting its raison d’être158
can be determined in reference to the text and nature of the treaty. 159
Recourse may be had to the preamble of a treaty in determining said object 
and purpose.160 The preamble of the 1970 UNESCO Convention provides 
that it is incumbent on every State to protect the cultural property existing 
within its territory against the dangers of theft, clandestine excavation, and 
illicit export.161 In Beyeler v. Italy, the ECtHR recognized that the UNESCO 
Convention “accords priority” to the ties between cultural property and their 
country of origin.162 Moreover, according to the Operational Guidelines of 
the 1970 UNESCO Convention,163 the purpose includes the recovery and 
return of stolen cultural property.164
                                                
156 VLCT, art. 18(b).
157 Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. The Barakat Galleries Ltd., Supreme Court of 
Judicature (U.K.), [2007] EWCA Civ 1374.
158 Alain Pellet, Note by the Special Rapporteur on draft guideline 3.1.5 (Definition of the object 
and purpose of the treaty) ¶1, Jun. 21, 2006, A/CN.4/572.
159 Id., ¶5.
160 Rights of United States Nationals in Morocco (Fra. v. U.S.A.), Judgment, 1952 I.C.J. 176 (Aug. 
27),¶196; Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), Judgment, 1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3), ¶52.
161 1970 UNESCO Convention, prmb.
162 Beyeler, ¶113.
163 UNGA Resolution 70/76.
164 Operational Guidelines Cultural Property, ¶9; VCLT, art. 31(2)(b).
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Rahad has defeated the object and purpose of the 1970 
UNESCO Convention.
The Ruby Sipar is Atania’s declared cultural property 
under the 1970 UNESCO Convention.
Under the 1970 UNESCO Convention, cultural property includes 
property, which, on religious or secular grounds, is designated by each State 
as being of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or 
science.165 The Convention reflects the theory of cultural nationalism by 
which a nation’s cultural property belongs within that nation’s territory.166
i. Atania has declared the Ruby Sipar as Atania’s cultural 
property.
Cultural property must be specifically designated as such by a 
State.167 States have the indefeasible right to classify and declare which 
property is cultural property. 168 The Ruby Sipar was designated by operation 
of the interpretative declaration169 made by Atania upon its ratification of the 
1970 UNESCO Convention.170
ii. The Ruby Sipar is covered by Article 1 of the 1970 
UNESCO Convention.
Article 1 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention covers property, which
relates to history, 171 is a product of archaeological excavations or of 
                                                
165 1970 UNESCO Convention, art. 1.
166 Carol Roehrenbeck, Repatriation of Cultural Property- Who Owns the Past? An Introduction 
to Approaches and to Selected Statutory Instruments, 38 INT. J. LEG. INF. 185, 190 (2010). See Merryman, 
supra note 151, at 846.
167 1970 UNESCO Convention, art. 1. See id., at 842-43.
168 Operational Guidelines Cultural Property, ¶35.
169 Alain Pellet, Thirteenth report of the Special Rapporteur on reservations to treaties, Alain 
Pellet, 20 May 2008, A/CN.4/600. An interpretative declaration was defined as, “a unilateral statement, 
however phrased or named, made by a State or by an international organization whereby that State or that 
organization purports to specify or clarify the meaning or scope attributed by the declarant to a treaty or 
to certain of its provision” in II.2 YILC 178 2001.
170 Compromis, ¶60.
171 1970 UNESCO Convention, art. 1(b).
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archaeological discoveries172 or an antiquity more than a century old.173 The 
Sipar, dating back to 500 CE,174 plays an important role in Atania’s history 
and was thought to have been lost prior to its discovery in 1903.175
Rahad has defeated the object and purpose through the 
acts of Carla Dugo.
i. Carla Dugo’s acts violate the object and purpose of the 
Convention.
The 1970 UNESCO Convention seeks to avert clandestine theft of 
cultural property176 because the illicit transfer of cultural property is one of 
the main causes of the impoverishment of the cultural heritage of countries 
of origin.177 Carla Dugo admitted that she entered the Kin Canyon Complex 
Cultural Center at night and took the Ruby Sipar from its vault a few days 
before 3 October 2014.178
ii. The acts of Carla Dugo are attributable to Rahad. 
The conduct of non-state actors may be attributable to the state to the 
extent that it acknowledges and adopts the act as its own.179 States may be 
held liable for private acts committed by those who are not State officials if 
it fails to penalize persons who have committed such private acts.180 Further, 
States are encouraged to take sanctions against persons involved in the theft 
of cultural property.181 The refusal of Rahadi authorities to take appropriate 
steps to return the Ruby Sipar, its subsequent claim of ownership, and failure 
to prosecute Carla Dugo renders Carla Dugo’s acts attributable to Rahad. 182
                                                
172 1970 UNESCO Convention, art. 1(c).
173 1970 UNESCO Convention, art. 1(e).
174 Compromis, ¶8.
175 Id., ¶¶ 8-9, 12.
176 1970 UNESCO Convention, prmb. & art. 3.
177 1970 UNESCO Convention, art. 2(1).
178 Compromis, ¶50.
179 Articles on State Responsibility, art 11. 
180 Tehran, ¶74. See also Security Council (UNSC) Res. 138 (Jun. 23, 1960). 
181 Operational Guidelines Cultural Property, ¶46.
182 Compromis, ¶¶50-52.
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As reparation, Rahad must return the Ruby Sipar to Atania
Every breach of an international obligation creates a concomitant 
obligation to provide reparations. 183 The state must “wipe out all the 
consequences of the illegal act[.]”184
Returning the Ruby Sipar is the proper means of 
reparation.
A State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an 
obligation to make restitution, or re-establish the situation, which existed 
before the wrongful act was committed.185 Restitution is possible through the 
return of the Ruby Sipar to Atania.
Return of the Ruby Sipar will not violate the rights of the 
Kin.
While restitution should not involve a burden out of proportion to the 
benefit deriving from restitution,186 the interests of the Kin must be balanced 
with the interest of Atania, which has acquired the Sipar in good faith.187
Atania has possessed and displayed the Ruby Sipar for over a hundred years 
without protest from the Kin after discovering it in 1903.188
C. RAHAD MUST RETURN THE RUBY SIPAR PURSUANT TO A 
CUSTOMARY OBLIGATION TO RETURN CULTURAL PROPERTY
ACQUIRED ILLICITLY.
States have returned cultural property to the State of origin when 
acquired illicitly, consistent with the principle of nemo dat quod non habet.189
This is evident through national legislation, 190 UN General Assembly 
                                                
183 Articles on State Responsibility, arts. 1 & 31. 
184 Factory at Chorzów, Jurisdiction, Judgment No. 8, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 9 [“Chorzów 
Jurisdiction”], 47. See ILC, supra note 135, at 91, art. 31, ¶3.
185 Articles on State Responsibility, art. 35. See id.
186 Articles on State Responsibility, art. 35. See Forests of Central Rhodope (Gre. v. Bulg.), 3 
R.I.A.A. 1405, cited in Conor McCarthy, REPARATIONS AND VICTIM SUPPORT IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT (2012) 161.
187 Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People, principle 9.
188 Compromis, ¶12.
189 See Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.A.) 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (1928), at 842.
190 For examples, see UNESCO Database of National Cultural Heritage Laws, at
http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws (last accessed Jan. 12, 2017).
256 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 24:1
Resolutions,191 and accession to international conventions.192
Pursuant to this, Germany returned an inscribed Babylonian tablet to 
Iraq after discovering the same having been illegally removed and donated 
to the Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation193. Similarly, Italy returned over 
12,000 pre-Columbian artifacts to Ecuador.194
IV. ATANIA OWES NO COMPENSATION TO RAHAD FOR ANY COSTS 
INCURRED RELATED TO THE KIN MIGRANTS.
A. ATANIA DOES NOT OWE RAHAD COMPENSATION AS A MEANS OF 
REPARATION FOR VIOLATING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE KIN.
Reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of 
the illegal act and reestablish the situation, which would, in all probability, 
have existed if that act had not been committed. 195 The obligation to 
compensate is based on a wrongful act that is, the expulsion by the state of 
origin of its nationals.196 Acceptance by a state of migrants is voluntary. By 
accepting these migrants, a state is fulfilling its obligation to cooperate.197
                                                
191 UNSC Res. 1483, S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003); UNGA Res. 70/76 (Dec. 9, 2015); UNGA Res. 
61/52 (Feb. 16, 2007); UNGA Res. 50/56 (Dec. 11, 1995); UNGA Res. 34/64 (Nov. 29, 1979).
192 List of States-parties to the 1970 UNESCO Convention, at
http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=13039&language=E (last visited Oct. 29, 2016).
193 Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the Return of Cultural Property to Its Countries of 
Origin or Its Restitution in Case of Illicit Appropriation, 20th Sess., Sept. 29-30, 2016, ¶27.
194 ALPER TASDELEN, THE RETURN OF CULTURAL ARTEFACTS: HARD AND SOFT LAW Approaches 
148 (2016). See, e.g., US v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F. 3d 131 (2d Cir. 1999), aff’g 991 F. Supp. 
222 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). For more examples, see, generally, Marilyn Phelan, Cultural Property, 32 INT’L L.
448, 450 (1998).
195 Factory at Chorzów (Claim for Indemnity) (Ger. v. Pol.), Merits, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A), No. 17 
[“Chorzów Merits”], 47. 
196 Hannah R. Garry, The Right to Compensation and Refugee Flows: A ‘Preventative Mechanism 
in International Law, 10 INT’L J. OF REFUGEE L. 97, (1998).
197 UN, Charter of the United Nations, Oct. 24, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI, arts. 55-56; International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 171 [“ICCPR”], prmb.
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Rahad has no standing to espouse the human rights claims 
of the Kin.
The Kin are Atanian nationals.
Generally, only the state of nationality is entitled to exercise 
diplomatic protection.198 While a State may exercise diplomatic protection 
on behalf of refugees it recognizes,199 claims may not be made against the 
state of nationality of those refugees. 200 Nationality being the basis for 
diplomatic protection, the same should not be allowed. 201 To allow 
diplomatic protection in such cases would open the floodgates for 
international litigation.202
Since the Kin are Atanian nationals, Rahad cannot espouse their 
human rights claims. Although Rahad has declared that many of the migrants 
are refugees under the KHAA, claims may not be made against Atania, the 
State of nationality. 
The Kin have not exhausted local remedies. 
The rule of exhaustion of local remedies before international 
proceedings may be instituted is a rule of customary international law.203 A
state must be given the opportunity to provide redress for violations by its 
own means within the framework of its own domestic legal system before 
resort may be had to an international court.204 This rule must be observed 
when domestic proceedings are pending.205 Atanian domestic processes are 
still ongoing.206
                                                
198 ILC, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, art. 3.
199 ILC, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, art. 8(2).
200 ILC, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, art. 8(3).
201 ILC, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries, II.2 YILC 51.
202 Id.
203 Elettronica, ¶46; Interhandel Case, (Switz. v. U.S.A), Judgment, 1959 I.C.J. 6, p. 27. 
204 Id.
205 Id., at 27-28.
206 Clarifications, ¶7.
258 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 24:1
The principle of erga omnes or erga omnes partes does not 
apply.
While all States have a legal interest in the protection of basic rights,
207 this Court has never upheld a claim based on the principle of erga omnes.
The ruling in Belgium v. Senegal applied the principle of erga omnes partes
with respect only to the Convention Against Torture, which is not applicable 
in this case.208
Rahad is barred by the Doctrine of Clean Hands.
The principle of ex delicto non oritur actio or the Clean Hands 
Doctrine is a general principle of law209 by which a State does not have locus 
standi necessary to bring its claim before the Court if it was itself guilty of 
illegal conduct.210 A party engaged in a continuing breach is not permitted to 
take advantage of the other party’s similarly illegal conduct. 211 The 
extraction of water from the Aquifer exacerbated the already precarious 
situation in Atania with regard to the availability of water. Rahad effectively 
caused the migration of the Kin.212
Atania did not discriminate against the Kin.
All persons are entitled without any discrimination to equal 
protection before the law. 213 Domestic legislation must not include 
provisions involving discrimination in law or in fact in any field regulated by 
public authorities.214 However, substantial distinctions may be the basis of 
                                                
207 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power, Limited (Belg. v. Spa.) 1970 I.C.J. 3, ¶34. 
208 Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), Judgment, 2012 
I.C.J. 422, ¶70.
209 Nicaragua (Schwebel, J., dissenting), at 272; Eastern Greenland (Anzilotti, J., dissenting), at 
95; Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Neth. V. Belg.), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 70 (Jun. 28) [“River 
Meuse”], (Hudson, J., separate), at 78.
210 Nicaragua (Schwebel, J., dissenting), at 272
211 River Meuse, (Hudson, J., separate), at 78.
212 Compromis, ¶¶ 26-28.
213 ICCPR, art. 26
214 Centre for Civil and Political Rights (CCPR), General Comment No. 18: Non-discrimination 
(Nov. 10, 1989) [ “General Comment 18”], ¶12.
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differentiated treatment. 215 No violation occurs if a restriction has a 
reasonable and objective justification.216
The WRAP Act was not directly discriminatory because it applies to 
all people within Atania, and aims to limit water usage for the good of 
everyone, including the Kin. 217 Neither was the WRAP Act indirectly 
discriminatory because the availability of exemptions is based on 
productivity.218 In any case, the WRAP Act was enacted to conserve water 
for all Atanians.
Atania has not deprived them of their right to an adequate 
standard of living.
Under the ICESCR, States undertake to take steps, to the maximum 
of their available resources, with a view towards progressively achieving the 
full realization of rights.219 Pursuant to the right to an adequate standard of 
living, people are also entitled to the right to water.220 In determining any 
violation of the right to water or food, a distinction is made between the 
inability and the unwillingness of a state to provide.221 A State that exerted 
every effort to use all resources at its disposal to satisfy minimum obligations 
will not be held liable.222
The WRAP Act was enacted in response to the loss of arable land 
and the longstanding drought.223 The continued importation of water224 has 
not alleviated public suffering.
                                                
215 European Union Burden of Proof Directive, Dir. 97/80/EC, OJ L14/6 (1998); Belgian 
Linguistics Case, ECtHR, Appl. No. 1474/62, ¶10 (1968).
216 UN Human Rights Committee (UNHCR), Lovelace v. Canada, Comm. No. R.6/24, ¶16; 
UNHRC, Kitok v. Sweden, Comm. No. 197/1985, ¶9.5.
217 Centre for Civil and Political Rights (CCPR), General Comment 18: Non-discrimination, ¶7.
218 Compromis, ¶35.
219 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 
[“ICESCR”], art. 2.
220 ICESCR, art. 11; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General 
Comment No. 15: The Right to Water (Jan. 20, 2003) [“General Comment 15”], ¶3.
221 General Comment 15, ¶41.
222 CESCR, General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (May 12, 1999), ¶17.
223 Compromis, ¶34.
224 Clarifications, ¶9.
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Atania has not deprived them of their right to cultural life.
Persons belonging to ethnic minorities should not be denied the right 
to enjoy their own culture.225 An ethnic minority’s right to enjoy its own 
culture is violated when state action is “so substantial” so as to “effectively 
deny” them the right.226 Assuming the Kin are an ethnic minority, the WRAP 
Act did not prohibit the Kin from farming. Cultural traditions do not prevent 
the Kin from applying for a license227 as at least 5% have done so.228
In any case, Rahad has no basis to seek compensation 
for violations of the human rights of the Kin.
Compensation is the proper form of reparation if restitution is 
impossible or impractical.229 The ICCPR provides that “any person” whose 
rights or freedoms are violated shall be entitled to an effective remedy.230 In 
the practice of the Human Rights Committee231 and this Court,232 the State
party was required to furnish the victim with an effective remedy, including 
compensation. Rahad cannot rely on Article 48(2) of the ASR as a basis of 
compensation for breaches of erga omnes rights since it is described as a 
mere progressive codification of international law.233
B. ATANIA DOES NOT OWE RAHAD COMPENSATION BY VIRTUE OF A 
QUASI-CONTRACT.
A quasi-contract is an obligation in law created absent an agreement, 
due to a situation of unjust enrichment.234 Though this may be a general 
principle of law, it does not apply in this case.
                                                
225 ICCPR, art. 27.
226 UNHRC, Länsman v. Finland, Comm. No. 511/1992, ¶9.5.
227 Compromis, ¶37.
228 Id., ¶36.
229Articles on State Responsibility, art. 36(1); Chorzów Merits, at 47.
230 ICCPR, art. 2(3)(a).
231 UNHRC, Huaman v. Peru, Comm. No. 1153/2003, ¶8.
232 Ahmadou Sadou Diallo (Guinea v. D.R.C.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 639 (Nov. 30), ¶50.
233 ILC, supra note 135, at 127.
234 Arthur Corbin, Quasi-Contractual Obligation, 21 YALE L.J. 533 (1912). See WILLIAM CLARK,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (4th Ed., 1939).
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Rahad has consented to providing protection to the Kin 
migrants under international law.
By ratifying the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, 
Rahad has undertaken obligations to house and care for refugees.235 Thus, 
even if the Kin are found to be refugees, Rahad has consented to undertaking 
the obligation to protect the rights of refugees.236 Moreover, the customary 
obligation to provide complementary protection gives rise to the duty to 
provide protection for migrants based on their human rights.237 Migrants 
must be treated in the same manner a State does its nationals.238 In this case, 
Rahad acted pursuant to its own obligations under international law. 
In any case, Rahad has failed to comply with its duty to 
provide protection for the Kin migrants.
States have obligations to uphold the human rights of all people 
within its jurisdiction. 239 These rights include the right against 
discrimination240 and the right against arbitrary detention.241 The Kin have 
not received genuine protection in Rahad. 242
Rahad has discriminated against the Kin under the 
KHAA.
International law prohibits discrimination on the ground of race, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin or status.243 The 
KHAA was directly discriminatory because it claims that all Kin were 
                                                
235 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 
137 [“Refugee Convention”], arts. 20-23.
236 Refugee Convention & the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 257; JENNIFER PEAVEY-JOANIS, A PYRRHIC VICTORY: APPLYING THE TRAIL SMELTER
PRINCIPLE TO STATE CREATION OF REFUGEES, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 263 
(2006); Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, A/AC.96/904, Sept. 7, 1998, ¶14.
237 KATIE SYKES, HUNGER WITHOUT FRONTIERS: THE RIGHT TO FOOD & STATE OBLIGATIONS TO 
MIGRANTS, in INTERNATIONAL LAW OF DISASTER RELIEF (David D. Caron, Michael J. Kelly, Anastasia 
Telesetsky, Eds.) 191.
238 See, generally, Refugee Convention; PEAVEY-JOANIS, supra note 236, at 263. 
239 ICCPR, art. 2; ICESCR, art. 2.
240 ICCPR, art. 26; ICESCR art. 2(2).
241 ICCPR, art. 9.
242 Compromis, ¶54.
243 ICCPR, art. 26. See General Comment 18, ¶12.
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“forced to escape hardship and persecution”, yet only the Sisters of the Sun 
were immediately granted refugee status.244 All other Kin had to be processed 
because they had to be assessed on a case-to-case basis. 245
Rahad has arbitrarily detained the Kin.
A State’s exercise of sovereignty through immigration detention is 
limited by ensuring the protection of fundamental human rights. 246 Detention 
should never be arbitrary.247 Detention is permissible if there exists a valid 
cause and reasonable period248 and is necessary for purposes of admission 
and deportation proceedings. 249 The UNHRC, 250 as supported by state 
practice,251 considers detention for six months to two years to be unduly
prolonged.252 Thus, a 24-month period of detention is arbitrary.253
C. ATANIA HAS NOT VIOLATED THE SIC UTERE PRINCIPLE IN 
RELATION TO THE KIN MIGRANTS.
Under the principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, states 
have an obligation not to knowingly allow their territory to be used in a 
manner injurious to the rights of another.254 States must use all means at its 
disposal to avoid activities within its territory that cause damage to another 
                                                
244 Compromis, ¶48.
245 Id.
246 UNGA Res. 40/114 (Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who Are Not Nationals 
of the Country in Which They Live) (1985) [“Declaration on HR of Non-Nationals”], art. 5; James A.R. 
Nafziger, The General Admission of Aliens under International Law, 77 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 804 (1983).
247 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), UNGA Res. 217 A(III) Dec. 10, 1948, art. 9;
ICCPR, arts. 9(1) & 12(3); UNHRC, General Comment No. 8: Right to Liberty and Security of Persons 
(Jun. 30, 1982), ¶4; Declaration on HR of Non-Nationals, art. 5.1(a); UN High Commissioner on Refugees 
(UNHCR), The Revised Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating to the Detention of 
Asylum Seekers (2012), guideline 4.
248 UNHRC, A v. Australia, Comm. No.560/1993 (1997), ¶9.2; UNHRC, van Alphen v. 
Netherlands, Comm. No.305/1988 (1990), ¶5.8.
249 UNHRC, Torres v. Finland, CCPR/C/38/D/291/1988 (1990), ¶7.3.
250 UNHRC, Comments on Peru, CCPR/C/79/Add.67 (July 25, 1996).
251 Directive 2008/115/EC, European Parliament and Council, art.15.5 (2008).
252 See Amuur vs. France, ECtHR, Judgment, Appl. No. 19776/92 (1996); Chahal v. United 
Kingdom, ECtHR, Judgment, Appl. No. 70/1995/576/662 (1996).
253 Compromis, ¶47, 59.
254 Corfu, at 22; Trail Smelter, at 1965; Rio Declaration, principle 2; Stockholm Declaration, 
principle 21.
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state. 255 A reasonable imputation of damage is sufficient to establish
causation. 256
Assuming this principle is applicable outside of environmental issues, 
Atania cannot be considered to have violated it as the cause for the mass 
migration is Rahad’s extraction of water from the Aquifer. The Savali 
Pipeline was the catalyst for the eventual migration of the Kin.257
Moreover, Atania made compliance easier by making licenses 
available for purchase online or at local WRAP offices,258 and providing that 
the Act take effect four months after enactment. 259 The violators of the 
WRAP Act were accorded due process.260
                                                
255 Pulp Mills, ¶101. See also Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, ¶115.
256 ILC, Draft principles on the allocation of loss in the case of transboundary harm arising out of 
hazardous activities, with commentaries, II.2 YILC 157, on principle 4, ¶16; see Olivier De Schutter, 
Asbjorn Eide, Ashfaq Khalfan, Marcos Orellana, Margot Salomon & Ian Seiderman, Commentary to the 
Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, 34 HUM. RTS. Q. 1084, 1114(2012).
257 Compromis, ¶¶27-28.
258 Compromis, ¶35.
259 Id., ¶34.
260 Id., ¶¶36-37; Clarifications, ¶7.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF
For the foregoing reasons, Atania requests the Court to declare that: 
Rahad’s extraction of water from the Aquifer violates international 
obligations undertaken by Rahad and constitutes an inequitable use of a 
shared resource;
The Savali Pipeline operations violate Rahad’s international 
obligations with respect to the Kin Canyon Complex and therefore must 
cease;
Rahad must immediately return the Ruby Sipar to Atania, its lawful 
owner; and
Atania owes no compensation to Rahad for any costs incurred related 
to the Kin migrants.
Respectfully submitted,
Agents of Atania
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Federation of the Clans of Atan (“Atania”) and the Kingdom of Rahad 
(“Rahad”) have consented to submit this dispute to the International Court of 
Justice (“this Court”), in accordance with Article 36(1) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice (“the Statute”). Pursuant to Article 40(1) of the 
Statute, this dispute was transmitted to the Registrar on 12 September 2016. 
Atania and Rahad have undertaken to accept the Court’s decision as final and 
binding on them and also commit to comply with it in its entirety and in good 
faith. 
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Whether extraction of water from the Aquifer violates Rahad’s
international legal obligations governing the proper use of a shared 
resource.
II. Whether the Savali Pipeline operations violate Rahad’s 
international obligations with respect to the Kin Canyon Complex.
III. Whether Rahad is entitled to retain possession of the Ruby Sipar.
IV. Whether Atania owes compensation to Rahad for any costs 
incurred for accepting the Kin migrants.
2017] Distinguished Brief 279
STATEMENT OF FACTS
BACKGROUND
Rahad and Atania are neighbouring States on the Nomad Coast. As at January 
2016, Rahad is a developing State with a GDP of US$11 billion, while 
Atania’s GDP is US$80 billion. The Nomad Coast region is characterised by 
arid and semi-arid lands. The entire Nomad Coast experienced drought 
between 1983 and 1989. Drought returned in 1999 with record-low rainfall. 
Atanian meteorologists confirmed meteorological and climatological 
changes would result in long-term water shortage for both States. 
THE GREATER INATA AQUIFER
The Greater Inata Aquifer (‘the Aquifer’), an unconfined fossil aquifer, is the 
largest source of fresh water in the Nomad Coast. In 1988, a team of 
hydrologists, commissioned by Rahad, conducted the first in-depth study of 
the Aquifer, finding that 65% of the Aquifer was located in Rahad and 35%
was located in Atania. 
WORLD WATER DAY 1993
On 22 March 1993, the first UN World Water Day, Rahad’s Queen Teresa
and Atania’s President Vhen appeared at a ceremony in Atania’s capital. The
Rahadi Minister of Water and Agriculture spoke of making reasonable efforts
to preserve, protect and equitably use the shared freshwater resources of the
Nomad Coast, and their importance for future generations.
THE SAVALI PIPELINE
On 16 June 2002, Queen Teresa stated her desire to ensure that the needs of 
the Rahadi people could be met through improved access to the Aquifer. She 
directed the Inata Logistic and Scientific Association (‘ILSA’) to study the 
feasibility and long-term effects of tapping the Aquifer. ILSA’s Report of 17 
January 2003 concluded that to end its reliance on imported water, Rahad 
would require an alternative supply of approximately 1.2km3 per year. The 
report included an EIA. On 2 February 2003, in response to the increasingly 
serious water crisis, Queen Teresa ordered implementation of the Savali 
Pipeline operations, a comprehensive program to extract water from the 
Aquifer.
A 2010 study, commissioned by Atania, concluded that operation of the 
Savali Pipeline had caused a permanent lowering of the water table in the 
region. The study found that 20% of Atanian farmland could no longer be 
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farmed, and that within 10 years an additional 30% would be lost if extraction 
continued at the same rate. 
THE KIN CANYON COMPLEX
The Kin Canyon Complex (‘the Complex’) is a group of Canyons of
archaeological significance. Two Canyons are located in Atania and one is
located within Rahad territory. After a joint proposal, the Complex was listed
as a mixed heritage site on 2 May 1994. The proposal included a two-
kilometre ‘buffer zone’ extending from the edge of the Complex.
The ILSA Study noted that in conducting the Pipeline operations, care would 
need to be taken to avoid harm to the Complex’s structural integrity. The 
ILSA Report and EIA were submitted to the World Heritage Committee. The 
Committee urged Rahad to ensure the proposed Savali Pipeline developed 
and implemented targets for improved conservation of the Complex.
Rahad limited drilling to more than 15 kilometres outside the Complex’s 
buffer zone. Extraction of water from the Aquifer began on 20 February 2006 
at a rate of 1.2km3 per year. Since 2006, 70% of the water extracted has been
used for agriculture and 22% by the natural gas industry, Rahad’s largest 
export. 
By late 2010, images emerged showing environmental degradation to remote
sections of the Canyon. The Atanian government closed sections of the
complex to visitors to ensure their safety. In June 2012, the Complex was
added to the List of World Heritage in Danger. Queen Teresa issued a press
release undertaking to conduct regular studies of the long-term impact of the
Savali Pipeline project on the region and the Complex.
THE WRAP ACT
On 28 September 2012, the Atanian Parliament enacted the 2012 Water 
Resource Allocation Program Act (‘WRAP Act’), which set a water quota 
for every household, farm and business in Atania. It also required farming
operations to purchase licences but offered an exemption to profit generating 
farms. 86% of farming operations qualified for this exemption. In the first 
two quarters of 2013, more than 80% of Kin household used water in excess 
of their quotas. Less than 5% of Kin farmers had applied for licences. 
In August 2013, Atania sentenced two Kin farmers to five years 
imprisonment for failing to comply with the WRAP Act. In October 2013, 
the Atanian Parliament amended the WRAP Act to provide that farms using 
water in violation of the Act would have their State-controlled water supply 
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terminated. By the end of 2013, Atania had completely cut of all water to the 
majority of farms in Kin lands.
THE RUBY SIPAR
The Ruby Sipar (‘the Sipar) is a ceremonial shield that, according to legend, 
was used by Teppa, a warrior of the Clan Kin, to unite the 17 Atan clans to 
defeat Ifan the Desert Fox. The Kin honoured Teppa by establishing the 
Sisters of the Sun, an order of women dedicated to the preservation of the 
Kin culture and traditions. The Sisters of the Sun remain social and cultural 
leaders within Kin society and wear miniature Sipar replicas as a symbol of 
loyalty to Teppa. 
In 1903, Dr. Gena Logres, from the University of Atanagrad, discovered the 
original Sipar during an excavation in the Complex within Atania’s territory. 
In 1996, the Sipar, identified as ‘on loan from the University of Atanagrad’ 
was moved to the Cultural Centre in Atania’s portion of the Complex. 
THE PROTESTS
In 2014, the Kin and their supporters protested against the ‘theft’ of their 
food, water, and way of life. The Sipar became a symbol for the protests; 
Carla Dugo and other speakers wore or carried replicas of the Sipar. President 
Vhen deployed armed police, who used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse 
the protests. President Vhen also ordered all Sipar pendants to be confiscated 
and destroyed. The Sipar was removed from display. In October 2014, Carla 
Dugo took the Sipar from storage and delivered it to Rahadi border patrol 
agents.
THE KIN MIGRANTS
The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (‘FAO’) condemned 
the effects of the WRAP Act in a speech to the General Assembly on 2 
February 2014. It was reported that farmers whose water supply had been 
terminated had to abandon farming and had no other means of securing 
sufficient food. The International Federation of the Red Cross confirmed that 
more than 500,000 Kin were undernourished. 
In early September 2014, Rahadi Immigration agents reported that 
approximately 100,000 Kin, citing fear of arrest and starvation, had crossed 
into Rahad in two weeks. Sisters of the Sun and their family members were 
granted refugee status. The applications of all other Kin remain pending.  The 
Rahadi Parliament enacted the Kin Humanitarian Assistance Act (KHAA),
establishing three temporary camps in order to process the Kin. By 2015, the 
number of Kin exceeded the capacity of Rahad’s facilities. Rahad suffered 
sporadic power outages and reduced access to clean water.  As at the date of 
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the special agreement 800,000 Kin had fled to Rahad.  On 18 January 2016, 
Rahad submitted a memorandum to Atania itemising expenditures associated 
with caring for the Kin. The total costs incurred and accruing as at the date 
of the Special Agreement were US$945,000,000.
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SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
PLEADING I
The statement made by the Rahadi Minister on 22 March 1993 did not create 
legally binding obligations in relation to the utilisation of the Aquifer. Even 
if the Court was to find that it did, Queen Teresa’s statement on 16 June 2002
constituted a valid revocation of any binding obligations that may have been 
assumed. There is no rule in customary international law requiring the 
equitable and reasonable utilisation of transboundary Aquifers.
In the event that this Court finds that either Rahad did bind itself unilaterally, 
or that it is under a customary obligation to utilise the Aquifer equitably and 
reasonably, Rahad has complied with its obligations in both respects. Rahad 
has not caused transboundary harm in utilising the Aquifer. Rahad 
discharged its due diligence obligations by conducting an EIA, notifying and 
co-operating with Atania throughout the construction of the Savali Pipeline. 
Irrespective of the Court’s findings vis-à-vis the aforementioned contentions, 
a state of necessity precludes the wrongfulness of any of Rahad’s acts. 
PLEADING II
Rahad has not violated its obligations under the WHC, or under customary 
international law, with respect to the Kin Canyon Complex. Rahad exercised 
due diligence, and so complied with its obligation under Article 6.3 of the 
WHC and customary obligation not to cause transboundary harm. In any 
event, Rahad has not caused significant harm to Atania as the degradation of 
the Complex was neither significant, foreseeable nor causally related to 
Rahad’s Savali Pipeline operations. Rahad fulfilled its obligations to prevent 
transboundary harm by exercising due diligence. Rahad complied with any 
developing prohibition on the intentional destruction of cultural heritage in 
peacetime as Rahad did not intentionally destroy the Complex. The non-
arbitrary nature of Rahad’s conduct is such that it cannot have abused its 
rights. As in Pleading I, the wrongfulness of any act committed by Rahad is 
precluded on the basis of necessity.
PLEADING III
Rahad is entitled to retain possession of the Sipar. On the evidence before 
this Court, Atania cannot establish that it is the lawful owner of the Sipar. 
Independent of this, Rahad is entitled to retain possession of the Sipar in 
order to ensure the Kin’s right to use, control, maintain and protect the Sipar. 
In the alternative, Rahad is entitled to retain possession of the Sipar as to
return it would render Rahad complicit in Atania’s violations of ICCPR and 
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ICESCR. Atania’s abuse of its rights also renders return of the Sipar 
inappropriate. 
There is no other basis upon which Atania may compel the Sipar’s return. 
Rahad’s retention of the Sipar is not an internationally wrongful act. The 
1970 Convention had not entered into force upon Rahad at the time the Sipar 
entered its territory, or at the time that Rahad refused to return it to Atania. 
At customary international law, Rahad did not defeat the object and purpose 
of the 1970 Convention between signing it and its entry into force upon 
Rahad. Moreover, there is no custom for the return of unlawfully obtained
cultural property to its country of origin.
PLEADING IV
Atania’s internationally wrongful acts have caused 800,000 Kin to leave 
Atania and enter Rahad, causing US$945,000,000 in costs to Rahad. Atania 
has arbitrarily deprived the Kin of water, food and, consequently, their means 
of subsistence. Atania has also violated the civil and political rights of the 
Kin for protesting against this deprivation. Through this conduct, Atania has 
abused its sovereign right to enact and enforce domestic legislation. Atania 
has also caused transboundary harm to Rahad, failing to exercise due 
diligence in its prevention. Further, Atania has violated the Kin’s human 
rights under ICCPR and ICESCR. Irrespective of this Court’s findings vis-à-
vis Pleadings I and II, the clean hands doctrine does not bar Rahad’s claim.
Rahad, as a State specially affected by a breach of an erga omnes partes 
obligation, is entitled to invoke Atania’s responsibility for these violations. 
Atania’s internationally wrongful acts caused the mass migration of Kin from 
Atania. The subsequent costs to Rahad were a ‘natural consequence’ of this 
violation. Therefore, Atania has an obligation to make reparation, in the form 
of compensation to Rahad.
PLEADINGS
I. RAHAD’S EXTRACTION OF WATER FROM THE 
AQUIFER DOES NOT VIOLATE RAHAD’S 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS GOVERNING
THE PROPER USE OF A SHARED RESOURCE
A. RAHAD DID NOT VIOLATE ANY OBLIGATIONS 
UNDERTAKEN BY UNILATERAL DECLARATION 
1. The declaration by the Rahadi Minister was not 
legally binding
On the first UN World Water Day, on 22 March 1993, the Rahadi Minister
for Water and Agriculture (‘the Minister’) stated that Rahad would make
‘every reasonable effort’ to preserve, protect and equitably use its shared
fresh water resources.1 Even if the Minister was vested with authority to bind
Rahad,2 Atania cannot enforce the statement as a source of legal obligation
as it was equivocal and did not express an intention to be legally bound.3
Rather, it was a non-legal statement ‘residing in morality and politics’.4 This
is confirmed by the circumstances surrounding the statement5 including: the
generality of the statement;6 the setting of World Water Day; the absence of
any equivalent statement by Queen Teresa; and Atania’s reception of the
statement as a ‘neighbourly gesture of cooperation and brotherhood’.7
2. In the alternative, there has been a valid 
revocation
If the Court finds that the Minister’s statement did create legal obligations,
Rahad, on 16 June 2002, validly revoked those by declaring its right and
                                                
1 Compromis, [16].
2 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application : 2002) (Democratic Republic 
of the Congo v Rwanda) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) [2006] ICJ Rep 6, 27-28 [47], [48] (‘Armed 
Activities’).
3 Nuclear Tests (Australia v France) (Judgment) [1974] ICJ Rep 253, [43] (‘Nuclear Tests’).
4 International Law Commission (‘ILC’), First report on Unilateral Acts of States by Víctor
Rodríguez Cendeño, UN Doc A/CN.4/486 (5 March 1998), 325.
5 Armed Activities, [53]. 
6 Nuclear Tests, [52].
7 Compromis, [16]. 
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intention to use the Aquifer.8 This revocation was not arbitrary9 because:
first, it was made following a fundamental change in circumstances; and
second, Atania did not rely on the declaration.
a. There was a fundamental change in 
circumstances 
The customary rules permitting treaties to be terminated on the ground of
fundamental change10 apply mutatis mutandis to unilateral declarations.11
Since the declaration was made, Rahad suffered from unprecedented drought
and climatological changes that deprived Rahad of sufficient water.12 This is
more than a ‘mere change’ in circumstance.13 Despite previous drought,14 it
was not foreseeable that Rahad would suffer such severe drought.15 The
availability of water for both present and future generations constituted the
essential basis16 of Rahad’s undertaking. The change to that availability
rendered Rahad’s obligations ‘essentially different.’ 17 To prioritise the
preservation of water for future generations would effectively require
denying water to present generations, an untenable proposition.
b. There was no reliance by Atania 
Prior to the declaration’s revocation in 2002, there is no evidence that Atania
took action, or suffered prejudice, in reliance on the Minister’s declaration.
                                                
8 Compromis, [22]. 
9 ILC, Unilateral Acts of States – Report of the Working Group – Conclusions of the International 
Law Commission Relating to Unilateral Acts of States, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.703, Principle 10 (20 July 
2006) (‘Guiding Principles’).
10 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 
171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) art 62 ('VCLT'); Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v 
Slovakia) (Judgment) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, [104] (‘Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros’).
11 Report of the ILC, UN Doc A/61/10 (1 May-9 June and 3 July-11 August 2006), 381
(‘Commentary to the Guiding Principles’); Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Spain v Canada) (Jurisdiction) 
[1998] ICJ Rep 432, [46] (‘Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v Canada)’). 
12 Compromis, [19]-[20].
13 Mark Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Martinus
Nijhoff, 2009) 771 (‘Villiger (2009)’).
14 Compromis, [14].
15 Compromis, [19], [22].
16 VCLT art 62(1)(a).
17 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom/Iceland) (Jurisdiction) [1973] ICJ Rep 3, [43].
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18 In light of this, Rahad validly revoked any unilaterally assumed
obligations.
3. Further in the alternative, Rahad complied with 
any obligation unilaterally assumed
Even if the declaration created binding obligations and was not validly
revoked, Rahad complied with its terms. The declaration must be interpreted
according to its ordinary meaning, in its context and with regard to its object
and purpose. 19 The customary rules of treaty interpretation 20 apply to
unilateral declarations.21
The Minister’s promise to ‘preserve and protect’ and ensure ‘equitable use’
is qualified by the words ‘reasonable effort’.22 ‘Reasonable’, as a ‘contextual
norm’, necessitates consideration of both the factual circumstances and
Rahad’s socio-economic capacities. 23 Considering the water scarcity, 24
expecting Rahad to refrain from using the Aquifer was not reasonable. The
reasonableness of Rahad’s utilisation of the Aquifer is evidenced by its
efforts in commissioning a report to ‘study the feasibility and long-term
effects’ of utilisation, including an environmental impact assessment (‘EIA’)
and undertaking to continuously monitor the long-term impact.25 Further,
Rahad limited its utilisation to a finite rate and only for as ‘long as drought
conditions continue[d]’. 26 Accordingly, Rahad complied with any
obligations undertaken by way of unilateral declaration.
                                                
18 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of 
America) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) [1984] ICJ Rep 391, [51] (‘Nicaragua (Jurisdiction)’).
19 VCLT art 31.
20 Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v Senegal) (Judgment) [1991] ICJ Rep 53, [48]. 
21 Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v Canada), [46]. 
22 Compromis, [16].
23 Duncan French, ‘Developing States and International Environmental Law: The Importance of 
Differentiated Responsibilities’ (2000) 49 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 35, 39. 
24 Compromis, [22].
25 Compromis, [20], [33]; Clarifications, [3].
26 Compromis, [21]-[22], [26]. 
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B. RAHAD’S UTILISATION OF THE AQUIFER IS CONSISTENT
WITH CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING 
SHARED RESOURCES
1. Rahad is not bound by a customary obligation of 
reasonable and equitable use specific to aquifers
The establishment of a rule of customary international law requires the
existence of ‘widespread international practice’ and the ‘opinio juris of
States’.27 While a customary rule of reasonable and equitable utilisation
exists regarding surface water, 28 no such rule exists for transboundary
aquifers. The ‘well-established rules’ applicable to surface water are ill-
adapted to govern aquifers because of the differing hydrogeological features
of each aquifer. 29
Caponera observed in 2003 that treaty provisions dealing with groundwater
are ‘too limited in scope to propose them in terms of customary law’.30
Indeed, of the nearly 600 identified transboundary aquifers in the world, only
four are the subject of utilisation agreements.31 The prevalence of soft law
instruments in this area reflects the absence of opinio juris. 32
Notwithstanding the opinion of the Special Rapporteur that the International
Law Commission’s (‘ILC’) Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers 33
codified custom, 34 the response of States evidences a lack of opinio juris.35
In the absence of custom regarding transboundary aquifers, Rahad is
                                                
27 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal) (Judgment) 
[2012] ICJ Rep 422 [99] (‘Belgium v Senegal’). 
28 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, [85].
29 Joseph Dellapenna, ‘International Law Applicable to Water Resources Generally’ in Kelly (ed) 
Waters and Water Rights (LexisNexis, 3rd ed, 2016) vol 3 49.06, 147 (‘Dellapenna (2016)’).
30 Dante Caponera, National and International Water Law and Administration (Kluwer, 2003) 421. 
31 Reneé Martin-Nagle, Transboundary Offshore Aquifers (Koninklijke Brill NV, 2016) 45. 
32 Eg, Memorandum of Understanding Relating to Setting up of a Consultative Mechanism for the 
management of the Iullemeden Aquifer System (Bamako, 20 June 2009).
33 Report of the ILC, UN Doc A/63/10 (5 May-6 June and 7 July-8 August 2008) (‘Draft Articles’).
34 Chunsei Yamada, ‘Codification of the Law of Transboundary Aquifers (Groundwaters) by the 
United Nations’ (2011) 36(5) Water International 557, 561.
35 See ILC, Topical Summary of the Discussion Held in the Sixth Committee of the General 
Assembly during its Sixtieth Session, prepared by the Secretariat, UN Doc A/CN.4/560 (13 January 2006)
[43]; Summary Record of the 16th meeting, UN Doc A/C.6/68/SR.16 (1 November 2013) [37], [40].
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permitted to do that which is not specifically prohibited under international
law, namely extraction of water from the Aquifer.36
2. In the alternative, Rahad’s utilisation of the 
Aquifer is equitable and reasonable
If Rahad has an obligation to utilise the Aquifer equitably and reasonably,
Articles 4 and 5 of the Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers present a
potential articulation of the obligation’s content. Article 4 requires ‘equitable
and reasonable’ utilisation.37 Article 5 specifies factors to consider in this
determination. 38 Applying those factors, Rahad’s utilisation: first, is
consistent with an equitable and reasonable accrual of benefits; and second,
maximised the long-term benefits derived from the Aquifer.
a. Rahad’s utilisation is consistent with an 
equitable and reasonable accrual of 
benefits 
As 65% of the Aquifer is located within Rahad,39 Rahad is entitled to utilise
no less than 65% of its volume,40 provided that it does so in accordance with
the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation.41 As at the date of the
Special Agreement, Rahad has used approximately half its share. 42 A
determination of whether utilisation is equitable necessitates a balancing of
‘countervailing equities’. 43 The extreme drought and climate changes
deprived Rahad of water to sustain a supply of food for its people. The
continued importation of water was not an ‘economically viable and
practicably possible’ solution for Rahad.44 Therefore, Rahad’s utilisation of
the Aquifer was necessary to meet the ‘vital human needs’ of its population.45
                                                
36 S.S. Lotus (France v Turkey) [1927] PCIJ (ser A) No 10, 21. 
37 Draft Articles art 4.
38 Draft Articles art 5.
39 Compromis, [15].
40 Julio Barberis, ‘The Development of International Law of Transboundary Groundwater’ (1991) 
1 Natural Resources Journal 167, 177-8.
41 Draft Articles art 3.
42 Compromis, [21], [26].
43 Draft Articles art 5; Stephen McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses (OUP, 2nd ed, 
2007) 394 (‘McCaffrey (2007)’).
44 Compromis, [22]. 
45 Draft Articles art 5(2); Compromis, [22].
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Rahad’s use of 22% of the extracted water for its natural gas industry46 is a
justified secondary usage47 of Rahad’s sovereign resources,48 particularly
considering Rahad’s reliance on natural gas exportation.49
Any harm indirectly caused to Atania from Rahad’s utilisation of the Aquifer
is justified by the fundamental benefits derived from utilisation. While both
States experienced drought, Atania, the wealthier of the two, has been able
to import water for over a quarter of a century.50 Atania’s decision to refrain
from utilising the Aquifer does not render Rahad’s use inequitable. In these
circumstances, Rahad’s use of the Aquifer to preserve the vital needs of its
population should take precedence over Atania’s commercial interests in
agriculture.51
b. Rahad’s extraction sought to maximise 
the long-term benefits derived from the 
Aquifer
To maximise the long term benefits of the Aquifer, all that was required of
Rahad was an ‘utilisation plan’. 52 As a fossil Aquifer, with negligible
recharge, it is unreasonable to limit utilisation to the recharge rate.53 Rahad’s
utilisation at a rate of 1.2km3 per year complies with the recommendation of
the Inata Logistic and Scientific Association’s report (‘ILSA’) which
evaluated the ‘long-term effects of directly tapping the Aquifer’.54 At the
current rate of extraction, the benefits from the Aquifer will be enjoyed for
decades.
                                                
46 Compromis, [26].
47 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (Judgment) [2010] ICJ Rep 14 [175] 
(‘Pulp Mills’); Eyal Benvinisti, ‘International Law and the Mountain Aquifer’ (1992) in Isaac and Shuval 
(eds), Water and Peace in the Middle East (Elsevier, 1992) 41.
48 Nico Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources (CUP, 1997) 265.
49 Compromis, [2], [26].
50 Compromis, [14]; Clarifications, [9]. 
51 McCaffrey (2007) 396.
52 Report of the ILC, UN Doc A/63/10 (5 May-6 June and 7 July-8 August 2008) 42, (‘Draft 
Articles Commentary’).
53 Draft Articles Commentary, 42.
54 Compromis, [20].
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3. Rahad’s utilisation of the Aquifer complied with 
its obligation not to cause transboundary harm
a. Rahad exercised due diligence 
Rahad had a customary obligation to ensure that any activity within its
jurisdiction or control did not cause harm to Atania’s territory.55 Importantly,
this principle only required Rahad to exercise due diligence; Rahad was not
required to prevent the occurrence of all harm.56
i. Rahad conducted an EIA and 
undertook continuous 
monitoring 
Queen Teresa directed ILSA to study the ‘long term effects of directly
tapping the Aquifer’ in its report, which contained an EIA.57 There is no
indication that ILSA did not fulfil this direction and there is evidence ILSA
did in fact consider potential transboundary impacts.58 That no risk of harm
was identified by the EIA in relation to Atania’s agricultural industry
indicates that harm was either not reasonably foreseeable or not significant.
Therefore, Rahad was not required to exercise further due diligence. In any
event, Rahad committed to ‘undertake regular studies of the long-term
impact’ of the project, in compliance with its continuous monitoring
obligation.59
ii. Rahad notified and cooperated 
with Atania
In any case, Atania was sufficiently notified by Queen Teresa’s televised
speech in 2003 that water was to be extracted from the Aquifer. 60 Indeed,
President Vhen responded that same day.61 Cooperation only required Rahad
‘to enter into contact’ with Atania regarding the proposed Pipeline project.62
                                                
55 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v
Nicaragua)/Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v Costa Rica)
(Merits) ICJ, General List Nos 150 and 152, 16 December 2015, [104] (‘Costa Rica v Nicaragua’).
56 Pulp Mills, [187].
57 Compromis, [20]; Clarifications [3]; Pulp Mills, [205].
58 Compromis, [21]. 
59 Compromis, [33]; Pulp Mills, [205], [215]-[216].
60 Compromis, [22].
61 Compromis, [23].
62 Rüdiger Wolfrum, ‘International Law of Cooperation’ in Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (OUP, 2010) [5].
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That Rahad did so is evidenced through the exchange of a number of
statements between Queen Teresa and President Vhen.63
b. Rahad did not cause significant harm
If this Court finds that Rahad did not sufficiently exercise due diligence,
Rahad nonetheless did not cause significant harm to Atania. Atania’s loss of
farmland and associated revenue is not ‘significant harm’. The financial loss
only constituted 0.38% of its GDP,64 which does not meet the threshold of
severity for actionable transboundary harm.65
Even if the harm was significant, causation cannot be established between
Rahad’s conduct and Atania’s loss. First, the activity and the impact on
Atania are temporally separated; the initial reports of environmental impact
were three years after the project’s commencement.66 Second, as in Costa
Rica v Nicaragua, there are ‘other factors’67 causally linked to Atania’s lack
of water; the return of extreme drought conditions and the ‘record-low
rainfall.’68 These facts create sufficient uncertainty to sever the causal chain
between Rahad’s extraction from the Aquifer and Atania’s harm.69
C. RAHAD HAS NOT ABUSED ITS RIGHTS
By virtue of Rahad’s permanent sovereignty over its natural resources, Rahad
has a right to extract groundwater from the Aquifer.70 As a general principle
of international law,71 there will be no abuse of rights where the right is
exercised in a ‘reasonable and bona fide’ manner which is ‘genuinely in
pursuit’ of its ‘legitimate interests’.72 As established, Rahad’s utilisation of
                                                
63 Compromis, [22]-[23], [33].
64 Compromis, [2], [29].
65 Report of the ILC, UN Doc A/56/10 (23 April-1 June and 2 July-10 August 2001), 388 (‘Draft 
Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm Commentary’).
66 Compromis, [30]. 
67 Costa Rica v Nicaragua, [119].
68 Julio Barboza, The Environment, Risk and Liability in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff,
2011), 11 (‘Barboza (2011)’).
69 Barboza (2011) 11.
70 Draft Articles art 3; ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources’ GA Res 1803 (XVII), UN 
Doc A/5217 (14 December 1962) 15-6 (‘Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty’). 
71 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, 95 (Separate Opinion, Vice President Weeramantry).
72 Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals 
(Stevens & Sons, 1953) 131-2 (‘Cheng (1953)’).
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the Aquifer was reasonable and intended to secure Rahad’s legitimate interest
in sustaining its population and attaining self-sufficiency.73
D. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, ANY WRONGFULNESS IS
PRECLUDED BY THE DEFENCE OF NECESSITY
The ‘increasingly serious water crisis in Rahad’ created a state of necessity
precluding any wrongfulness. 74 The extraction from the Aquifer was
necessary to safeguard Rahad’s essential interest in food and water security
for its population. 75 This essential interest was in ‘grave’ and ‘imminent’
peril as, at the time of decision-making, long-term water shortage had already
manifested itself and was projected to continue indefinitely. 76 In these
circumstances, for Rahad to refrain from utilising the Aquifer would have
been ‘self-destructive’.77 Queen Teresa specifically stated that there was ‘no
other way’ to safeguard Rahad’s essential interest.78
Rahad’s water and food security outweighs Atania’s interest in water for
commercial agriculture, 79 particularly considering Rahad’s comparative
economic inability to address the drought. Atania could have utilised the
Aquifer, and it continued to be economically viable for Atania to import
water.80
                                                
73 Compromis, [21]. 
74 Compromis, [22]; ILC, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, GA Res 56/83, 
UN Doc A/RES/56/83 (28 January 2002) annex, art 25 (‘ASR’).
75 ILC, Addendum to Eighth Report on State Responsibility by Mr Robert Ago, Special Rapporteur,
UN Doc A/CN.4/318/Add.5-7 (19 June 1980) 50 (‘Ago, Eighth Report’); Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros [40]-
[41], [51]-[52].
76 Compromis, [19]-[22]; Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, [40]-[41], [51]-[52]. 
77 Report of the ILC, UN Doc A/56/10 (23 April-1 June and 2 July-10 August 2001), 198 (‘ASR 
Commentary’).
78 ASR art 25(1)(a); Compromis, [22].
79 ASR art 25(1)(b); ASR Commentary, 184; Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, [58].
80 Compromis, [14]; Clarifications, [9]. 
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II. RAHAD’S SAVALI PIPELINE OPERATIONS DO NOT
VIOLATE ANY LEGAL OBLIGATIONS RELATING TO 
THE KIN CANYON COMPLEX
A. RAHAD COMPLIED WITH ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 
1972 UNESCO WORLD HERITAGE CONVENTION
Article 6.3 required Rahad to do all that it could 
to prevent damage to the Complex 
Rahad and Atania are both parties to the 1972 World Heritage Convention 
(‘WHC’) 81 and are jointly responsible for conserving the Kin Canyon 
Complex.82 Article 6.3 requires States ‘not to take any deliberate measures 
which might damage directly or indirectly the cultural and natural heritage… 
situated on the territory of other States Parties to [the] Convention.’
The Court should reject any submission by Atania that Article 6.3 imposes 
strict liability for any deliberate action which might cause damage to a world 
heritage site. The proper interpretation, in accordance with the customary 
rules of treaty interpretation,83 is that the obligation involves a fault-based 
standard. Therefore, Rahad complied with Article 6.3 as it exercised due 
diligence vis-à-vis the Complex, even if actual damage nonetheless occurred. 
The meaning of Article 6.3 must be interpreted in light of the context of the 
provision within the WHC.84 Importantly, Article 6 ‘complements’ Articles 
4 and 5.85 These Articles require a State to ‘do all it can to the utmost of its 
resources’86 and ‘in so far as possible’ to protect the world heritage within
its territory. 87 Article 6, dealing with heritage located outside a State’s 
territory, must be interpreted consistently with Articles 4 and 5 by similarly 
imposing fault-based liability. It would be unreasonable to interpret the 
Convention as imposing a higher standard of liability over world heritage 
outside a State’s territory, over which a State has no sovereign control, than 
                                                
81 Convention for the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage, opened for signature 
16 November 1972, 1037 UNTS 151 (entered into force 17 December 1975) (‘WHC’); Compromis, [59].
82 Compromis, [13].
83Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v Senegal) (Judgment) [1991] ICJ Rep 53, [48].
84 VCLT art 31.
85 Guido Carducci, ‘Articles 4-7 National and International Protection of the Culture Heritage’ in 
Francioni (ed), The 1972 World Heritage Convention: A Commentary (OUP, 2008) 118. 
86 WHC art 4.
87 WHC art 5.
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world heritage located within the State’s own territory, over which it has such 
control. An interpretation of Article 6 as entailing fault-based liability is also 
consistent with the object and purpose of the WHC,88 to ensure international 
cooperation by all States where individual States are unable to secure the 
protection of world heritage.89
Rahad’s interpretation is consistent with the approach of the World Heritage 
Committee (‘the Committee’).90 For example, in a decision regarding world 
heritage in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Committee requested 
that Sudan, ‘in accordance with Art. 6.3… does its best to prevent transborder 
poaching activities’. 91 In this way, Article 6.3 reflects the customary 
obligation for a State to ‘use all the means at its disposal’92 to avoid doing 
harm to another State’s territory.93 Recourse to the travaux préparatoires
confirms this interpretation. 94 While Article 6.3 went through various 
iterations during drafting,95 ‘the Committee of Experts did not wish this 
paragraph construed to impose strict liability for unintentional damage 
caused’.96
Rahad has complied with Article 6.3 because it 
exercised due diligence
While the Canyon has suffered some ‘environmental degradation in remote 
sections’ and been placed on the Danger List,97 this does not mean that Rahad 
has violated Article 6.3. Rather, as an obligation of conduct, ‘what counts is 
                                                
88 VCLT art 31.
89 WHC Preamble paras 6-8.
90 Eg, Decision 27 COM7B.70, adopted at the 27th Session (Paris, 2003) WHC-03/27.COM/24, 74.
91 Decision 29 COM7A.4, adopted at the 29th Session (Durban, 2005) WHC-05/29.COM/22, 11.
92 Pulp Mills, [101].
93 International Council of Environmental Law, Draft International Covenant on Environment and 
Development (4th ed, 2010, Environmental Policy and Law Paper) 91; Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 
156 CLR 1, 196.
94 VCLT art 32.
95 ‘Working Document prepared by the Working Group’ (7 April 1972) UNESCO Doc 
SHC.72/CONF.37/5; ‘Article 6 (Text Presented by the Drafting Committee)’ (4-22 April 1972) UNESCO 
Doc SHC.72/CONF.37/10 RED 2.
96 Robert Meyer, ‘Travaux Préparatoires for the UNESCO World Heritage Convention’ (1976) 2 
Earth Law Journal 45, 52. 
97 Compromis, [30]-[31].
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the violation of the best effort obligation, not the end result generally 
achieved.’98
Rahad completed a full EIA99 consistent with Rahadi domestic law, which 
considered potential harm to the Complex and was submitted to the 
Committee100 in accordance with Committee Guidelines.101 In working to 
comply with the Committee’s recommendations, Rahad ‘limited drilling for 
the extraction of water to areas more than 15 kilometers outside the 
Complex’s buffer zone.’ 102 Responding to the site’s inscription on the 
Danger List, Rahad voluntarily committed to ‘undertake regular studies’103
and engaged in discussions with the Committee regarding the Pipeline.104
Collectively, these factors indicate Rahad did all it could to prevent damage 
to the Complex. 
B. RAHAD HAS NOT VIOLATED ITS CUSTOMARY 
OBLIGATIONS
Rahad has not caused transboundary harm
Rahad is under a parallel customary obligation to that in Article 6.3 WHC.105
For the same reasons outlined in Section II.A, Rahad has not violated this 
obligation as it exercised due diligence vis-à-vis the Pipeline operations. 106
In any event, causation cannot be established between Rahad’s Pipeline 
operations and any damage to the Complex. First, Atania has not 
demonstrated the expertise and independence of the panel of geologists that 
examined the degradation to the Complex, and thus the panel’s report is of 
                                                
98 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, ‘Reviewing the difficulties of codification’ (1999) 10 European Journal of 
International Law 371, 379.
99 Compromis, [20]-[21]; Pulp Mills, [205].
100 Compromis, [24]; Clarification, 3.
101 UNESCO, ‘Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention’ 
(8 July 2015) Doc No WHC.15/01, [118] (‘2015 Operational Guidelines’). 
102 Compromis, [26]; 2015 Operational Guidelines, [103].
103 Compromis, [33]. 
104 Clarifications, 6.
105 Legality of the Threat or Use of Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, [29]; Trail 
Smelter case (United States, Canada) (1938-41) RIAA 1905, 1965 (‘Trail Smelter’).
106 Pulp Mills, [187].
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minimal probative value. 107 Second, there are multiple potential overlapping 
causes that sever the causal chain: the meteorological and climatological 
changes to the Nomad Coast and the impact of tourism (i.e. an average of 
350,000 visitors each year),108 a recognised threat to ‘site vulnerability’.109
Third, the damage lacks temporal immediacy to the commencement of the 
Pipeline, occurring four years later.110
Rahad has not violated any customary 
prohibition against intentional destruction of 
cultural heritage in peacetime
Following the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas, commentators suggest 
there is a developing customary prohibition against intentional destruction of 
cultural heritage in peacetime. 111 Rahad’s conduct is not comparable to the 
destruction of the Buddhas which was ‘motivated by invidious and 
discriminatory intent’ and undertaken ‘in blatant defiance of appeals’ from 
institutions and States.112 To the contrary, Rahad recognises its ‘obligations 
as stewards’ of the Complex and took steps to ensure the Pipeline operations 
would not cause damage to the Complex.113
Further, not all impacts on world heritage will contravene any developing 
customary rule.114 Egypt’s construction of the Aswan Dam, resulting in the 
relocation of the Abu Simbel temples and loss of cultural artefacts, was 
recognised as justified by economic considerations.115 Similarly, any impact 
                                                
107 Compromis, [30]; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Merits) [2007] ICJ Rep 43, [227].
108 Compromis, [13], [19], [30].
109 Adam Markham et al, World Heritage and Tourism in a Changing Climate (UNEP and 
UNESCO, Paris, 2016) 26.
110 Compromis, [26], [30].
111 Francesco Francioni and Frederico Lenzerini, ‘The Destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan and 
International Law’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law 619, 634-6 (‘Francioni and 
Lenzerini (2003)’); cf Roger O’Keefe ‘World Cultural Heritage: Obligations to the International 
Community as a Whole?’ (2004) 53 International Comparative Law Quarterly 189, 205.
112 Francioni and Lenzerini (2003) 635.
113 Compromis, [33].
114 Kanchana Wangkeo, ‘Monumental Challenges: The Lawfulness of Destroying Cultural 
Heritage During Peacetime’ (2003) 28 Yale Journal of International Law 183, 264 (‘Wangkeo (2003)’).
115 Wangkeo (2003) 209, 268.
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on the Complex by the Pipeline was minimal, and justified by Rahad’s 
essential needs.
C. RAHAD HAS NOT ABUSED ITS RIGHTS
Rahad has not abused its right to use its natural resources.116 The Pipeline 
operations were ‘genuinely in pursuit’ of its legitimate interest in sustaining 
its population and attaining self-sufficiency. 117 Rahad demonstrated the 
‘highest possible standards of care’118 towards the Complex throughout the 
duration of its Pipeline operations and therefore did not exercise its rights in 
a way ‘calculated to cause any unfair prejudice’119 to world heritage interests.
D. ANY WRONGFULNESS IS PRECLUDED BY THE DEFENCE OF 
NECESSITY 
As established in Section I.D., Rahad’s construction of the Pipeline to extract 
water from the Aquifer was the only way to safeguard its essential interest in 
food and water security for its population.120 These interests also outweigh
the remote and minor damage to the Complex.121 Rahad cannot be expected 
to deny its population food and water to avoid limited impacts to a world 
heritage site.
E. CESSATION IS NOT AVAILABLE
Cessation is not available as Rahad has complied with its obligations relating 
to the Complex, or alternatively, any wrongfulness is precluded by necessity.
122
                                                
116 Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty, 15-6. Compromis, [21]. 
117 Compromis, [21].  
118 Compromis, [33]. 
119 Cheng (1953) 131-2.
120 ASR art 25(1)(a).
121 Wangkeo (2003) 268.
122 ASR art 30; ASR Commentary, 216-7.
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III. RAHAD IS ENTITLED TO RETAIN POSSESSION OF THE 
RUBY SIPAR
A. ATANIA CANNOT ESTABLISH OWNERSHIP OF THE RUBY 
SIPAR
International law contains no substantive rules regarding ownership of 
moveable property, which falls to be determined by municipal law. 123
Pursuant to the ‘universal principle’ of lex situs, 124 ownership of the Sipar is 
governed by Rahad’s municipal law as the Sipar is in Rahad. Even if the 
Court was persuaded to instead apply Atanian municipal law, Atania bears 
the onus of proving its ownership under its municipal law. It has furnished 
no evidence of any municipal law relating to ownership.125 Accordingly, the 
Court is ‘free to deny the relief sought’.126
B. IRRESPECTIVE OF OWNERSHIP, THE KIN HAVE THE 
RIGHT TO USE AND CONTROL OF THE RUBY SIPAR
Rahad has a positive obligation to retain possession of the Sipar to ensure 
respect for the Kin’s cultural rights under ICESCR and ICCPR. Common 
Article 1 provides that ‘all peoples’ have a human right to self-determination.
127 The Kin constitute a ‘people’ as they fulfil the definition of an ‘indigenous 
group’128 on the basis of their long-standing relationship to their ‘ancestral’
lands as well as their distinct cultural isolation from the rest of Atanian 
society.129 The Kin, as an ‘ethnic minority’, also have a right under Article 
                                                
123 Christopher Staker, ‘Public International Law and the Lex Situs Rule in Property Conflicts and 
Foreign Expropriations’ (1988) 58 BYIL 151, 154 (‘Staker (1988)’.
124 Ernst Rabel, The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study (University of Michigan Law School, 
1958) vol 4, 66-9; Staker (1988) 163.
125 Nicaragua (Jurisdiction), [101]; Georg Schwarzenberger, International Law as Applied by 
International Courts and Tribunals (Stevens & Sons, 1957) vol 1, 73.
126 Société Commerciale de Belgique (Belgium v Greece) [1939] PCIJ (ser A/B) No 78, 184 
(Separate Opinion, Judge Hudson); D.P. O'Connell, International Law (Stevens & Sons, 1965) vol 2,
1187.
127 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 
999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) art 1 ('ICCPR'); see also International Covenant on 
Cultural, Economic and Social Rights, opened for signature 19 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered 
into force 3 January 1976) ('ICESCR') art 1; Human Rights Committee (‘HRC’) General Comment 12, 
Article 1, UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9  (13 March 1984) [2].
128 Jose Cobo, Special Rapporteur of Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities, ‘Study on the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations’, 
E/CN.4/SUB.2/1986/7ADD.4 (1986) [34], [379]-[82].
129 Compromis, [11]. 
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27 of ICCPR to enjoy their own culture.130 In addition, under Article 15 of 
ICESCR, the Kin have a right to take part in cultural life.131
The practice of parties to the Covenants is relevant to the interpretation of the 
rights contained therein. 132 The General Assembly Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples (‘UNDRIP’) reflects the practice of the parties to the 
Covenants.133 UNDRIP provides a right to ‘use and control’ of ceremonial 
objects134 and the right to ‘maintain, protect and develop’ manifestations of 
culture.135 Carla Dugo, a Clan Kin member and Sisters of the Sun elder, by 
taking the Sipar into Rahad,136 exercised her right to ‘use’ and ‘control’ of
the Sipar.137 The Sipar ‘belongs with the Kin wherever [they] are’.138 The 
majority of Clan Kin are now located in Rahad. 139 As recognised in 
Chabad, 140 cultural property can belong to a group or ‘communal … 
movement’. Therefore, to comply with the Covenants, Rahad must retain the
Sipar so that it is available to the Kin and to ‘all who wish to see it’.141
C. IRRESPECTIVE OF OWNERSHIP, RETURNING THE RUBY 
SIPAR WOULD RENDER RAHAD COMPLICIT IN ATANIA’S
INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS 
Under customary international law,142 as codified in Article 16 of the ASR,
Rahad’s complicity would arise as: first, returning the Sipar would constitute 
aid or assistance in the commission of wrongful acts; second, Rahad has 
                                                
130 ICCPR art 27.
131 ICESCR art 15.
132 VCLT art 31(3)(b).
133 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UN Doc 
A/RES/61/295 (2 October 2007) annex (‘UNDRIP’).
134 UNDRIP art 12(1).
135 UNDRIP art 11(1).
136 Compromis, [50].
137 UNDRIP art 11(1).
138 Compromis, [50].
139 Compromis, [40], [49].
140 Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S. v Russian Federation, 528 F.3d 934 (2008) (2d Cir (US)), 943.
141 Compromis, [52].
142 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Merits) [2007] ICJ Rep 43, [420].
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knowledge of the circumstances of the wrongful acts committed by Atania; 
and third, if Rahad had acted as Atania did, Rahad’s actions would have been 
wrongful. 
This Court has interpreted ‘aid or assistance’ in Article 16 of the ASR as the 
‘provision of means to enable or facilitate the commission’ of the wrong.143
The ‘aid or assistance’ must have ‘contributed significantly’ to the 
commission of the wrongful act. 144 Atania’s banning of the Sipar from 
display and placing it in storage145 amounts to a violation of Article 15 of 
ICESCR and Article 27 of ICCPR. The Sipar is an item of cultural heritage 
of significant spiritual importance to the Kin.146 Article 15(1)(a) of ICESCR 
includes an obligation to ensure physical access to and the availability of 
cultural heritage.147 Article 27 of ICCPR provides that States shall not deny 
the rights of ethnic minorities to enjoy their own culture, including ‘access to 
cultural heritage’.148 By banning the Sipar, Atania has prevented physical 
access to it and has therefore violated both articles.149 There is no indication 
that if Rahad returns the Sipar, Atania will cease its unlawful conduct.
Therefore, to return the Sipar to Atania would aid or assist further violations.
The ILC’s commentary to Article 16(a) restricts complicity to cases where a 
State ‘intended… to facilitate the occurrence of the wrongful conduct’.150
Special Rapporteur Ago has recognised that intent can be inferred from 
knowledge of ‘the specific purpose for which the State receiving certain 
supplies intends to use them’. 151 Any intent requirement is satisfied by 
Rahad’s knowledge of Atania’s ‘campaign to eradicate all vestiges of the 
                                                
143 Bosnian Genocide, [419]; Mile Jackson, State Complicity in the Internationally Wrongful Acts 
of Another State (OUP, 2015) 153. 
144 ASR Commentary, 156.
145 Compromis, [44]. 
146 Compromis, [43].
147 HRC, Report of the Independent Expert in the Field of Cultural Rights, A/HRC/17/38 (21 March 
2011) [58]-[60]; CESCR, General Comment No 21, Right of Everyone to take part in cultural life (Article 
15), UN Doc E/C.12/GC/21 (21 December 2009), [15]-[16] (‘CESCR General Comment 21’). 
148 Janet Blake, International Cultural Heritage Law (OUP, 2015) 292 (‘Blake (2015)’).
149 ICESCR art 15(1)(a).
150 ASR Commentary, 156.
151 ILC, Seventh report on State Responsibility by Mr Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc 
A/CN.4/307 and Add.1 & 2 and Corr.1 & 2 (29 March, 17 April and 4 July 1978) 58.
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Sipar’.152 Accordingly, Rahad would be complicit in Atania’s wrongful acts 
were it to return the Sipar to Atania. Further, if Rahad acted as Atania did, 
Rahad would also have violated the Covenants.153
D. EVEN IF ATANIA IS THE LAWFUL OWNER, IT ABUSED ITS
OWNERSHIP RIGHTS RENDERING RETURN OF THE RUBY 
SIPAR INAPPROPRIATE 
A State will abuse its rights where it ‘avails itself of its right in an arbitrary 
manner in such a way as to inflict upon another State’154 or the international 
community ‘an injury which cannot be justified by a legitimate consideration 
of its own advantage.’155 Ownership rights relating to cultural property must 
be ‘seen in relative not absolute terms’156 because otherwise, a State by virtue 
of its ‘sovereign rights’ would be entitled to damage or destroy cultural 
property forming part of the ‘civilisation and heritage of mankind.’157 Here, 
by banning the Sipar, Atania exercised its rights in an arbitrary manner, 
injuring the interests of Rahad and the international community in cultural 
property and the common heritage of humanity.158 Given the inextricable link 
between the Sipar and the history and culture of the peoples of the Nomad 
Coast, the Sipar is an invaluable cultural artefact that must be protected and 
enjoyed by all.159 Considering Atania’s abuse of rights, Rahad cannot be 
required to return the Sipar.
                                                
152 Compromis, [52].
153 ASR art 16(b).
154 Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law: Peace 
(Longman, 9th ed, 2008) vol 1, 407 (‘Oppenheim (2008)’).
155 Oppenheim (2008) 407.
156 Blake (2015) 317; Lyndel Prott and Patrick O’Keefe, ‘Cultural Heritage or Cultural Property’ 
(1992) 1(2) International Journal of Cultural Property 307, 309.
157 Sharon Williams, The International and National Protection of Moveable Cultural Property. A 
Comparative study (Oceana, 1978) 64.
158 John Merryman, ‘Cultural Property Internationalism’ (2005) 12 International Journal of 
Cultural Property 11, 11.
159 Cf SC Res 2199, UN Doc S/RES/2199 (12 February 2015); SC Res 2253, UN Doc S/RES/2253 
(17 December 2015).
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E. RAHAD’S RETENTION OF THE RUBY SIPAR IS NOT AN 
INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACT 
Rahad did not violate the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention
a. The 1970 Convention does not apply 
retroactively 
Rahad cannot have violated any obligations contained in the 1970 
Convention.160 This is because Rahad gained possession of the Sipar and 
formally rejected Atania’s request for repatriation,161 prior to the entry into 
force of the 1970 Convention for Rahad on 30 December 2014.162 The 1970 
Convention does not have retroactive effect.163
Jurisdiction ratione temporis under the 1970 Convention cannot be extended 
here by reference to any continuing acts.164 The import of the Sipar was a 
completed, not continuing act165 and to find otherwise would have untenable 
ramifications for the broader application of the 1970 Convention. 166 For 
example, the United Kingdom would be required to return the Parthenon 
Marbles to Greece; Germany, the Bust of Nefertiti to Egypt; and various 
States, the Benin Bronzes to Nigeria.167 The parties to the 1970 Convention
never intended such consequences to flow.168
                                                
160 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer 
of Ownership of Cultural Property, opened for signature 14 November 1970, 823 UNTS 231 (entered into 
force 24 April 1972) (‘1970 Convention’).
161 Compromis, [50]-[52].
162 1970 Convention art 21, Corrections [3]. 
163 Patrick O’Keefe, Commentary on the 1970 UNESCO Convention (Institute of Art and Law, 2nd
ed, 2007) 9.
164 Phosphates in Morocco (Italy v France) (Preliminary Objections) (1938) PCIJ, (ser A/B) No 
74, 23; Villiger (2009) 383.
165 ASR art 14.
166 Kurt Siehr, ‘Legal Aspects of the Mystification and Demystification of Cultural Property’ 
(2011) XVI(3) Art, Antiquity and the Law 173, 180-1.
167 See John Merryman (ed), Imperialism, Art and Restitution (CUP, 2006) 6-7, 98-113, 114-134.
168 UNESCO, ‘Final Report’ (27 February 1970) UNESCO Doc SHC/MD/5 Annex II, 4.
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b. Rahad has not defeated the object and 
purpose of the 1970 Convention
Article 18 of the VCLT requires a State, in the period between signature and 
entry into force of the treaty for that State, to ‘refrain from acts which would 
defeat the object and purpose of [the] treaty.’169 The VCLT came into force
after the UNESCO Convention and does not operate retroactively. 170 If 
Atania seeks to rely on the rule set out in Article 18, it is for Atania to 
establish its customary status. Publicists regard the customary status of 
Article 18 as being ‘ambiguous’ and this Court has never ruled on the 
issue.171
In any event, Rahad has not defeated the object and purpose of the 1970 
UNESCO Convention.172 The object and purpose of a treaty is only defeated 
when a State’s act ‘renders meaningless subsequent performance of the 
treaty, and its rules.’173 An illustration of this would be if a State destroyed 
artwork that it was treaty-bound to return to another State just prior to the 
treaty’s entry into force.174 By contrast, Rahad’s receipt and retention of the 
Sipar prior to entry into force of the 1970 Convention for Rahad has not 
rendered ‘meaningless’ Rahad’s subsequent performance of its treaty 
obligations under the 1970 Convention.
There is no custom requiring return of 
unlawfully obtained cultural property during 
peacetime 
It is for Atania to establish the existence of a customary rule requiring return 
of unlawfully obtained cultural property during times of peace. Rahad 
submits that no such custom exists. This Court has stressed that the practice 
of States that are parties to a treaty cannot provide evidence of opinio juris
to establish custom as it is the treaty which is the source of any sense of legal 
                                                
169 VCLT art 18.
170 VCLT art 4.
171 Laurence Boisson de Chazournes et al., ‘Article 18 Convention of 1969’ in Corten and Klein 
(eds), The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (OUP, 2011), vol 1 369, 371-2; 
ILC, ‘Second Report on the Law of Treaties: Revised articles on the draft convention’ [1951] II Yearbook 
of the International Law Commission.
172 VCLT art 18.
173 Villiger (2009) 249.
174 ILC, Report of the ILC on the work of the first part of its seventeenth session, UN Doc 
A/CN.4/181 (3 May – 9 July 1965) 92.
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obligation.175 As the preponderance of instances of return of illicitly obtained 
cultural property during peacetime has been by States bound by the 1970 
Convention,176 no opinio juris can be derived from this State practice. The 
widespread retention of cultural artefacts and antiquities by museums177 is 
further evidence of the lack of any customary rule obliging States to return 
unlawfully obtained cultural property. 
IV. ATANIA MUST COMPENSATE RAHAD FOR ALL DIRECT 
AND INDIRECT EXPENSES INCURRED AND ACCRUING
AS A RESULT OF ACCEPTING MEMBERS OF CLAN KIN 
FLEEING FROM ATANIA
As at the date of the Special Agreement, Rahad is providing refuge to 
approximately 800,000 Kin. Rahad is entitled to compensation as reparation 
for the internationally wrongful acts Atania committed by: first, abusing its 
rights to enact and enforce domestic legislation; second, violating Rahad’s 
territorial sovereignty by causing transboundary harm; and third, violating 
its human rights obligations. Although Rahad has thus far determined that 
approximately 155,000 of the 800,000 Kin are refugees, 178 Rahad’s 
entitlement to compensation in relation to each of these internationally 
wrongful acts is not legally dependent on a determination of refugee status 
for all.179
A. ATANIA HAS ABUSED ITS RIGHTS
In 1939, Sir Robert Jennings observed that ‘if a doctrinal ground be required 
for regarding as illegal the conduct of a State of origin of destitute refugees, 
                                                
175 North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark/Federal Republic of 
Germany v Netherlands) [1969] ICJ Rep 4, [77]; Richard Baxter, Treaties and Custom (1970) 129 Recueil 
des Cours 25, 64.
176 See, eg, Agreement between the Republic of Paraguay and the Republic of Bolivia on the 
recovery of stolen cultural property and other property, stolen or illegally imported or exported,
Paraguay—Bolivia, signed 16 April 2004, 2429 UNTS 143  (entered into force 21 November 2005);
Agreement between the Swiss Federal Council and the Government of the Republic of Colombia on the 
import and repatriation of cultural property, Switzerland—Colombia, signed 01 February 2010, 2801 
UNTS (entered into force 4 August 2011).
177 Jeanette Greenfield, The Return of Cultural Treasures (CUP, 3rd ed, 2007) 63.
178 Compromis, [48]-[49]. 
179 Chaloka Beyani, 'Responsibility for the Prevention and Resolution of Forced Population 
Displacements in International Law' (1995) 7 International Journal of Refugee Law 130, 142-143 
(‘Beyani (1995)’).
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it will be found in the generally accepted doctrine of abuse of rights.’180 As 
set out in Section I.C, a State abuses its rights where it ‘avails itself of its
right in an arbitrary manner in such a way as to inflict upon another State an 
injury which cannot be justified by a legitimate consideration of its own 
advantage.’181 A State must exercise its legislative discretion reasonably and
‘with due regard to the interest of others.’182
Atania’s enactment and enforcement of the Water Resource Allocation 
Program Act (‘WRAP Act’) required farmers to purchase licences, but 
exempted profit-generating farms. 183 This was arbitrary as it indirectly 
discriminated184 against the Kin. The Kin constituted 98% of subsistence 
farmers. Those that were subsistence farmers were, by definition, not entitled 
to the exemption 185 and were also less likely to be able to afford the 
licences.186 Atania’s disconnection of the Kin’s water supply compounded 
the arbitrariness of Atania’s conduct.187
The disproportionate measures taken to suppress the peaceful WRAP Act
protests were also an arbitrary exercise of enforcement rights. 188 The 
cumulative effect of Atania’s conduct was to render the Kin’s continued 
presence in Atania untenable, offering no alternative for 800,000 Kin (given 
desert to the North and an ocean to the South) but to seek refuge in Rahad.189
                                                
180 Robert Yewdall Jennings, ‘Some International Law Aspects of the Refugee Question’ (1939) 
20 BYIL 98, 112.
181 Oppenheim (2008) 407.
182 Cheng (1953) 133-4.
183 Compromis, [35].
184 Sarah Joseph, Jenny Schultz and Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (OUP, 2013) 777 (‘ICCPR Commentary’).
185 Compromis, [11], [35].
186 Compromis, [36]-[37].
187 Compromis, [38].
188 Compromis, [45]-[46]; Clarifications, [7].
189 Compromis, [1], [49].
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B. ATANIA HAS VIOLATED RAHAD’S TERRITORIAL 
SOVEREIGNTY 
In Trail Smelter it was recognised that ‘no State has the right to use … its 
territory in such a manner as to cause injury … to the territory of another’.190
Eminent publicists recognise the applicability of this doctrine to 
transboundary mass-movements of people contrary to the territorial 
sovereignty of receiving States. 191 Although equating the movement of
humans to cross-border pollution may seem unpalatable on a superficial 
level, there is no principled reason for the ‘no-harm’ rule not to apply and, 
importantly, its application ensures that expelling-States are held accountable 
for refugee-generating policies.192
Atania’s use of its territory in a manner that led to the influx of 800,000 Kin 
into Rahad constitutes a violation of Rahad’s territorial sovereignty. It was 
foreseeable that depriving the Kin of food and water (in conjunction with 
repressive measures), would cause them to seek food and water elsewhere, 
and that it would be ‘immensely burdensome’ to receiving States where they 
did.193 Notwithstanding this risk of significant harm, Atania failed to exercise 
due diligence in relation to the food and water needs of the Kin, even after 
pleas from the FAO.194
Atania’s conduct in causing mass human movement resulted in significant 
harm to Rahad. The FAO and the Red Cross confirmed that Atania’s 
termination of water resulted in undernourishment and mass starvation.195
International correspondents confirmed that starvation and fear of arrest were 
the primary reasons for the border crossing.196 Rahad’s damage is significant;
                                                
190 Trail Smelter, 1965.
191 Guy Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (OUP, 3rd ed, 2007)
3 (‘Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (2007)’); Beyani (1995) 132; Luke T Lee, ‘The Right to Compensation: 
Refugees and Countries of Asylum’ (1986) 80 American Journal of International Law 532, 553-4 (‘Lee 
(1986)’).
192 Jack Garvey, 'Toward a Reformulation of International Refugee Law' (1985) 26(2)  Harvard 
International Law Journal 483, 495.
193 Mass Exoduses, GA Res 35/196, UN Doc A/RES/35/196 (15 December 1980).
194 Compromis, [39]; International Co-operation to Avert New Flows of Refugees: Note by the 
Secretary-General, UN Doc A/41/324, (13 May 1986) [66](c)(d); Theo van Boven, Study Concerning the 
Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, UN Doc EICN/41-Sub.2/1990/10, 298. 
195 Compromis, [39]-[40]. 
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the influx of a number of Kin equal to approximately one quarter of Rahad’s 
original population197 has stretched Rahad’s national infrastructure ‘beyond 
the breaking point.’ 198 This damage has been quantified at 
US$945,000,000.199
This court should not countenance any submission by Atania that Rahad’s 
acceptance of the migrants constituted consent to the harm. Rahad should not 
be disadvantaged by its fulfilment of its non-refoulement obligations. 200
Atania, as creator of its refugee-generating policies, ‘must be deemed to be 
estopped from claiming that to receive its citizens was an independent 
decision’.201
C. ATANIA HAS VIOLATED ITS HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS
Rahad can invoke Atania’s responsibility for its 
human rights violations and its claims are 
admissible 
A State that is ‘injured’ is entitled to invoke the responsibility of another 
State and seek compensation202 for its own losses where, inter alia, the 
obligation breached is owed to ‘a group of States including that State’ and 
the breach ‘specially affects that State’.203 By being required to accommodate 
800,000 Kin, Rahad has been ‘specially affected’ by Atania’s human rights 
violations in a way that ‘distinguishes it from the generality of other States 
to which the obligation is owed’.204 Human rights treaties create obligations
not only for the benefit of natural persons205 but also ‘create rights and 
                                                
197 Compromis, [3], [49].
198 Compromis, [53]; Hannah Garry, ‘The Right to Compensation and Refugee Flows: A 
‘Preventative Mechanism’ in International Law?’ (1998) 10(1/2) International Journal of Refugee Law
97 (‘Garry (1998)’).
199 Compromis, [57].
200 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (2007) 201-84.
201 Christian Tomuschat, ‘State Responsibility and the Country of Origin’ in Gowlland-Debbas 
(ed), The Problem of Refugees in the Light of Contemporary International Law Issues (Martinus Nijhoff, 
1994) vol 12, 78, 74; Beyani (1995) 136, 137. 
202 ASR Commentary, 295; ASR art 36.
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204 ASR art 42(b)(i); ASR Commentary, 119.
205 HRC, General Comment No 31: The nature of the general legal obligation imported on States 
Parties (CPPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13) (26 May 2004) [9].
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obligations between their parties’. 206 Additionally, Rahad is entitled to 
invoke Atania’s responsibility for its human rights violations in the ‘interest 
of’ the Kin, the beneficiaries of Atania’s human rights obligations.207
Rahad’s claim for direct injury is not constrained by any requirement to 
exhaust local remedies.208 In relation to Rahad’s indirect claim in the ‘interest 
of’ the Kin, the local remedies rule209 is not applicable because remedies are 
not ‘effective’ in cases of large-scale human rights violations.210 In any event, 
it would be for Atania to prove that available and effective local remedies 
existed.211
Atania violated the ICESCR and ICCPR
a. Article 11 of ICESCR 
Atania has an obligation to provide its nationals with an adequate standard of 
living, including, inter alia, a right to adequate food, which extends to 
water.212 The CESCR has stressed the importance of ensuring access to water 
insofar as is required to realise the right to adequate food,213 ‘even where’ a 
State faces ‘severe resource constraints’.214 Arbitrary disconnections of water 
are prohibited.215
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As established in Section IV.A, the licence scheme mandated by the WRAP 
Act was indirectly discriminatory and deprived the Kin of the enjoyment of 
their rights to adequate water and food. 216 Therefore, the ‘arbitrary 
disconnection’ of the water supply in October 2013, as a penalty for 
noncompliance with the licence scheme, necessarily constituted a
‘retrogressive measure’ and a violation of Article 11.217
Additionally, the disconnection of water led the Kin to suffer severe 
deprivation and malnutrition. Even when the Director General of the FAO
implored Atania to stop denying the Kin access to water, 218 Atania failed to 
take ‘immediate and urgent steps’ to ensure ‘the fundamental right to 
freedom from hunger and malnutrition’.219
b. Article 1(2) of ICESCR and ICCPR
As the Kin are ‘a people’ to which the right to self-determination extends,220
Atania has an ‘unqualified’ obligation not to deprive the Kin of its means of 
subsistence.221 As the Kin are entirely dependent on subsistence farming, 
Atania must ensure adequate access to water to secure their livelihood. The 
WRAP Act and consequent termination of water supply rendered it 
impossible for the Kin to continue subsistence farming,222 in violation of
Common Article 1. 
c. Article 27 of ICCPR and Article 15 of 
ICESCR
As established in Section III.C, Atania has an obligation not to interfere with 
the right of the Kin to enjoy their own culture,223 which includes ‘traditional 
farming’.224 The Red Cross and the FAO concluded that the termination of 
                                                
216 CESCR General Comment 15 [13]-[16]; ICCPR Commentary, 777 [23.40]; ICESCR 
Commentary, 901.
217 CESCR General Comment 15 [15], [19].
218 Compromis, [39].
219 ICESCR art 11(2). This conduct is also a discrete violation of the right to health in ICESCR art 
12. 
220 As established in Section III.B.
221 ICESCR Commentary, 121. 
222 Compromis, [38], [39], [40]. 
223 ICCPR art 27; ICCPR Commentary, 25. 
224 Compromis, [40]; HRC, Views: Ángela Poma Poma v Peru Communication No. 1457/2006, UN 
Doc CCPR/C/95/D/1457/2006 (9 April 2009) [7.3] (‘Poma Poma v Peru’).
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the Kin’s water supply deprived them of ‘their primary source of sustenance’ 
(i.e. traditional farming).225 At no point did Atania consult with the Kin or 
seek their ‘informed consent’ 226 about the WRAP Act’s effects on 
subsistence farming. The restriction to the Kin’s ability to take part in their 
culture also violates Article 15 of ICESCR.227
d. Article 19 of ICCPR
Atania has an obligation to uphold the Kin’s ‘right to freedom of 
expression’,228 which extends to political and human rights discourse and 
commentary on public affairs.229 The Sipar is an expression of identity for 
the Sisters of the Sun,230 and a medium to protest against the ‘persecution of 
the Kin’.231 Atania has violated the right to freedom of expression of the Kin 
by ordering the confiscation and destruction of all Sipar pendants.232
e. Article 21 of ICCPR
Atania has an obligation to respect the right to peaceful assembly.233 The 
protests and human-chains were nonviolent234 and therefore an exercise of
the right to peaceful assembly. Atania’s use of tear gas and rubber bullets to 
supress the peaceful protests infringed upon this right.235
f. Article 9 of ICCPR
Atania must ensure that ‘anyone arrested or detained on a criminal 
charge...shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release’.236
The Kin protesters charged with inciting a riot have remained in pretrial 
                                                
225 Compromis, [40].
226 Poma Poma v Peru [7.7]; HRC General Comment No 34: Freedom of Opinion and Expression,
UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34 (12 September 2011) [18] (‘HRC General Comment 34’). 
227 CESCR General Comment 21 [6], [48].
228 ICCPR art 19(2).
229 HRC General Comment 34 [11].
230 Compromis, [9], [41].
231 Compromis, [41].
232 Compromis, [43].
233 ICCPR art 21.
234 Compromis, [41]-[42].
235 Compromis, [45].
236 ICCPR art 9(3).
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detention for over two years. 237 Such pretrial detention is excessive, 
‘arbitrary’ and inconsistent with an expeditious trial.238
Atania cannot rely on Covenant limitation or 
derogation provisions or a plea of necessity
Both Covenants include specific provisions allowing States to limit the 
enjoyment of rights239 or to derogate from obligations.240 Atania cannot rely 
on these provisions as their requirements have not been satisfied. These
provisions operate to exclude the general defence of necessity as they are lex 
specialis.241
D. THE ‘CLEAN HANDS’ DOCTRINE DOES NOT BAR RAHAD 
FROM BRINGING THIS CLAIM
Even if the Court finds against Rahad in Pleadings I or II, Atania cannot 
invoke the ‘clean hands’ doctrine to avoid responsibility for its own actions. 
The doctrine only applies where the ‘two parties have assumed an identical 
or a reciprocal obligation’.242 The violations asserted by Atania in Pleadings 
I or II in relation to the Pipeline are not identical or reciprocal to any 
obligations that Atania has violated in relation to the flight of the Kin. 
E. ATANIA MUST COMPENSATE RAHAD BY WAY OF 
REPARATION 
In relation to its wrongful acts, Atania must make full reparation to, ‘as far 
as possible, wipe out all consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the 
situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been 
committed’.243 The wrongful conduct must be the ‘proximate cause’ of any
damage.244 Rahad is entitled to compensation to restore the US$945,000,000 
                                                
237 Clarifications, 7; Compromis, [46]; HRC, Teesdale v Trinidad and Tobago, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/74/D/677/1996 (1 April 2002) [9.3].
238 HRC, General Comment No 32: Article 14 Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to 
fair trial, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/32 (23 August 2007) [35].
239 ICESCR art 4.
240 ICCPR art 4. 
241 Ago, Eighth Report, [66]-[69]; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion [2004] ICJ Rep 136, [136]-[142].
242 Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Netherlands v Belgium) [1937] PCIJ (ser A/B) No 17, 77 
(Separate Opinion, Judge Hudson), 49.
243 Chorzów Factory (Merits)[1928] PCIJ (ser A) no 17, 47; ASR arts 1, 31.
244 Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (OUP, 3rd ed, 2015) 355 (‘Shelton 
(2015)’); ASR art 31; ASR Commentary, 207.
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loss suffered as a result of providing refuge to the Kin.245 Rahad would not 
be the first State to receive compensation in relation to refugee outflows.246
Rahad is entitled to compensation for its own 
losses 
Rahad is entitled to compensation for all direct and indirect costs incurred 
and accruing as a result of accepting the Kin, as Atania’s internationally 
wrongful acts were the ‘proximate cause’247 of that harm. The causal link 
between Atania’s conduct and the Kin’s flight is evidenced by: first,
statements by the FAO and the Red Cross that Atania’s actions resulted in
mass starvation and undernourishment; 248 and second, reports by 
international correspondents confirming that ‘starvation’ and ‘fear of arrest’ 
were the primary reasons for the Kin fleeing.249 The cumulative effects of 
Atania’s wrongful acts were of such gravity250 as to cause 800,000 Kin to
flee Atania.251 The infliction of significant costs on Rahad was the natural 
consequence of Atania’s wrongful acts.252
Rahad is also entitled to compensation in the 
interest of the Kin 
Rahad is entitled to seek compensation on behalf of each Kin in order to 
restore them to the position they would have been in had they not been 
                                                
245 ASR art 36.
246 Agreement between the State of Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany, signed 10 
September 1952, 162 UNTS 2137 (entered into force on 27 March 1953); SC Res 687, UN Doc 
S/RES/687 (3 April 1991) [16].
247 Shelton (2015) 355.
248 Compromis, [39]-[40]. 
249 Compromis, [47]. 
250 Shelton (2015) 14.
251 Compromis, [49]; ILA, Cairo Declaration of Principles of International Law on Compensation 
to Refugees (65th Conference, Cairo, 1992) Principle 4. 
252 Report and Recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners concerning the Egyptian 
Workers’ Claims (Jurisdiction) (1995) 117 ILR 195, 248-9; Rainer Hoffman, ‘Refugee-generating 
policies and the law of state responsibility’ (1985) 45(4) Heidelberg Journal of International Law 694,
709.
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victims of Atania’s human rights violations.253 Compensation is payable to 
Rahad and can be allocated by it for the benefit of the Kin. 254
                                                
253 ASR art 48(2)(b).
254 See by analogy Diplomatic Protection Articles, art 19; Cyprus v Turkey (ECtHR, Grand 
Chamber, Application No 25781/94, 12 May 2014) [46]-[47]. 
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF
The Kingdom of Rahad respectfully requests that this Court DECLARE that:
1. The extraction of water from the Aquifer does not violate 
international obligations undertaken by Rahad and constitutes an 
inequitable use of a shared resource;
2. The Savali Pipeline operations do not violate Rahad’s international 
obligations with respect to the Kin Canyon Complex;
3. Rahad is entitled to retain possession of the Ruby Sipar; 
4. Atania must compensate Rahad for all direct and indirect expenses 
incurred and accruing as a result of accepting members of Clan Kin 
fleeing from Atania.
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